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Abstract
 
 
 
The goal of this thesis is to analyse the impact of Arctic ecology on the development of 
international systems in the circumpolar world.  It is a goal pursued in two steps: (i) by 
developing an analytical approach capable of tracing the mutual constitution of 
international and ecological systems in world history; and (ii) by using the resulting 
toolkit to establish a baseline understanding of the international systems of the polar 
basin.  Part One adapts the analytical approach pioneered by Barry Buzan and Richard 
Little to study international systems in world history, adding a contextual axis to their 
analytical matrix in order to escape the anthropocentric cul-de-sac that has heretofore 
limited IR’s ability to consider ecology’s role in the constitution of international units, 
processes, and structures.  The resulting approach – defined in terms of Socio-
Ecological Coevolution – describes this relationship in terms of three sources of 
explanation: coevolutionary process, ecological capacity and biogeographical 
structure.  Part Two uses the toolkit to analyse the past four hundred years of Arctic 
history, charting the impact of ecological systems on the principles of membership and 
behaviour that define international systems in circumpolar world.  Through discussions 
of socio-ecological coevolution, ecological capacity and biogeographical structure, the 
project identifies the Arctic as a region defined by competing sets of Westphalian and 
imperial principles.  The balance between the Arctic’s anarchic states system and its 
hierarchic imperial systems has its fulcrum on a socio-ecological ecotone – a 
transitional gradient that divides its neo-European and non-European biomes and 
marks a shift from Westphalian to imperial social principles.  Though designed to 
answer specific questions about the constitution of international systems in the 
circumpolar North, Coevolution proves itself to be a promising tool for ecological 
analysis in IR with potential applicability to regions outside of the Arctic Basin. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Research Question, Anthropocentrism, Plan of Investigation 
 
 
The goal of this thesis is to analyse the impact of arctic ecology on the development of 
international systems in the circumpolar world.  It is a goal pursued in two steps: (i) by 
developing an analytical approach capable of tracing the mutual constitution of 
international and ecological systems in world history; and (ii) by using the resulting 
toolkit to establish a baseline understanding of contemporary international systems in 
the polar basin.  This will deepen our understanding of circumpolar IR and provide a 
starting point from which further research into the effects of Global Environmental 
Change (GEC) on international systems can be pursued, both in the Arctic and 
beyond.1  The first step will enlist and adapt the analytical matrix developed by Barry 
Buzan and Richard Little to disaggregate and analyse the evolution of international 
systems in world history.2  The second will use this adapted matrix to uncover the 
coevolutionary relationships that bind arctic ecology to the constitution of the region’s 
international units, processes, and structures.  To balance against International 
Relations’ (IR’s) instinctively anthropocentric ontology, I will spend much of what 
follows looking at ecology’s influence on the development of international systems.  
This should not be interpreted as a return to monocausal environmental determinism.  
The development of international and ecological systems is not driven by either 
ecological or social factors alone, but by Socio-Ecological Coevolution – an ongoing 
historical process that describes their mutual constitution.   
 
Like many terms in IR, Coevolution is borrowed from another part of the academy.  In 
Ecology, where it was popularized by Paul Ehrlich and Peter Raven in the mid-1960s, 
it describes cases in which two or more biological populations affect each other’s 
development through a process of mutual constitution based on repeated interaction.3  
                                                
1 This goal derives from research priorities developed in O.A. Anisimov, D.G. Vaughan et. al., ‘2007: Polar regions 
(Arctic and Antarctic)’, in M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani et al., Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 677. 
2 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: remaking the study of international 
relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): Ch. 4. 
3 John Thompson, ‘Coevolution’, in Encyclopedia of Life Sciences (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2001). [online] 
February 23, 2012. <http://www.els.net> [doi: 10.1038/npg.els.0001761]; Paul Ehrlich & Peter Raven, ‘Butterflies 
and Plants: a study in coevolution’, Evolution 18(4) 1964, passim. 
  P a g e  | 11 
 
In this project, it is used in a manner similar to that of Richard Norgaard to describe 
the means by which human and ecological systems affect one another’s development.  
Coevolutionary explanations of history are characterised by narratives in which 
‘environmental subsystems are treated symmetrically with [human] subsystems of 
values, knowledge, social organization, and technology’.4  This implies a dynamic 
relationship between human systems and the ecological contexts in which they are 
embedded.  Coevolution therefore links international units and systems to ecological 
contexts described by the five main subsystems of the planetary ecosphere: the 
atmosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, and biosphere.5  In IR terms, 
Coevolution’s principal insight is that the present condition of any international or 
ecological system is contingent on evolutionary influences emanating from the ‘other 
side’ of the socio-ecological equation.  Humanity’s long history of ecological 
manipulation – discussed in Chapter Two – and the fact of the planet’s ecological 
interconnectedness – discussed in Chapter Three – ensure that neither humans nor 
nature can claim absolute priority in the chain of causation that links us to the 
biological, chemical, and physical systems of which we are a part.  As one animal 
population – albeit sometimes a very clever one – among the many that inhabit the 
natural world, our behaviour is bound up with the ecologies with and within which we 
interact.6  As we adapt to our physical environment, our adaptations resonate back into 
the ecological systems around us, altering their composition and spurring further social 
and ecological evolution.  This interconnectedness must be at the heart any attempt to 
integrate Ecology into IR’s understanding of the world.7 
Research Question: why Ecology? why the 
Arctic? 
 
After nearly a century as a recognized social science, IR can lay claim to many 
achievements.  It has developed analytical tools to study the behaviour of international 
                                                
4 Richard Norgaard, Development Betrayed: the end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of the future 
(London: Routledge, 1994):36. 
5 These refer, in turn, to ‘the gaseous envelope surrounding the Earth’, ‘the upper layer of the solid Earth’, ‘liquid 
surface and subterranean water’, ‘all snow, ice and frozen ground (including permafrost) on and beneath the surface 
of the Earth and ocean’, and ‘all ecosystems and living organisms, in the atmosphere, on land (terrestrial biosphere) 
or in the oceans (marine biosphere)’.  See Susan Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning et al. (Eds.), Climate Change 2007: 
The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 941-942, 944, 947-
948., 
6 Jianguo Liu et al., ‘Complexity of Coupled Human and Natural Systems’, Science 317(1513) 2007, p. 1513. 
7 Dennis Pirages, "Ecological Theory and International Relations", Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5(1) 
1997, p. 53. 
  P a g e  | 12 
 
actors that include sovereign states, private firms, and international civil society 
organizations.  It has constructed a number of compelling approaches to understand 
international systems in world history.  It has successfully raided other social sciences 
for concepts useful to its study of the international, the spatial construct at the heart of 
IR that is defined by its position outside the domestic jurisdictions of any one 
collective actor.   
 
IR has used these tools to address several issues associated with the environment. 
Much work has been done on the role of international institutions and regimes in 
mitigating and adapting to Global Environmental Change (GEC), particularly in the 
field of Global Environmental Politics (GEP).  Though its interests are wide-ranging, 
the dominant strand of GEP focuses on institutional arrangements to manage the 
immediate effects of anthropogenic environmental degradation.8  It has generally 
‘viewed global governance as a function provided primarily by the states-system, 
through processes of international negotiations and regime building.’9  This 
Institutionalist tradition has less to say about the effects of historical and impending 
ecological transformations on the constitution of the units, processes, and structures 
that make up the international system.10  By focusing on problems of collective action, 
Institutionalist GEP often fails to question the ontological bases of its guiding 
assumptions.  As Marc Williams explains of IR’s and International Political 
Economy’s (IPE’s) approaches to GEC, ‘the issue… has served to reproduce 
orthodoxy in the discipline’ without asking sufficient questions about where those 
orthodoxies come from.11  IR and IPE alike often ignore fundamental questions about 
                                                
8 This tradition has a number of key literary sources, including Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury (Eds.) The 
International Politics Of The Environment : actors, interests, and institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992); Oran Young, Arctic Politics: conflict and cooperation in the circumpolar north (Hanover: University Press 
of New England, 1992); Peter Haas, R. Keohane & M. Levy (Eds.) Institutions for the Earth: sources of effective 
international environmental protection (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1993); Oran Young, International 
Governance: protecting the environment in a stateless society  (London: Cornell University Press, 1994); John 
Vogler & Mark Imber (Eds.) The Environment and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1996); Oran 
Young, Creating Regimes: arctic accords and international governance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); 
John Vogler, The Global Commons: environmental and technological governance (Chichester: John Wiley, 2000); 
Peter Dauvergne (Ed.), Creating Regimes: arctic accords (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2005); John Vogler, 
‘Environmental Issues’, in The Globalization of World Politics: and introduction to international relations, John 
Baylis, Steve Smith & Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) sixth edition. 
9 Robert Falkner, ‘Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links’, Global 
Environmental Politics 3(2) 2003, pp. 75.   
10 Clapp, Jennifer & P. Dauvergne. Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005): 227-230; R.K. Pachauri. & A. Reisinger (Eds.), Climate Change Synthesis 
Report 2007: Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 45. 
11 Marc Williams, ‘International Political Economy and Global Environmental Change’, in Vogler & Imber (1996): 
42. 
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the constitutive relationship between international systems and the ecological contexts 
in which they are embedded.12   
 
Matthew Paterson, who works in the Green tradition of GEP, argues that adequate 
explanations of GEC in IR require that we examine the ontological assumptions behind 
our analyses, which tend to obscure and marginalise the physical environment.13  The 
Green tradition tends to focus on the systemic roots of the current ecological crisis 
rather than the management of issues arising from it.14  A number of its adherents have 
considered the issue of ontology.  Robyn Eckersley, for one, directly attacks the 
anthropocentric worldview that dominates mainstream IR.  In its place, she constructs 
an alternative ecocentric approach in which ‘the interests of nonhuman species and 
ecological communities . . . are not ignored... simply because they are not human, or 
because they are not of instrumental value to humans.’15  Although this project is 
largely analytic in its goals, ecocentrism has clearly influenced the coevolutionary 
approach adopted in Part One. This influence is tempered, however, by the fact that 
even Green GEP is largely interested in the impact of human action on ecological 
systems, particularly in terms of ecological footprints and the culture of 
consumption.16  The question of how ecological systems have contributed to the 
historical constitution of the planet’s international units and systems remains under-
theorized and underexplored. 
 
Over the past forty years, a growing chorus of warnings from the scientific community 
about the potential impact of anthropogenic climate change has forced Ecology into 
IR’s field of view.  There is nothing historically novel about anthropogenic ecological 
transformations radically altering an international system.  History is pockmarked with 
epidemics resulting from changing distributions of pathogen populations – from the 
Bubonic Plague and Smallpox to Rinderpest – that follow on the heels of social 
interaction between regional international systems.  The Eurasian spread of the 
Bubonic Plague, for example, was enabled by the construction of an orderly trade 
                                                
12 Ibid: 42-43, 48. 
13 Matthew Paterson, ‘IR Theory: neorealism, neoinstitutionalism, and the Climate Change Convention’, in Vogler 
& Imber (1996): 69-70. 
14 Matthew Paterson, ‘Green Theory’, in S. Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations 2nd Ed. (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001): 79-80, 91. 
15 Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: toward an ecocentric approach (London: UCL Press, 
1992): 22-25, 57. [Italics in original] See also Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and 
Sovereignty (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2004). 
16 Clapp & Dauvergne (2005): 230-238. 
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corridor across the continent by the Pax Mongolica of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries.17  Structural examples of human-induced ecological change also abound, 
from hominids’ early use of fire as a terraforming technology to extend the ranges 
within which our hunting and gathering lifestyles could flourish, to our genetic 
manipulation of plant and animal species following their domestication by early 
agriculturalists.18  The ecological effects of these anthropogenic transformations have 
resonated back to affect the development of the planet’s human populations, impacting 
the evolution of international units and systems around the world. 
 
This coevolutionary relationship has not gone unnoticed by the academy.  The past 
twenty years have seen a jump in the number of scholarly histories dealing with topics 
from the ecological footprint of pre-Columbian Amerindian civilizations to the role of 
Holocene climatic conditions in the development of agricultural civilization.19  In 
Development Studies and Economics, Coevolution has been interpreted as ‘an 
evolutionary process based on reciprocal responses’ between a human system and the 
ecosystem in which it is embedded.20  IR, however, has remained stubbornly tied to the 
human side of the socio-ecological equation.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, 
its dominant theories routinely refer to ecological systems as static sets of natural 
resources whose value to international actors and systems is purely instrumental.21  
This ontological choice is the single biggest obstacle in the way of understanding the 
role of ecological systems in our discipline.  One goal of what follows must therefore 
be to provide an alternative approach to international analyses of world history; one 
that maintains the strength of existing IR narratives while folding them into a wider 
understanding of mankind’s coevolutionary relationship with the natural world in 
which we live.  This project’s approach is evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
                                                
17 Ronald Findlay & Kevin O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: trade, war, and the world economy in the second 
millennium (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007): 111. 
18 I.G. Simmons, Global Environmental History: 10,000BC to AD2000 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2008): 30, 54 
19 I.G. Simmons, Changing the face of the earth: culture, environment, history (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996) 
second edition; Neil Roberts, The Holocene: An Environmental History (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1998) 
second edition; Peter Richerson et al., ‘Was Agriculture Impossible During the Pleistocene but Mandatory During 
the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis’, American Antiquity 66(3) 2001; Brian Fagan, The Long Summer: 
how climate changed civilisation (New York: Basic Books, 2004); Charles Mann, 1491: New Revelations of the 
Americas Before Columbus (London: Knopf, 2005). 
20 Richard Norgaard, ‘Coevolutionary Agricultural Development’, Economic Development & Cultural Change 
32(3) 1984, p. 528; Norgaard (1994): 196-197;  Nick Winder et al., ‘The Origin, Diagnostic Attributes, and 
Practical Application of Co-evolutionary Theory’, Ecological Economics 54(4) 2005, p. 353. 
21 Eivind Hovden, ‘As If Nature Doesn’t Matter: ecology, regime theory and international relations’, Environmental 
Politics 8(2) 1999, pp. 52-53, 60-61; Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990): 
175-192; Susan Board, Ecological Relations: towards an environmental politics of the Earth (London: Routledge, 
2002): 23-24. 
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insofar as it builds on the strengths of existing IR analysis while recognizing the need 
to change the way that we think about our relationship to the planetary ecosphere at the 
international scale.    
 
Though perceived by many in IR as a marginal region, the circumpolar Arctic should 
be at the heart of our efforts to understand GEC’s effects on the evolution of 
international systems.  It is here, at one of the Earth’s ecological extremes, that GEC’s 
effects have been most dramatic, making its impact on units, processes, and structures 
both more apparent and more pressing than in other, more temperate regions of the 
globe.  While average global temperatures have increased by around 0.6°C since the 
start of the Industrial Revolution, the Arctic Basin has seen thermometers climb much 
more rapidly, with autumn increases of up to 5°C above the 1979-2000 average.22  The 
resulting changes affect both the international units and systems that inhabit the region 
and several of the negative feedback loops that normally stabilize the planet’s 
atmospheric, terrestrial, hydrological, and biological systems.  Though the climate 
models developed for the polar basin contain varying degrees of uncertainty, many of 
their predictions – particularly in terms of sea ice extent – are strongly supported by 
empirical observation.23  Such predictions present immediate opportunities for analysis 
in terms of their effects on the international systems of the region.  Beyond their local 
impact, changes in the Arctic may also indicate the direction of future systemic 
transformations beyond its southern frontiers, particularly in similarly structured 
ecological regions such as the Saharan-Sahelian belt of Africa, Amazonia, the Tibetan 
Plateau and Taklimakan Desert, and Arabia.24    
 
It is important to note that the selection of the Arctic as the primary case study with 
which to test this project’s coevolutionary toolkit carries with it certain risks. A 
successful analysis of Coevolution in an extreme ecological region such as the 
circumpolar basin does not ensure that the approach will be generalizable across the 
global international system.  Given the heterogeneous constitution of the ecosphere – a 
                                                
22 Martin Sommerkorn, Susan Hassol et al., Arctic Climate Feedbacks: global implications (Oslo: WWF 
International Arctic Programme, 2009) second edition: 23. [online] accessed 23 March 2010 
<assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_arctic_feedbacks_report.pdf.> 
23 John Walsh et al., ‘Cryosphere and Hydrology’, in Carolyn Symon et al., Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 189-196. 
24 Henry Huntington et al., ‘An Introduction to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment’, in Carolyn Symon et al., 
Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 
2, 10-12.  
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topic that we will tackle in greater detail in Chapter Three – this is an ever-present 
danger in ecological analysis.  Though linked by planetary systems and cycles, Earth’s 
ecological structure varies greatly over time and space, making generalization on a 
planetary scale very difficult even where analytical tools and empirical evidence 
abound.25  This has been made abundantly clear by the four Assessment Reports tabled 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), each of which notes the 
regional character of GEC’s impacts on ecological and human systems alike.26  
Although this specificity may limit the geographical reach of the approach proposed by 
this project, it is a natural consequence of the fragmented ecological systems with 
which this project attempts to grapple.  Despite these limitations, Chapter Seven argues 
that our findings do have their applications elsewhere, including Saharan-Sahelian 
Africa.  Although neither region is at the core of the global international system, they 
still deserve study and may indicate avenues of analysis that point more directly 
towards the temperate biomes at the heart of contemporary IR.  Moreover, GEC’s 
impact on several core areas of the international system may result in their transition to 
more extreme conditions, increasing Coevolution’s utility in tracing the course of their 
development.  At a minimum, given Ecology’s marginal position in our discipline, any 
widespread recognition that ecological structures are constitutive of the principles of 
membership and behaviour that bound and define international systems would be an 
accomplishment. 
 
Developing tools with which to assess the impact of ecological conditions on the 
development of Arctic international systems is important for at least three reasons.  
First, it will allow us to develop historical baselines from which future research can 
proceed into the effects of GEC on the international systems of the circumpolar world.  
Second, it will illustrate general trends in Socio-Ecological Coevolution that may have 
resonances in parts of the globe which share the Arctic’s ecological structure.  Third, 
and more speculatively, a study of Coevolution in the Arctic may prove useful even 
farther afield as the Earth’s temperate biomes, including those in which its dominant 
international units and systems are embedded, find themselves altered by the uncertain 
                                                
25 Karl Butzer, Archaeology as Human Ecology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 8-9. 
26 The IPCC, a panel composed of scientists and diplomats coordinated by the World Meteorological Association 
and United Nations member states, is charged with studying the state of the global climate system, assessing the 
impact of climate change on natural and human systems, and considering strategies for mitigation and adaptation. 
[IPCC, Understanding Climate Change: 22 years of IPCC assessment, November 2010 [online] accessed 25 June 
2011 <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press/ipcc_ leaflets_2010/ipcc-brochure_understanding.pdf>: 4-7] J.H. Christensen 
et al., ‘Regional Climate Projections’, in Solomon et al. (2007): 852-853. 
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effects of anthropocentric climate change.  Although Europe is likely to escape radical 
transformation, the same cannot be said of regions such as the Middle East and parts of 
North America and East Asia, all of which are likely to experience steeper 
precipitation gradients and higher temperatures over the next century, affecting the 
sustainability of international units and the organisation of international systems.27 
The ‘International’ & Anthropocentrism 
 
IR has reinvented itself many times over the past ninety years.  Since its earliest days 
as a formal academic discipline in the wake of World War One, it has expanded to 
include not only the study of diplomatic and military relations between governments – 
arguably its earliest areas of interest – but also economic, cultural, and societal 
relations between a variety of state and non-state actors.  Other social sciences, such as 
Political Science, Sociology, and Economics, define themselves largely by the sector 
of human interaction they investigate – be it political, societal, or economic.28  IR, 
meanwhile, tends to define its disciplinary boundaries according to the scale at which 
human interactions take place.  This is defined by the international, a scale that exists 
outside of the domestic jurisdiction of any single collective actor, be it a government 
or corporate body.  Broadly defined, International Relations is the study of units, 
processes, and structures at this ontological level, regardless of the sector in which its 
objects of study operate.  IR’s focus on scale rather than sector has been both a 
blessing and a curse.  It allows the discipline to synthesize lessons from many allied 
social sciences in order to develop holistic understandings of international 
relationships.  This has made IR into something of a conceptual burglar, taking 
theories and frameworks from the ‘domestic’ social sciences and applying them to 
collective actors at the international scale, saving many in the discipline – this author 
included – from having to develop completely new ways of imagining human 
relationships.   
 
                                                
27 Ibid: 870, 883, 890. 
28 This project distinguishes between two very different, if apparently similar terms: ‘social’ and ‘societal’. The first 
is a description of how human systems are constructed through repeated interactions between individual or 
collective actors.  The second describes a sector of interaction to which those relations can  belong, and is 
comparable to other sectors, such as the economic or political.  A social system is one that is constructed by the 
interaction of its human inhabitants, while a societal system is one concerned with the specific cultural and 
ideational relationships between them.  Thus, according to the arguments of this project, all societal systems are 
social, but not all social systems are societal. 
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The most basic objection to IR’s use of scale as a bounding device is that the 
discipline’s distinction between domestic and international spheres is not as 
straightforward as it first appears.  Instead of constituting two truly autonomous scales 
of human interaction, each tightly insulated from the other, the international and the 
domestic are mutually constituted aspects of a wider reality.  A state’s domestic 
conditions can impact its international behaviour.  Likewise, the networks of 
international interaction to which a state belongs can impact its domestic politics, 
economics, and forms of societal organization.29  The same is true of firms, NGOs, and 
other collective actors: networks of individuals with sufficiently unified decision-
making capacities to (i) reproduce themselves over time and (ii) be treated as actors for 
the purposes of analysis.30  While it is true that a collective actor has an ‘inside’ and an 
‘outside’, the membrane between them is porous, with events on one side invariably 
bleeding through to affect events on the other.  The state is therefore both an actor in 
IR and a marker that separates the domestic from the international.31  This distinction 
can become problematic when viewed in the long lens of history.  The states of the 
Arctic Basin, as I will argue in chapters Four, Five and Six, began their existence as 
hierarchic imperial international systems in their own rights, only recently moving to 
close their territorial boundaries and take on a more ‘Westphalian’ and unit-like 
appearance.32  They therefore possess characteristics common to both units and 
systems, straddling the boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that defines IR.  Much 
of the historical analysis that follows in Part Two compares the influence of Arctic 
ecology on the convergent and divergent evolution of these imperial international 
systems, whose interactions within the region’s secondary international system will – 
as discussed in Chapter Six – be dramatically affected by the ecological consequences 
of anthropogenic GEC.33 
 
                                                
29 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994): 2-4. 
30 Barry Buzan,  From International to World Society? English school theory and the social structure of 
globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 119. 
31 RBJ Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993): 134. 
32 The Westphalian characteristics of modern states will be discussed at length in Chapter Five.  For now, this 
project will use Buzan and Little’s shorthand, which identifies the modern state as a collective actor possessing 
‘hard’ territorial boundaries within which it can make a reasonable claim to centralized sovereign control. [Buzan & 
Little (2000): 244-245.] 
33 A secondary state system is composed of interacting ‘suzerain sate systems’ rather than autonomous, Westphalian 
states. [Martin Wight, ‘De Systematibus Civitatum’, in Hedley Bull, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1977): 24.] In order to avoid terminological confusion, this project will describe both empires and 
suzerain state systems as ‘imperial systems’ in which peripheral units’ international relationships are dominated by, 
but not wholly reducable to, those of a metropolitan state. 
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IR’s focus on the analysis of human relationships at the international scale presents a 
problem of even more immediate concern to my work: anthropocentrism.  This 
ontological assumption asserts that there exists ‘a clear and morally relevant dividing 
line between humankind and the rest of nature, that humankind is the only or principal 
source of value and meaning in the world, and that nonhuman nature is there for no 
other purpose but to serve humankind.’34  Because of anthropocentrism, IR tends to 
ignore Ecology’s influence on the evolution of international units, processes, and 
structures, relegating it to instrumental status in analyses of human interaction.35  
When this project began, my intention was to latch myself onto an existing theoretical 
framework in order to understand the impact of changing ecological conditions on the 
constitution of international systems in the circumpolar North.  I was surprised, and 
more than a little dismayed, to find that no such framework existed within the IR 
canon.  The world-historical approach to the study of international systems developed 
by Barry Buzan and Richard Little for International Systems in World History (ISWH) 
appeared at first to present a viable path to success.  It allows its authors to observe 
patterns and discontinuities in the evolution of units, processes, and structures in 
international systems stretching back to the earliest days of human society.  Even using 
so broad a brush, however, Buzan and Little are unable to fold ecological relationships 
into their world-historical model.  Although they propose an environmental sector of 
international interactions – a move with which this project disagrees – they admit 
defeat when considering the environmental structure of IR.36  It is an instructive 
admission with its roots firmly planted in IR’s anthropocentric worldview, and a 
shortcoming that this project is intended to address.  
 
Anthropocentrism has not always ruled IR’s roost.  Prior to the end of the Second 
World War, attempts to synthesize international politics and physical geography 
‘assumed that the physical environment and human activity covaried spatially because 
human activity was controlled primarily by the physical environment.’37  Deterministic 
geopolitical theories, such as those put forward by Halford MacKinder to explain the 
geographical roots of Britain’s imperial power and policies prior to the First World 
War, were certainly nonanthropocentric – interested as they were in a wide variety of 
                                                
34 Eckersley (1992): 51. 
35 Hovden (1999), pp. 60-63. 
36 Buzan & Little (2000): 84. 
37 David Grigg, ‘The Logic of Regional Systems’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 55(3) 1965, 
p. 472.  
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historical causes, including the character of regional drainage, climate, and agriculture.  
Unfortunately, the resulting analyses were limited by the highly incomplete picture of 
ecological dynamics available around the turn of the century.38  This understood the 
planet to be a relatively stable stage on which the human drama was played out, failing 
to account for the ongoing dynamism that binds humanity to the natural systems in 
which we are embedded.  As a result of this static view of the ecological world, early 
geopoliticians fell back on simplified, ‘eternal’ spatial generalisations about the 
relationship between geography and international politics.  Mackinder, for example, 
saw the world in terms of a central ‘pivot’ in European and Siberian Russia whose 
control was the key to controlling Eurasia and – consequently – the planet.39  This was 
typical of the tendency to view geopolitics in terms of a hierarchy of spaces, often 
capped by the ‘superior’ nature of Europe and its inhabitants.40   In Nazi Germany, the 
work of academics like Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer did much to sully the 
reputation of classical geopolitics.  Their association with Nazi ideology, particularly 
ideas relating to lebensraum and racial hierarchies, relegated the discipline to the 
academic sidelines for many decades after 1945, leaving the young field of IR without 
a means – however imperfect – of integrating physical geography into its narratives.41  
Monocausal geographical determinism thereafter came to be replaced by narratives 
whose causes and effects were firmly rooted in human interaction.42  Whereas classical 
geopolitics was opposed to the idea that human will was the primary determinant of 
history (a role that it gave to stable natural environments and geographical settings), 
post-war IR grew to take our ability to control the natural world for granted.43 
 
                                                
38 Geopolitics can be understood as the attempt to ‘“spatialize” international politics in such a way as to represent it 
as a “world” characterized by particular types of places, peoples, and dramas.’ Gearoid O Tuathail & John Agnew, 
‘Geopolitics and Discourse: practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy’, in The Geopolitics 
Reader, Gearoid O Tuathail, Simon Dalby & Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 1998): 80. 
39 Halford Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, The Geographical Journal 23(4) 1904, pp. 434-437.  
Other important early geopoliticians include Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen (who first coined the term geopolitics 
to describe the role of geographical location, size, and character in determining the nature of state behaviour), 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Nicholas Spykman. [Sven Holdar, ‘The Ideal State and the Power of Geography: the 
life-work of Rudolf Kjellen’, Political Geography (11:3) 1992, p. 319; Bert Chapman, Geopolitics: a guide to the 
issues (Oxford: Praeger, 2011): Chapter 1 passim.] 
40 Klaus Dodds, Global Geopolitics: a critical introduction (London: Pearson Prentice-Hall, 2005): 6. 
41 Chapman (2011): 8, 15-16, 21-22. 
42 Dodds (2005): 21-22; Chapman  (2011): 7-10, 15-16. 
43 Tuathail & Agnew (1998): 79; Hovden (1999), pp. 52-53, 62-63. The ‘critical’ incarnation of contemporary 
geopolitics  focuses on the ways in which humans ‘spatialize’ politics rather than on the ways in which our 
environment affects our behaviour.  As one of its chief proponents explains, ‘Rather than defining geopolitics as an 
unproblematic description of the world political map, [critical geopolitics] treats geopolitics as a discourse, as a 
culturally and politically varied way of describing, representing, and writing about geography and international 
politics.’ [Gearoid O Tuathail et al, Eds. The Geopolitics Reader (London: Routledge, 1998): 3.]  Though useful for 
uncovering the role of power in shaping geopolitical discourse, it is worth considering how little this Foucaultian 
approach might contribute to overcoming the anthropocentric tendencies of geopolitical debates. 
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Anthropocentrism has since come to dominate our discipline.  Robert Jackson’s claim 
that ‘there is no part of [IR] that is natural or supernatural, controlled by non-human 
forces’ is just one illustrative example.44  At best, as when he admits that ‘there are of 
course plenty of human and physical circumstances which limit the choices and 
actions available in international politics’, writers in IR accept ecological systems as a 
set of instrumental rather than constitutive factors in international systems’ 
development.45  As such, they affect the range of choices available to actors without 
generating the principles that drive their action.46  Jackson helpfully completes IR’s 
anthropocentric line of argument by acknowledging an externalized role for non-
human factors, explaining that ‘circumstances are not fixed, but shift and change so 
that at one time or place an opportunity for action might arise which might not exist in 
another.’47  Though changeable, ecological context is not seen to drive units’ 
constitution or the structures, processes, and interaction capacities that help to define 
an international system.  Rather, it serves only to open or close one or more 
evolutionary pathways to affect the direction of humanity’s historical development.  
Although this contextual parsimony produces an elegant image of international 
systems’ evolution, there is a heavy price to be paid.  That is the alienation of IR’s 
human subjects and objects from the ecological systems in which they and their 
interactions are embedded, effectively closing debate on the constitutive dynamics of 
socio-ecological relationships.48  Given the importance now being placed on ‘the 
development of standardised baseline human system data for circumpolar regions’, 
including ‘integrated multidisciplinary studies” and “regionally specific human 
vulnerability studies’, it is time to reconsider IR’s anthropocentric turn.49 
 
IR’s anthropocentric worldview is evident in each of its dominant theoretical 
approaches.  Though increasingly questioned over the past four decades, Realist 
discourse has probably done more than any other to define the scope of our discipline.  
At its heart are several assumptions about the proper subjects of international study, 
particularly the primacy of the state as a rational, unitary, and power-seeking actor 
                                                
44 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000): 33. 
45 Jackson (2000): 99. Italics in original. 
46 Eckersley (1992): 97-98. 
47 Jackson (2000): 145. 
48 Eckersley (1992): 21-26.  See also Williams (1996): 48. 
49 Anisimov et al. in Parry et al. (2007): 677. 
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trying to survive in an anarchic international system.50  Though its different variants 
disagree about the root causes of state behaviour, they agree that survival is every 
state’s paramount concern.  The resulting prioritization of actors’ material capabilities 
for self-preservation demotes ecology to a instrumental means serving IR’s ultimate 
end: state survival.51  Questions about the impact of GEC on international systems are 
therefore limited to how it may affect states’ power, closing discussion on how 
ecological conditions affect the constitution of units and the processes and structures 
that describe the international systems they inhabit.  As Hans Morgenthau makes clear 
in Politics Among Nations, natural resources are ‘relatively stable’ components of 
power, external to and controllable by the state.52  Nowhere does Morgenthau or his 
successors accept a constitutive role for ecological factors in the evolution of the 
international system.  The latter tend to define states as like units differentiated by their 
material capabilities.  A state’s ecological structure is therefore of no interest except 
insofar as it is instrumental to those capabilities.  The question of ecology’s influence 
on international systems’ development is therefore smothered by Realism’s 
decontextualized and ahistorical anthropocentrism.53 
 
Before I am accused of duelling with a straw man, Realism’s relegation of ecology to 
the status of an externalised and instrumental factor is mirrored in IR’s other major 
theoretical approaches.  Liberal Institutionalists, Marxists, International Political 
Economists, and members of the English School alike view planetary ecology as a 
relatively stable and controllable set of resources and conditions.  This widespread 
ontological assumption has its roots in the European Enlightenment, when intellectual 
and political developments saw the rise of the scientific method and the nation-state as 
twin pillars of modernity, both presupposing humanity’s ability to harness and 
manipulate the natural world around it for the purposes of human self-realization.54  
The subordination of nature to human ends, internalized by our discipline, fails to 
account for ecology as a constitutive force in the development of international systems.  
In determining which facts are significant to our studies – arguably the main function 
                                                
50 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1985) sixth edition: 12-13; Jack Donnelly, 
“Realism”, in S. Burchill et al. Theories of International Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) second 
edition: 31-33. 
51 Eric Laferrière & Peter Stoett, International Relations Theory and Ecological Thought (London: 
Routledge,1999): 84-85. 
52 Morgenthau (1985): 109-112. 
53 Halliday (1994): 32-35. 
54 Laferrière & Stoett (1999): 5; Eckersley (1992): 21-25. 
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of theory – IR tends to find its explanations of human behaviour in human behaviour, 
be it considered in terms of human nature, rational choice, or socially-constituted 
structures.   In so doing, our discipline masks non-human factors that fall outside of its 
anthropocentric terms of reference.  
 
Marxism, to which many look for the roots of critical theory in IR, is a case in point.  
Historical Materialism embraces class and the means of production as the primary 
determinants of our social evolution.55  Though neo-Marxist writers acknowledge the 
importance of society’s ‘historically contingent setting’ to its subsequent development, 
the forces driving that development are still to be found within human society and its 
socio-economic relationships.  Ecology is significant only to the extent that it is 
claimed and used by classes seeking to control society’s means of production.56  
Blindness to the constitutive effects of ecological conditions is one of Marxism’s key 
ontological premises, summed up in Friedrich Engels’s dictum on the ability of 
economic systems to bend nature to their will:  
 
Capitalist industry has already made itself relatively independent of the local 
limitations arising from the location of sources of the raw materials it needs…Society 
liberated from the restrictions of capitalist production can go much further still… in so 
far as it is conditioned on the most equal distribution possible of modern industry over 
the whole country.57 
 
The Engels Dictum is symptomatic of Marxism’s blindness to the impact of local 
ecological conditions on the constitution of the units, processes, and structures that 
describe any international system.  Its assumption of mankind’s ability to modify and 
control nature became a central tenant of Soviet planning in arctic Siberia during the 
second half of the 20th century, and continues to be an important statement of 
humanity’s relationship to the ecological world.58 
 
This understanding of ecology as an instrumental factor in the constitution of 
international units, processes, and structures is mirrored in IPE.   IPE grew out of IR’s 
increasing interest in economic relations during the food, oil, and credit crises of the 
                                                
55 Laferrière & Stoett (1999): 138; Halliday (1994): 63-64. 
56 Laferrière & Stoett (1999): 154-155. 
57 Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947) Marxists 
Online Archive, [online] accessed May15, 2011 <http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/ 
download/pdf/anti_duhring.pdf>. 
58 Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, The Siberian Curse: how communist planners left Russia out in the cold (New 
York: The Brookings Institution, 2003): 88-91. 
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1970s and ‘80s and embraces a wide range of theoretical positions.  Each has a 
different view of the best way to study the interplay between economics and politics in 
world affairs, particularly the relationship between authority and market relations. 
Robert Gilpin identifies three primary approaches – realist, liberal, and Marxist – each 
of which owes a debt to an associated branch of IR.59  Ngaire Woods labels these 
approaches as mercantilist, liberal, and Marxian, but agrees with Gilpin’s claim that 
orthodox IPE owes much of its conceptual scaffolding to the dominant IR theories out 
of which its variants grew.60  As a result of their common intellectual heritage, IPE 
reproduces IR’s anthropocentric assumptions by externalising and instrumentalising 
ecology’s impact on the evolution of international economic systems.  The result has 
often been a myopic focus on environmental problem solving.  This has left questions 
of Socio-Ecological Coevolution highly under-theorized.  As such, even this 
innovative approach to IR remains focused on putting out the fires associated with 
GEC rather than looking at the systemic causes and effects of the conflagration.61 
 
Anthropocentrism is even central to the English School (ES), arguably the most 
historically sensitive branch of IR.  The ES interprets IR according a set of historically 
evolved practices and principles – institutions – that pattern unit interactions and 
thereby bring some level of order to an otherwise anarchic international society.62  In 
the course of its work, the ES has come to see historical relationships between human 
actors (be they individual or collective) as inherently social, implying actors’ 
acceptance of some level of rule-making, communication, and agreement on common 
principles and values.  Many of its members therefore argue that purely mechanical 
inter-human relations, devoid of shared social content, do not exist in the real world.63  
Though useful as thought experiments, mechanical understandings of human 
interaction should be relegated to the worlds of sci-fi alien invasions and – arguably – 
the impersonal processes of natural selection.64  The English School’s prioritization of 
social over mechanical relations generates a particular vision of international history, 
                                                
59 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987): 
25-64.  
60 Ngaire Woods, ‘International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization’, in J. Baylis et al. (2010): 252-254. 
61 Williams in Vogler & Imber (1996): 45-49. 
62 Andrew Linklater & Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: a contemporary 
reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 21, 43. 
63 Alan James, ‘System or Society?’, Review of International Studies, 19(3) 1993:, pp. 269-288; Hedley Bull & 
Adam Watson, The Expansion of International Society, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984): 1; Adam Watson, The 
Evolution of International Society: a comparative historical analysis (London: Routledge 2009) second edition: 
238. 
64 Buzan (2004): 100. 
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whose sources of continuity and change are assumed to be endogenous to humanity 
itself.  Having alienated international society from its ecological context, the English 
School explains systemic evolution in entirely social terms and relegates ecological 
factors to instrumental status, making them of interest only so long as they impact the 
means by which IR’s human subjects pursue their social ends.  Ecological context is 
still assumed to be largely static, a source of neither social stability nor social change.  
Robert Jackson – whose work is sympathetic to international society – again sums up 
this approach when he states that IR ‘is entirely a sphere of human experience, nothing 
more and nothing less… no part of it exists beyond human relations.’65   
 
Anthropocentrism is deeply ingrained in contemporary IR, standing easily beside the 
five ideological assumptions identified by Buzan and Little as being responsible for 
limiting our discipline’s ability to map the historical evolution of the planet’s 
international systems.66  As argued by writers including Robyn Eckersley, Andrew 
Dobson, and Marc Williams, anthropocentrism has handicapped efforts to address 
questions of systemic adaptation to GEC, leading to a myopic focus on climate change 
mitigation that takes for granted our ability to manipulate and control the natural world 
in which we live.67  At the heart of my project lies a profound scepticism about the 
international system’s ability to mitigate the causes (and effects) of GEC.  Continued 
anthropogenic forcing of the environment and the positive feedback mechanisms that 
this activity appears to be activating make mitigation an ever more complicated and 
expensive undertaking.  This seems to be leading many leading international actors to 
defer action in the face of imperfect information and free riders, who flout 
international environmental agreements in order to profit from the ecological 
responsibility of others.  Given the difficulties facing international mitigation efforts 
and the high likelihood of ecological impacts regardless of their short-term success or 
failure, it is surely prudent to hedge against the likeliest effects of GEC by considering 
their potential impact on international units and systems.  
 
                                                
65 Jackson (2000): p. 29. 
66 The five ideological assumptions identified in IR by Buzan and Little are: presentism, ahistoricism, Eurocentrism, 
anarchophilia, and state centrism. [Buzan & Little (2000): 18.]  Where B&L blame these for IR’s general failure to 
achieve a world-historical perspective on the development of international systems, I consider anthropocentrism to 
be the ideological assumption most directly responsible for IR’s failure to adequately consider these systems’ 
ecological constitution across time and space. 
67 Dobson (1990): 175-192; Eckersley (1992): 23-25; Williams in Vogler & Imber (1996): 48. 
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IR’s anthropocentric approach to planetary ecology need not have the final word.  
Though flawed, the discipline’s instrumental treatment of ecological context can 
provide a starting point from which to consider deeper constitutive questions.  IR has 
often shown itself willing to reconsider its guiding assumptions in order to account for 
the influence of heretofore marginalised factors on its objects of study.  IPE, for 
example, locates political systems in their economic environment, enriching the study 
of the international by acknowledging the role of the economic sector in the 
development of political relations.  In so doing, IPE has altered our understanding of 
the relationship between IR’s classical interests – such as politics and diplomacy – and 
the worlds of production, trade, and finance. The English School locates the atomistic 
world of Realism in its social context, allowing it to generate much more compelling 
historical analyses of international units and systems.  I assert that the same feat can be 
accomplished with regard to the ecological contexts in which all of our international 
systems are embedded.  This need not entail a wholehearted embrace of an ecocentric 
approach that brings ecological systems into play in every branch of IR.  Rather, it 
means that students and practitioners of IR should explicitly state which contexts – 
social or ecological – they will include in their analyses rather than simply taking for 
granted that ecological systems have nothing to offer.  This project is a first step 
towards such a synthesis, exploring the impact of Socio-Ecological Coevolution on the 
international systems of the circumpolar world. 
Literature: International Social Systems & 
Ecology 
International Social Systems 
My analysis of GEC’s effects on Arctic international systems brings together two 
heretofore separate literatures: international system analysis and Ecology.  My 
approach to the former is rooted in the analytical matrix used by Buzan and Little in 
their study of international systems in world history.  This frames much of the analysis 
to follow, and traces the influence of Socio-Ecological Coevolution on three aspects of 
historical and contemporary international systems: their interaction capacities, their 
interactive processes, and their social structures.  Buzan and Little’s analysis adopts a 
theoretically pluralist approach to the historical study of international systems, which 
are broadly defined as social networks constituted by structured sets of interacting 
units, two or more of which “have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient 
impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure 
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– as parts of a whole.”68  This definition requires some clarification and will be 
discussed further in Chapter Two.  For now, I would make two general points.   
 
First, I assume that historical international systems are socially rather than 
mechanically constructed insofar as the actors who inhabit them are always “conscious 
of certain common interests and common values”.69 These common interests and 
values generate “a society in the sense that [units] conceive of themselves to be bound 
by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings 
of common institutions.”70    As argued by Alan James and Alexander Wendt, among 
others, international units and systems are generated by human interaction.71  Both are 
social constructs, bounded and constrained by rules of membership – which identify 
who is included as a member of a given system; and rules of behaviour – which 
identify what kinds of conduct the resulting society (of states, firms, civil society 
organizations, etc.) will tolerate from its members.  These evolving principles mark the 
boundaries of any international system.72 
 
A survey of history makes it clear that such principles are a necessary product of 
human interaction at any scale. As Adam Watson observes, ‘[e]ven where states 
locked into international systems do not constitute what we have called a society, they 
evolve regulatory rules and institutions and formulate them in capitulatory agreements 
because they cannot manage without. No system has existed without rules and 
conventions of some kind, and it is hard to see how one could.’73  Rather than try to 
identify a discreet moment at which regulatory rules become the ‘rules and institutions 
consciously based on shared assumptions and theories’ (the English School’s general 
definition of an international society), I follow Alan James in arguing that all 
international interactions take place amidst socially constructed principles, erasing the 
distinction between systems and societies by folding the former into the latter.74 
International systems exist on a spectrum ranging from thin to thick forms of society.  
                                                
68 Buzan & Little (2000): 442; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1995) second edition: 9. 
69 Bull (1995): 13. 
70 Ibid. [italics added] 
71 James (1993), pp. 269-288; Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: the social construction of 
power politics’, International Organization 46(3) 1992, pp. 394-395. 
72 Buzan (2004): 167.  The sets of practices and principles under discussion are roughly equivalent to the primary 
institutions of the English School. 
73 Watson (2009): 238. 
74 Ibid: 121; James (1993), pp. 272-276. 
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Thus, many conflictual forms of the states-system actually represent ‘thin’ forms of 
international society, characterized by ‘a relatively low, or narrow, degree of shared 
norms, rules and institutions amongst the states, where the focus of international 
society is on creating a framework for orderly coexistence and competition, or possibly 
also the management of collective problems of common fate (e.g. arms control, 
environment).’75 This ‘thin’ form of society can be set alongside thicker varieties, in 
which it is possible for actors to cooperate ‘over a wider range of issues, whether in 
pursuit of joint gains (e.g. trade), or realisation of shared values (e.g. human rights).’76  
In the contemporary states system, thick and thin international societies exist side-by-
side in different parts of the world: thicker in the case of Europe’s international 
political system, where states have sacrificed some aspects of their sovereignty to the 
supra-state European Union; thinner in the case of the international political system in 
South Asia, where the processes that describe international society’s purposes and 
principles are less about cooperation than they are about the maintenance of a balance 
of power between rivals and enemies. 
 
Second, international systems cannot be described with reference to any single sector 
of human interaction.  They are sectorally layered, with nested political, economic, and 
societal systems operating alongside and within one another.77  The visual learner 
might imagine international systems as webs, their filaments made up of the political, 
economic, and societal interactions that link us together individually and as units. 
Some of these webs are small, such as those that connect a family or a firm.  Some are 
enormous, such as the economic networks that bring us cocoa from Côte D'Ivoire, cars 
from China, and insurance from Lloyds of London.  Each of us participates in a huge 
number of these networks at any one time: as a client of a firm, as a member of a civil 
society group, and as a citizen of a state.  Each network represents a social system in 
its own right, complete with the rules of membership and behaviour discussed in the 
previous paragraph.  The global international system, taken as a totality, is composed 
of a huge number of networks with overlapping memberships.  In this sense, the global 
international system is a system of systems or, to burgle the vocabularies of Fernand 
Braudel and Kirti Chaudhuri, a ‘set of sets’.78  Among the global system’s subsets are 
                                                
75 Buzan (2004): 49. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Buzan & Little (2000): 109. 
78 Kirti Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe: economy and civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the rise of Islam to 1750 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 431; Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th 
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collective actors: the states, firms, and civil society organizations whose interactions 
are primarily responsible for generating its rules of membership and behaviour.  
Collective actors are themselves made up of interacting sets of individuals and groups, 
blurring the boundaries between the international and domestic scales and 
problematising the inside-outside distinction discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  
The resulting image of the international scale as constituting an interwoven set of 
interacting social networks serves my purposes by opening space for a theoretically 
pluralist conception of international systems, in which processes and structures located 
in different sectors can be disaggregated and analysed before being recombined to 
understand the connections between them.79   
Ecology 
The second literature on which this thesis draws is rooted in Ecology, which studies 
the biological and physical systems in which all life is embedded.  Instead of taking a 
static and classificatory approach to the study of the physical environments in which 
international systems develop, I will consider ecological context as a dynamic 
constitutive factor in their evolution.  Ecological context plays a key role in the 
analysis to follow, constituting a third axis to complement and expand the analytical 
matrix of sectors and levels employed by Buzan and Little.  The application of an 
explicitly ecological framework to this matrix will transform its sources of explanation 
– process, interaction capacity, and structure.  These describe, in turn, what kinds of 
interactions take place across a given system, how much interaction is possible, and 
how interacting units are arranged with respect to one another.80  When reinterpreted 
for the purposes of ecological analysis, process becomes concerned with the dynamics 
that link our social and ecological environments – coevolutionary processes – and their 
impact on the Arctic’s mutually constituted international and ecological systems.81 
Interaction capacity is reinterpreted in terms of ecological capacity, which measures 
the sustainability of units and systems in a given time and place.   Social structure, 
                                                                                                                                        
Century: Volume 2, The Wheels of Commerce (London: Collins, 1981):  459, Ch. 5 passim;  R.J. Moore, “World 
History: world economy or a set of sets?”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Series 3, 3(1) 1993, pp. 103-104. 
79 Buzan & Little (2000): 35. Though more historically accurate than the simple inside-outside distinction that 
typifies much IR scholarship, this complexity carries with it significant analytical costs insofar as many subsystems 
normally thought of as ‘domestic’ reveal themselves to be more international than they first appear.  Thus, as we 
will discuss in the coming Chapters, the imperial states of the circumpolar world may be defined as domestic and 
international systems to the extent that they include a variety of semi- autonomous units that hold subordinate 
positions in imperial systems. [Adam Watson, ‘Systems of States’, Review of International Studies 16(2) 1990, pp. 
102-103.] 
80 Ibid, pp. 79, 80, 84. 
81 Butzer (1982): 6-7. 
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reinterpreted as biogeographical structure, is the last source of explanation discussed 
in ISWH and may prove to be the most fruitful area of socio-ecological synthesis.  
Starting with the distribution of biomes and niches around the circumpolar world, I 
will develop a model of international systems that links their social constitution to the 
biogeographical structures in which they are embedded, producing a hybrid of imperial 
and Westphalian principles to describe the regional international system of the 
circumpolar North.   
 
Incorporating ecological literature into my analysis of international systems will rely 
on several theses developed by environmental historians.   Though its roots are deep, 
playing a central role in the work of Herodotus and Thucydides, Environmental 
History is relatively young branch of that venerable craft, being organised as a 
coherent subfield in the 1970s.  Over the past four decades, it has become one of 
History’s most active disciplines, producing volumes on everything from the general 
causes of human societies’ growth and collapse to specific studies of the role played by 
individual floral and faunal species in human history.82  Environmental History is 
primarily concerned with studying the constitutive impact of ecological and human 
systems on one another’s development, a goal captured by two of its main 
assumptions:  
 
1. that the ecological systems in which we are embedded affect the ways we live, 
the technologies we choose to adopt, and the ways in which we relate to the 
world; and 
2. that our lifestyles, technologies, and social relations have immediate and long-
term impacts on the ecological systems around us.83 
                                                
82 Among those with the most influence on this project are Alfred Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological 
and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003) 30th anniversary edition; Alfred 
Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: the biological expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986); Joseph Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); 
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: the fates of human societies (New York: W.W. Morton, 1997);  Brian 
Fagan, The Little Ice Age: how climate made history 1300-1850 (New York: Basic Books, 2001);  J. Donald 
Hughes, An Environmental History of the World: Humankind’s changing role in the community of life (New York: 
Routledge, 2001); Brian Fagan, The Long Summer: how climate changed civilization (New York: Basic Books, 
2004); Jared Diamond, Collapse: how societies choose to succeed or fail (London: Penguin, 2005); Sing C. Chew, 
The Recurring Dark Ages: ecological stress, climate changes, and system transformation (London: Altamira Press, 
2007); George Rose, Cod: the ecological history of the North Atlantic fishery (St. John’s, NL: Breakwater Books, 
2007); I.G. Simmons, Global Environmental History: 10,000 B.C. to A.D. 2000 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007); Brian Fagan, The Great Warming: climate change and the rise and fall of civilizations (London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008); Ian Morris, Why the West Rule – For Now: the patterns of history and what they 
reveal about the future (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2010). 
83 J. Donald Hughes, What Is Environmental History? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006): 4. 
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These twinned hypotheses describe a constitutive relationship as old as our species.  
As J. Donald Hughes observes, “humans and the rest of the community of life have 
been engaged in a process of coevolution that did not end with the origin of the human 
species, but continues in the present.”84 Although this process has largely been ignored 
by students and practitioners of IR, environmental historians use it to capture several 
interesting historical dynamics.  For my purposes, the most important derive from 
Alfred Crosby’s 1986 book, Ecological Imperialism: the biological expansion of 
Europe, 900-1900.  This looks at the role of biogeographical factors, including specific 
climatic and biological systems, in constraining and encouraging Europe’s overseas 
expansion.85  Crosby’s analysis folds neatly into the history of the modern 
international system, itself the product of the centuries-long process by which non-
European peoples and territories have been incorporated into international systems 
centred on Europe and its neo-European colonial extensions.86  By combining these 
streams of environmental and international analysis, this project will shed light on the 
Coevolution of Ecology and IR in the Arctic, providing a baseline against which to 
judge the likely impact of future ecological changes on associated regional 
international systems. 
Plan of Investigation 
 
Part One of this project puts together the theoretical toolkit for its analysis.  This 
begins in Chapter Two, which establishes why IR will benefit from ecologically-
grounded analyses of international systems.  In doing so, the Chapter (i) identifies 
some of  the analytical tools with which the subsequent sections will define and 
identify international systems in the historical record, (ii) disaggregates the composite 
structure of the global international system in terms of levels of analysis and sectors of 
interaction, (iii) explains the role of ecological and social factors in evolutionary 
dynamics, and (iv) defines Socio-Ecological Coevolution as the key process linking 
our international social systems to the ecological contexts in which they are embedded.  
The tools used to identify and trace the evolution of international systems in the 
circumpolar Arctic are based on the analytical matrix developed by Buzan and Little.  
                                                
84 Hughes (2006): 14. 
85 Crosby (1986): 5-6. 
86 Buzan & Little (2000): 241-242; Watson (2009): 201.  
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This uses three sources of explanation – interaction capacity, process, and structure – 
to analyse the constitution of international systems, which the authors disaggregate by 
reference to sectors of interaction and levels of analysis. Once it has examined this 
matrix in terms of its sources of explanation, sectors, and levels, the chapter considers 
the mechanisms by which ecological systems affect the evolution of their international 
counterparts.  This is done by highlighting sources of evolutionary stability and change 
that are endogenous and exogenous to human society.  Endogenous social factors such 
as path dependence and sectoral interference are weighed against exogenous influences 
emanating from ecological contexts.  International systems do not exist in an 
ecologically homogenous world.  They are the products of an ongoing process of 
mutual constitution involving human interactions with and within ecological 
environments. This process affects both the human systems by which collective actors 
relate at the international scale and the ecological systems in which individuals, units, 
and systems alike are embedded.   
 
Chapter Three asks how we should go about incorporating ecological factors into our 
analysis.  It does so by (i) considering sectors and levels as potential tools with which 
to achieve a socio-ecological synthesis, (ii) identifying context as a key ontological 
lens in the analysis of systemic evolution, and (iii) explaining the effects of adding a 
new ontological axis to ISWH’s heretofore socially-contextualised matrix.  Firmly in 
IR’s anthropocentric approach to systems analysis, sectors and levels are ill-suited to 
act as points of contact between international systems and their ecological 
surroundings.  This project therefore proposes adding a third axis to Buzan and Little’s 
two-dimensional matrix.  This captures the context in which systemic interaction 
evolves, forcing students and practitioners of IR to explicitly include and exclude 
ecological contexts from their studies.  Its main purpose is to provide a space in which 
the influence of non-human factors can be considered without compromising the 
coherence of IR’s existing social narratives.  One's choice of context can range from 
the parsimonious to the complex.  For the purposes of this project, I identify two 
dominant varieties: social and ecological.  Locating an international system in its 
social context is a necessary step towards the construction of a historically coherent 
image of the world – one pursued by Martin Wight, Adam Watson, and Buzan and 
Little amongst others.  It describes the ‘common interests and common values’ that 
develop out of repeated human interaction, constraining relations between actors in a 
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system. 87  The socially-contextualised analyses produced by this ontology correspond 
closely to the image of international society advanced by the English School.  As 
previously discussed, this focuses on ways in which shared social principles constrain 
and enable actors’ behaviour in a formally anarchic international social system.  Social 
context forces us to reinterpret the atomistic individuals of mechanically-constituted 
theories – such as liberal economics and neo-Realism – as members of a socially-
constructed system in which shared principles shape their roles and behaviours.88  
These principles describe both who is part of a given social system (principles of 
membership) and how they should act towards one another (principles of behaviour).   
Buzan and Little’s argument that ‘systems defined in military-political terms are 
normally embedded in economic and societal systems that are often wider in extent 
and earlier in formation’89 sets the pattern for this project’s claim that international 
social systems are themselves embedded in an even wider, and older, set of ecological 
systems.   
 
Chapter Three concludes by summarizing the theoretical toolkit used to analyse this 
socio-ecological relationship in the circumpolar world, using context in conjunction 
with the matrix’s existing divisions – sectors and levels – to investigate the impact of 
ecological systems on the sources of explanation that drive social evolution.  This is 
accomplished by reconstructing Buzan and Little’s three sources of explanation – 
interaction capacity, process, and structure – in ecological terms. It begins by 
considering the general impact of Socio-Ecological Coevolution – a primary socio-
ecological process – on the development of international units and systems.  Instead of 
describing the ‘dynamics of the interactions among units in the [international] system 
and the use made of the existing interaction capacity by these units’, process becomes 
a route by which to examine interactions between international systems and the 
ecological contexts in which they are embedded.90  This ecological reinterpretation of 
process has its corollary in interaction capacity, the second of Buzan and Little’s 
sources of explanation.  This is defined as a unit’s or system’s ability to transport 
ideas, goods, and people across space.91  Ecological contextualization reconstructs this 
                                                
87 Bull (1995): 13. 
88 Kal Holsti, Taming the sovereigns: institutional change in international politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004): 19.  
89 Buzan & Little (2000): 78. 
90 Ibid: 79. 
91 Ibid: 80. 
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source of explanation as Ecological Capacity (EC), which analyses the sustainability of 
units and systems at a given site.  Its main ecological determinant is Net Primary 
Production (NPP), which measures the amount of atmospheric carbon fixed by 
autotrophs in a given area over time.  NPP can be thought of as a measurement of a 
site’s potential ecological energy, and is mediated by the physical and social 
technologies with which we access and supplement it.  Thus, EC is determined by 
three interconnected factors:  
 
i) whether local levels of ecological productivity, measured in terms of NPP, 
make it easy or difficult to sustain specific international units and systems; 
ii) what physical technologies are available for the extraction and utilization of 
a habitat’s energy reserves; and 
iii) what social technologies are available for the extraction and utilization of a 
habitat’s energy reserves. 
 
Structure – Buzan and Little’s third and final source of explanation – describes the role 
of units’ social environment in shaping a system’s rules of membership and 
behaviour.92  As with process and interaction capacity, structure is transformed by the 
act of ecological contextualization.  Using the main functional divisions of ecology – 
biomes – as a starting point, the toolkit draws on Alfred Crosby’s work to identify the 
role of biogeographical structures in the constitution of their embedded international 
systems.93  By integrating Crosby’s hypothesis into the international history of the 
Arctic, this project will take an important step towards conceptualizing ecological 
structure in IR terms, focusing on ways in which the distribution of biomes can be used 
to understand the constitution and behaviour of their embedded human populations.   
 
Part Two, covering chapters Four, Five, and Six, applies its ecologically 
contextualized toolkit to analyse the evolution of international systems in the 
circumpolar Arctic beyond the wedge of medieval European settlement.  Its 
chronology begins at the time of Europe’s expansion into terrestrial ecosystems 
beyond the Ural Mountains and Denmark Strait in the mid- to late-16th century.  
Chapter Four begins by looking generally at the effects of Socio-Ecological 
                                                
92 Ibid: 84. 
93 Manuel C. Molles, Ecology: concepts and applications (London: WCB/McGraw-Hill, 1999): 14, 235. 
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Coevolution on the development of early modern Arctic processes and units, be they 
pre-international indigenous units and systems or the European fur traders and settlers 
who began to infiltrate Siberia and arctic North America from the 1580s. Long before 
the arrival of Europeans, preinternational arctic and subarctic indigenous units and 
systems were profoundly influenced by their Ecological Capacity.  This affected both 
their internal organisation – analysed in terms of their populations and levels of social 
differentiation – and the processes by which they interacted.  The European traders and 
settlers who subsequently entered the tundra and taiga were faced with a variegated 
ecological tableau, generating processes of tribute and commodification whose 
distribution reflects several axes of ecological productivity.  These axes produce 
patterns which can be traced by reference to the distribution of social differentiation 
among early modern Arctic units, whose physical and social technologies were not yet 
sophisticated enough to effectively mediate the impact of NPP.  
 
Chapter Five looks at the impact of EC on the organisation of the region’s dominant 
units – the imperial systems that claim and exercise sovereignty over much of the 
Arctic Basin.   These units – including Russia, Great Britain, Denmark, and, more 
recently, the United States and Canada – inhabit a heterogeneous ecological region.  
Where neo-European ecologies boosted their EC and permitted the establishment of 
agricultural settlements, their organising principles of membership and behaviour 
converged with characteristics that typified their increasingly ‘Westphalian’ European 
metropoles, particularly ‘hard’ territoriality and centralised sovereign control.94  In 
non-European arctic and subarctic biomes, limited EC forced these units to adopt a 
different set of social technologies to protect their sovereign claims.  Indirect rule 
through imperial proxies became the norm – whether through co-opted indigenous 
leaders or chartered corporations with de jure and de facto rights over circumpolar 
lands and peoples.  The states of the circumpolar world thus began their lives as 
hierarchic imperial international systems rather than as autonomous and centralised 
units.  They were ‘structurally centralized political systems within which core states 
and elites dominate[d] peripheral societies, serve[d] as intermediaries for their 
significant interactions, and channel[led] resource flows from the periphery to the core 
and back to the periphery.’95 The international units that have since evolved out of 
                                                
94 Buzan & Little (2000): 244-245. 
95 Alexander J. Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires: conceptual limits and theoretical possibilities (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999): 126. 
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these imperial systems remain deeply bifurcated, with split organisations that mirror 
the divergent levels of EC that they enjoy in the various biomes they straddle.  In their 
relatively unproductive arctic and subarctic hinterlands, EC has encouraged states to 
retain characteristics associated with imperial hierarchies, particularly in terms of their 
frontiers and indirect exercise of sovereignty.  In these non-European biomes, Russia, 
the United States, Canada, and Denmark continue to sit at the centre of their own 
imperial international systems, and thus inhabit a the grey area between domestic and 
international systems.  Each is dominated by core-periphery relationships ‘in which 
one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society.’96  The 
latter role is played mainly by the indigenous peoples of the Arctic Basin, who are 
widely recognised as semi-autonomous nations in direct relationships with their 
metropoles.  As states’ metropolitan cores have found themselves better able to access 
and mobilize EC, their need to maintain these imperial relationships has decreased, 
leading to as yet incomplete moves away from indirect rule and towards structures that 
more closely resemble the Westphalian ideal of centralised state sovereignty. 
 
Chapter Six concludes our analysis of Arctic international systems by considering the 
impact of the Arctic’s biogeographical structure on its contemporary international 
systems, paying particular attention to the influence of neo-European and non-
European biomes on the principles that constrain systemic membership and behaviour.  
It argues that the Arctic basin’s biogeographical structures have shaped attempts to 
incorporate its lands and peoples into neo-European metropolitan states, preserving 
some of the bifurcated characteristics described in Chapter Five.  As a result of the 
Arctic’s specific environmental history, its international systems are a hybrid of 
anarchic states-systems and imperial hierarchies – diverging from the Westphalian 
ideal associated with the global international system.  The Chapter addresses these 
developments in two steps. First, it looks at the impact of social and physical 
technologies on the development of the Arctic’s international system since the Second 
World War, when states’ concerted efforts to bring their hinterlands into line with 
metropolitan principles of sovereignty and territoriality resulted in the hybrid system 
we see today.  Second, it considers the potential impact of melting sea ice on the socio-
ecological dynamics of the region, making an initial foray into the kind of specialized 
                                                
96 Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986): 45. 
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IR analysis for which the tools and baselines developed in this project have been 
created. 
 
Chapter Seven considers the implications of the project’s findings for the Arctic and 
IR.  It begins by looking at the reasons and framework behind the project, reviewing 
the approaches taken in previous chapters.  It then moves on to consider the project’s 
main conclusions.  These include the possibility of (i) a direct correlation between a 
site’s ecological productivity and the characteristics that define its embedded 
international units and system; (ii) a refined understanding of the coevolutionary 
relationship between physical and social contexts in the circumpolar world; and (iii) a 
generalizable explanation of the role of biogeographical structure in shaping the 
political and economic networks that constitute the international social system.  
Throughout, the Chapter considers the value of ecologically-contextualized analyses of 
international units and systems, highlighting potential gains and pitfalls.  In the end, its 
prognosis for Socio-Ecological Coevolution is cautiously optimistic so long as it is 
used alongside existing social approaches to systems analysis.  This project does not 
argue for an ecocentric approach to IR that will replace current, anthropocentric 
narratives.97  Rather, it calls on students and practitioners to make their ontological 
assumptions regarding Ecology’s place in IR explicit, clearly identifying the contexts 
in which they are locating their analyses and accepting the limitations imposed by 
those decisions.  Socio-Ecological Coevolution is most useful when it is harnessed to 
the power of social analysis, and vice versa. If used properly, this partnership raises 
interesting possibilities for future studies into relationships between international 
systems and the ecological contexts in which they are embedded.  These include a 
deeper understanding of the relationship between hierarchic and anarchic principles of 
membership and behaviour in the international social system and a new approach to 
the identification of regions within the global ‘set of sets’.  Though by no means a 
panacea, Socio-Ecological Coevolution represents a promising avenue by which IR 
can synthesize ecological relationships into its existing narratives – strengthening our 
understanding of each and giving us new tools with which to understand the likely 
impacts of GEC on the international and ecological systems in which we are 
embedded. 
                                                
97 Eckersley defines ecocentrism as an ontological position in which ‘the interests of nonhuman species and 
ecological communities . . . are not ignored... simply because they are not human, or because they are not of 
instrumental value to humans’ [Eckersley (1992): 57.] 
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Part One 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution: a toolkit for the ecological analysis of international 
systems in world history
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Chapter Two 
Why Is Ecology Important to the Evolution of International Systems? 
 
 
Having established the purposes of this project, this Chapter asks why ecological 
relationships should be integrated into IR systems analysis.  It begins by considering 
existing approaches to the study of international systems in world history, looking 
particularly at the analytical matrix devised by Barry Buzan and Richard Little.  
Designed to address five shortcomings in previous methods – presentism, ahistoricism, 
eurocentrism, anarchophilia, and state centrism – Buzan and Little’s matrix 
disaggregates the global international system according to a typology of sectors and 
levels, each of which describes systemic evolution on the basis of three sources of 
social explanation: interaction capacity, process, and structure.  Though highly 
effective in addressing the questions posed in ISWH, their approach has its limitations. 
Thanks to its anthropocentric ontology, the matrix is unable to capture the 
coevolutionary relationships that bind international systems to the ecological contexts 
in which they are embedded.  Understanding the impact of these relationships on the 
evolution of Arctic international systems will therefore require (i) establishing the 
analytical tools with which to trace the historical evolution of international systems, 
(ii) clarifying the role of social and ecological factors in shaping human history, and 
(iii) defining the mutually constitutive, coevolutionary relationship that links the 
planet’s international and ecological systems. 
International Systems: interaction capacity, 
processes, and structures 
 
This project’s ecological analysis of Arctic international systems is based on a 
particular understanding of what an international system is and how one should be 
assessed in the historical record.  Human systems – of which international systems are 
one example – are networks constituted by the structured interactions of the humans 
who inhabit them.98  In this sense, a human system is more than the sum of its parts.  
This broad definition leaves room for families and states alike to be considered in 
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systemic terms, constituted by the interactions of uncles and sisters, bureaucrats and 
generals.  In both examples, an individual’s role depends on their position within the 
group.  These positions are governed by rules of membership and behaviour that 
structure individuals’ interactions and mark the system’s boundaries, with those 
outside of the network excluded from its internal structures and processes.   
 
Michael Mann’s definition of a society is a useful referent when thinking about 
international systems in the historical record.  Societies, he says, are ‘constituted of 
multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power.’99  Instead of 
focusing on the units that inhabit a network, Mann focuses on their interactions.  He 
divides these into a typology of ideological, military, economic, and political (IMEP) 
relationships, each defined by its own network of power relations.  The state, for 
example, is ‘only one of four major types of power network’ that constitute the 
overarching concept of a ‘society’.100    Because Mann’s societies are composite 
entities, he argues that they do not actually exist as basic units of study.  Rather, they 
are analytical tools made up of many interacting subsystems, organised networks 
established by human actors to pursue specific goals.  These combine to form the 
constantly-shifting ‘social’ unit, whose evolution is influenced by competing 
influences radiating out of ideological, military, economic, and political networks of 
power.  As opposed to Mann’s dynamic picture of multicausal human social systems, 
his contemporaries tend to reify human systems, treating them as stable, even static 
totalities.101  Much of the systems analysis that follows takes its cue from Mann’s 
work.  Given the argument in Chapter One that all human systems are fundamentally 
social, and given the goal of this project to trace the evolution of ecologically-
contextualized international systems in world history, the equation of Mann’s societies 
with contemporary international systems should come as no surprise. 
   
International systems are distinguished from other varieties of interactive network by 
the scale at which their interactions take place.  As discussed in Chapter One, ‘the 
international’ is a tricky concept to pin down.  Early IR literature identifies it with 
Europe’s system of states, with its legal roots in the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the 
                                                
99 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: a history of power from the beginning to 1760, vol. I (Cambridge: 
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Peace of Westphalia (1648).  These settlements helped to establish the boundaries of 
Europe’s international system by defining who could be a member – by describing the 
roles and rights of sovereign states – and how units could legitimately act within it – 
via mutual recognition and non-interference in one another’s domestic affairs.  From 
this early conception of an international system, Hedley Bull develops his definition of 
an international system as a network in which ‘two or more states have sufficient 
contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause 
them to behave… as parts of a whole.’102 
 
Though international systems of various sizes and types have existed through much of 
the past six thousand years, the contemporary global system has been dominated for 
some time by the states that inhabit it and whose sovereignty helps to define the inside-
outside distinction that bounds the international scale. Interactions that take place 
within a state’s borders are domestic and are therefore said to fall outside of IR’s 
sphere of interest.  As a result, the state holds a privileged position at the heart of 
international systems analysis, defining what ‘international’ means.103  This privileged 
position has often masked the influence of non-state actors, which lack the sovereign 
state’s domestic-international divide.  For many years, this left IR ill-equipped to deal 
with an array of non-state actors.  Since the 1970s, however, developments in the 
discipline have extended the range of units that we imagine inhabiting the international 
system to include multinational firms, intergovernmental actors, and international non-
governmental organizations.104 
 
States may have lost their exclusive position as the sole participants in the international 
system, but the inside-outside distinction defined by their borders remains central to 
how we think about IR. As the range of economic and societal international systems 
included in IR analyses has increased, the traditional inside-outside distinction has 
continued to define the international scale in these non-political – and therefore non-
state centric – international systems. This leads to confusion about the boundaries of 
non-political international systems, which have a tendency to penetrate states’ 
sovereignty and thereby problematise the international scale.  Though not sovereign in 
                                                
102 Bull (1995): 9. These interactions are described as systemic processes, the dynamics of interaction amongst 
actors in a system. 
103 Buzan (2004): 91. 
104 Bob Reinalda et al, ‘Non-State Actors in International Relations: Do They Matter?’, in Non-State Actors in 
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the sense of territorial states, non-state actors such as multinational firms have insides 
and outsides.  The ways in which they make decisions and organize themselves 
internally is very different from the ways in which they relate to ‘outside’ actors.  At 
some point, their internal decision making processes give way to external ones.  In 
these external relationships, the entire firm or state becomes a collective actor; acting 
as a client, supplier, service provider, lobbyist, or litigant in a wider system of 
economic, political, and social relationships.  While states, firms, and civil society 
organisations vary widely in their goals and functions, they are all collective actors 
insofar as they can: 
 
(i) reproduce themselves over time, and  
(ii) be treated as actors for the purposes of analysis.105   
 
Because collective actors have insides and outsides, they are important referents in 
efforts to identify the international as an ontological reality.106  States still retain much 
of their former, privileged position.  As the historical analysis that follows will show, 
however, other collective actors, often acting as state proxies, have played key roles in 
determining the extent of the international system in the Arctic and beyond.  Collective 
actors will therefore be used throughout this project to trace the evolution of the 
different kinds of international systems that they inhabit.  
 
Beyond identifying international systems as networks formed by the structured 
interaction of collective actors at the international scale, the analysis that follows will 
trace the evolution of dynamic international systems by reference to three sources of 
explanation.  These describe essential social elements of any international system, be it 
global or regional.  The first is interaction capacity, which describes the amount of 
interaction that can occur between units in a system.  The second is process, which 
describes the ways in which units choose to interact.  These might include political 
processes like diplomacy, economic processes like trade, and social processes like 
proselytizing.  The third source of explanation used to describe the evolution of 
international systems is structure.  This describes the way in which units’ behaviour is 
affected by the construction of their environment, including the ways in which units 
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are arranged in a system, how they are differentiated from each other, and how they 
stand in terms of their relative capabilities.107  Together, interaction capacity, process, 
and structure make up three key sources of explanation in any dynamic human system, 
describing how much interaction can take place within it, what kinds of interactions are 
typical, and how those interactions are affected by the environments in which they take 
place.108   
Interaction Capacity 
The first source of explanation that will be used to analyse the social evolution of 
international systems is their interaction capacity (IC) – their ability to move ideas, 
goods, and people across space.  Interaction capacity answers specific questions about 
the nature of the system under analysis: what can be moved, across what distances, at 
what speed, and at what cost?  At least three factors mediate a system’s interaction 
capacity: 
 
(i) whether geographical factors make movement easy or difficult; 
(ii) what physical technologies are available for transportation and communication; 
and 
(iii) what social technologies are available for transportation and 
communication.109 
 
International systems with relatively unsophisticated physical or social technological 
will be more exposed to geographical factors than those with more sophisticated 
adaptations.  As technological sophistication increases, so will a system’s ability to 
overcome geographical obstacles that otherwise limit its interaction capacity.  For 
example, until Europeans’ development of the physical and social technologies 
associated with oceanic navigation in the fifteenth century, the Atlantic Ocean 
represented an almost impenetrable barrier between the Old World and the Americas.  
Within a century, however, the development of post rudders and caravels, discoveries 
associated with the fundamentals of navigation, and the evolution of collective actors 
with sufficient capital to back expensive and risky transoceanic ventures transformed 
the Atlantic barrier into a highway, greatly increasing the interaction capacity of 
international systems associated with early-modern Europe, allowing them to contact – 
                                                
107 In this sense, an environment refers to the context in which an actor is embedded.  As might be expected from an 
anthropocentric discipline, IR tends to equate the term with a unit’s social milieu rather than the physical systems of 
which it is a part.  Though this thesis disagrees with IR’s customary, anthropocentric construction of environment, it 
will continue to use the term to denote a system’s overall social and physical context.  It will employ the term 
ecology to refer to the specifically physical environments associated with Earth’s planetary systems. 
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and eventually overlay – those of the Americas.  Interaction capacity can therefore 
help to explain three defining parameters of any international system: how large it can 
be; how its units are distributed; and what kinds of processes are possible within it.  
Systems with higher interaction capacity are able to interact effectively across longer 
distances, extending their range.  The ways in which geography and technology relate 
also affect the distribution of units within the system, with units spatially distributed to 
take advantage of geographies well-suited to their existing technological adaptations. 
Finally, different varieties of interaction require different levels of interaction capacity, 
leading to the development of different interactive processes. For example, trade in 
bulk goods is more demanding than the exchange of ideas, and therefore requires a 
higher level of interaction capacity in order to develop within an international system.  
In addition to these effects, interaction capacity affects the way in which structure 
affects systemic interactions, with higher levels of interaction capacity normally 
translating into higher levels of structural influence. 110 
Processes 
The systems created by the interaction of collective actors at the international scale are 
inherently social insofar as they produce patterns of behaviour that recur over time.  
These patterns are evidence of processes, which describe the means by which actors 
relate to one another – be it through trade, tribute, diplomacy, or war. Actors’ choices 
depend on the dynamics of interaction within the systems they inhabit, including their 
interaction capacities. As previously argued, a system whose technological capacities 
make it unable to move heavy goods over large distances is unlikely to develop bulk 
trade.  It is also unlikely to experience large-scale warfare, as armies require even 
higher levels of interaction capacity than do commodities such as lumber or wheat.111   
 
Over time, the processes through which units interact can become entrenched in formal 
and informal codes of systemic behaviour, generating principles that describe (i) who 
can legitimately act within a system, and (ii) what they can legitimately do.  Until very 
recently, only some states were permitted to take part in diplomatic discussions, with 
firms and civil society organizations being excluded.  Though this membership rule 
has since weakened, diplomacy still takes place within the context of social principles 
that privilege states over non-states.  While such principles of membership determine 
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who can act, principles of behaviour, such as respect for diplomatic immunity, specify 
what is expected of systemic participants.  Both varieties of principle can be formal or 
informal, written down in treaties or based on precedent.  In this sense, processes give 
rise to the social principles that bound a system – institutions in the English School 
sense of the term.  These pervade all historically-constructed international systems and 
are constituted the social content of an international system, and are generated by the 
repeated interaction of its constituent actors.112 
 
International systems’ social content is an inescapable product of human interactions.  
Even in the midst of the most horrific wars of the twentieth century, unit interaction 
generated shared social principles.  On the Western Front of World War One, truces 
and prisoner exchanges continued to describe the ‘rules of war’ despite the unrelenting 
slaughter, showing the power of social content to regularize even the most horrific 
processes.  On the Russian Front of World War Two, more sanguinary principles 
evolved in which neither side expected or gave any quarter to the other.  Even this 
mutual dehumanization still contained a social element in which the sides arrived at a 
set of expected behaviours in the context of their dealings.  This leads us to an 
important point for understanding the nature of the principles that derive from social 
processes: the content generated by systemic interaction need not be peaceful or 
cooperative.  As Alexander Wendt argues in Social Theory in International Politics, 
international systems constituted by the interaction of units can range from convergent 
to adversarial, depending on how units act towards one another (i.e. as friends, rivals, 
or enemies).113  The systemic ‘rules of the game’ that develop out of repeated 
processes can vary from those aimed at cooperation between actors to those that 
describe the ways in which they fight.  Only wars of total extermination, in which one 
collective actor seeks the annihilation of another without any communication between 
them, could generate a truly asocial system.  In the few historical cases where such 
systems can be identified, they are short-lived, giving way to socially constrained 
forms of combat as victors begin to demand tribute from or rule over defeated 
territories and populations.  In reality, asocial wars of extermination are best studied 
through their frequent use in science fiction and fantasy.  Tolkien, not Thucydides, 
describes international systems devoid of social content.  The true history of the 
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international system is resolutely social, characterized by processes that become 
sedimented over time, giving rise to the principles of membership and behaviour that 
describe systemic relationships at the international scale.114 
Structure 
The third and final source of explanation that Buzan and Little use to analyse the 
evolution of international systems in world history is structure.  In the context of their 
work, structure is a function of a system’s social environment – encouraging units to 
act in ways that may be at odds with their internal processes and ensuring that an 
international system is more complex than the sum of its parts.  Whereas processes 
describe the ways in which units interact, structures describe the influence of 
environmental conditions on ‘the principles by which units are arranged into a system, 
how units are differentiated from each other, and how they stand relative to each other 
in terms of relative capabilities.’115  For Hedley Bull, the absence of a supreme arbiter 
or judge in the global states-system defines an anarchical structure in which no actor 
holds a hierarchically superior position in regards to decision-making and conflict 
resolution.  This anarchical structure encourages units in the system to pursue 
processes, such as war, that they might avoid were their relationships arranged in such 
a way as to permit alternative forms of conflict resolution, such as is sometimes found 
in domestic and hierarchic political systems.116   
 
IR’s highly developed use of structure to describe the influence of social environments 
on the evolution of international systems masks the discipline’s continuing inability to 
explain the structural implications of physical environments.  Even theoretical 
pluralists like Buzan and Little ‘admit defeat in trying to conceptualize [ecological] 
structure in IR terms.’ Their reasoning is straightforward and instructive, citing the fact 
that ecological structures fall ‘outside the social realm that is [their] subject’, leading 
them to marginalize physical context except ‘in terms of its consequences for 
international systems.’117 This instrumental use of ecological structure results in a 
model of historical evolution that treats international systems as ecologically 
homogenous – relatively unaffected by differences in climate, precipitation, or soil 
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chemistry except insofar as these constrain or encourage social sources of systemic 
evolution.  Though unproblematic when applied to topics unconcerned with ecological 
causes and effects, their anthropocentric approach is unsuited to the socio-ecological 
analysis to which this project is dedicated.  A new approach, capable of folding Buzan 
and Little’s social ontology of into an ecological framework, is needed if we are to 
account for Ecology’s constitutive role in systemic evolution.  
 
*** 
 
International systems are networks formed by the structured interactions of collective 
actors at the international scale, whose interactive processes generate principles of 
systemic membership and behaviour.  Their evolution can be analysed in terms of 
three fundamental sources of explanation: interaction capacity, process, and structure.  
The international economic system responsible for the global trade in petroleum 
products, for example, can be described in terms of its ability to move oil and capital 
around the globe, the ways in which its participants interact, and structural features 
generated by the social environment that affect actors' positions and relative 
capabilities – such as the nature of the market system that determines prices.   By 
tracing changes to these three sources of explanation, it becomes possible to analyse 
the evolution of the international systems that they describe. 
International Systems: levels of analysis, 
sectors, & the matrix 
 
Now that we have identified criteria by which international systems’ evolution can be 
analysed, we must return to a fundamental question: how many international systems 
are there?  The obvious answer is: more than one.  ‘The’ international system is not a 
discrete historical entity.  As was hinted at through our use of Michael Mann’s 
definitions, a system is a composite made up of numerous interacting networks ranging 
from the states system to the international economy.   These ‘subsystems’ are 
themselves constituted by the structured interaction of collective actors at the 
international scale.  Thanks to this complex layering, it is not enough to identify the 
sources of explanation by which international systems’ evolution can be traced.  We 
also need some means by which to identify and analyse the different functional and 
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regional subsystems out of which 'the' international system – taken as a whole – is 
constructed.  Fortunately, two tools are ready at hand: levels of analysis and sectors. 
Levels of Analysis 
Levels of analysis are ontological referents that disaggregate international systems 
according to the spatial scales at which one locates their sources of explanation and 
outcomes.  Different levels of analysis portray the world in terms of different referents.  
Some in IR choose to locate their sources of explanation for systemic behaviour at the 
level of the individual.  The individual, they might argue, sits at the centre of an 
expanding set of concentric circles ‘which starts with the family, moves out to the 
neighbourhood, then to the city, the state, and finally the human race.’118  In this 
worldview, interactive processes among families, neighbourhoods, cities, states, and 
humanity can all be explained in terms of the individual human beings who make them 
up, with each concentric circle locating explanations and outcomes at the individual 
level of analysis. 
 
There is nothing about the use of levels that suggests a necessary pattern of priority 
among them.  Choices of explanatory level simply reflect analysts’ interests and the 
topics that they choose to pursue.119  In descending order of scale, IR’s levels of 
analysis include: 
 
1. International Systems, which signify the largest communities of interacting 
units.  Although the rise of widely-accepted behavioural principles has led 
some students and practitioners of IR to focus on the presence of a single, 
monolithic international system, both the historical and the contemporary 
record indicate that – at any one time – several international systems are 
operating simultaneously around the world;  
2. International Subsystems, which signify groups of units within an international 
system that are distinguished from the system as a whole by the nature or 
intensity of their interactions.  Some may be territorially coherent, in which 
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case they are regional subsystems.  Others focus on relations in a single 
sector;120 
3. Units, which are collective actors made up of interacting sets of organizations 
and individuals.  In terms of IR, a unit must be (1) organized enough to be 
capable of cohesive decision-making and (2) sufficiently autonomous in its 
decision-making to have independent standing among the highest levels of 
collective actor, such as the state and the firm.  As discussed earlier, units play 
an important role in defining the boundaries of the international scale by 
tracing the outlines of the inside-outside distinction on which it is based; 
4. Subunits, which are collective actors operating within a unit.  They are often 
capable of affecting their parent units’ behaviour, though they lack the 
autonomy to operate on par with other, higher-level collective actors; 
5. Individuals, which are the most basic unit of study.  Their interactions 
constitute each of the levels above them and are, in turn, affected by the 
structural constraints and incentives that their interactions generate.121 
 
Levels of analysis describe the ontological scale at which an analyst chooses to locate 
sources of explanation and outcomes in their description of an international system. 
Thus, a unit-level analysis will locate its explanation of individual and systemic 
decision-making at a spatial scale described by units’ internal constitutions.  
Alternatively, the analyst may focus on the influence of system-level interaction 
capacities, processes, and structures.   The levels of analysis can be applied to the same 
subject matter in a variety of ways.  A political scientist might identify an individual 
state as the ‘system’ they wish to study – composed of the structured interaction of 
individual citizens and 'domestic' groups.  A student of IR is more likely to identify the 
systems level with a regional or global international system in which states themselves 
are individual ‘units’.  One person’s unit can be another person’s system, and vice-
versa.  As Buzan and Little explain, ‘each level can be represented as a unit within a 
larger system, or as a system embracing the units of a lower level.’122 
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If levels provide us with an ontological tool with which to analyse specific sources of 
explanation and locate their outcomes, how do the three sources of explanation 
discussed in the previous section relate to the level at which analysis takes place?  
Each of our three sources of explanation can be located at any level of analysis.  The 
development of structures can be explained in terms of the individuals, units, or 
systems whose interactions with their social environment generate structural 
constraints.  The same is true for interaction capacity and process.  Levels of analysis 
illustrate how the global international system, often referred to in monolithic terms, 
can be reimagined as a series of interacting and overlapping regional subsystems, each 
of which can be described in terms of its own social sources of explanation. 
Sectors 
The various components out of which ‘the’ international system is constructed can also 
be organised into a typology based on the sector of interaction to which units, 
processes, and structures belong.  Whereas levels are ontological referents that 
describe the spatial scale at which an analyst chooses to locate her sources of 
explanation and outcomes, sectors are analytical tools that disaggregate human 
relationships into a manageable typology of political, economic, and societal 
interactions.123  They are means of managing information by analysing the global 
international system ‘in terms of the types of activities, units, interactions, and 
structures within it.’124  Sectors generate particular visions of reality according to the 
types of unit, process, and structure chosen for analysis.  Classical Marxists, for 
example, prioritize relations in the economic sector, using a unit’s or system’s class 
relationships to explain its political and societal interactions.  Sectors paint different 
pictures of international systems in the same way that different lenses change an 
observer’s view, emphasizing and masking aspects of the world before them.  Buzan 
and Little explain sectors by reference to this metaphor, explaining that,  
 
[e]ven though the observed object remains the same (ignoring Heisenberg), different 
lenses highlight different aspects of its reality.  The naked eye sees mostly exterior 
shape and colour.  The infrared sees the pattern of heat.  The X-Ray sees patterns of 
physical density.  The electron microscope sees molecular structure. The function of 
sectors is the same as that of these physical lenses: each one gives a view of the whole 
that emphasizes some things, and de-emphasizes, or even hides completely, others.125 
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Sectors, then, are analytical tools used to disaggregate the infinite complexity of 
human interactions, allowing relatively simple political, economic, and societal 
dynamics to be analysed in isolation from the broad sweep of human history.   
 
Though analytically powerful, sectors are not without their shortcomings.  The neat 
categories into which sectors divide reality belie the complex interdependencies at the 
heart of international systems.  Reality cannot be divided into neat typologies without 
doing considerable violence to the connections that – in reality – link political, 
economic, cultural, and military systems.  Despite their utility as analytical tools, 
sectors “lack the quality of independent existence.  Relations of coercion do not exist 
apart from relations of exchange, authority, identity, or environment.”126  Rather, the 
practices and principles that define membership and behaviour in an international 
system tend to spill over sectoral boundaries, spreading the impact of activity in one 
sector to every other part of the wider system under investigation.  Sectoral 
interference, in which such spillage allows causes in one sector to generate effects in 
another, adds to an international system’s inherent complexity by generating emergent 
outcomes.  These arise from of the interaction of a system’s constituent units, 
processes, and structures, allowing unforeseen effects to radiate through an interactive 
network from a single, apparently isolated sectoral subsystem.127  An analysis of the 
Communications Revolution might identify the impact of online networking, a practice 
located in the societal sector, on the way that firms operate in the economic sector.  As 
evidenced by the role of information technology in the Arab Spring, these societal and 
economic processes can also have unintended political consequences, neatly 
illustrating the ways in which phenomena in one sector spill over to affect the 
evolution of others. 
 
When applied to international systems, different sectors highlight different varieties of 
unit, process, and structure.  They provide a handy analytical device with which to 
organise the planet’s functionally defined international subsystems in terms of the 
units and interactions that they embody.  An international system located in the 
political sector will feature political units interacting via political processes, influenced 
by political structures derived from their social environment.  An international system 
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located in the economic sector will likewise be described in terms of economic units, 
processes, and structures.  As has already been discussed, sectors do not represent 
well-defined divisions between historically distinct international systems.  They are 
parts of a much more complex whole, in which one unit can play a number of different 
roles in a number of different sectoral subsystems.  Despite their contested position in 
the international system, states remain the most influential unit in the political sector 
where they hold a structurally superior position to most firms and civil society 
organizations.  At the same time, states are actors in the international economic 
system.  Here, their structural position has recently been shown to be less-than-
dominant – as evidenced by several downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings by 
private-sector economic actors such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.   
 
Finally, sectors help us to understand the influence of interaction capacity on the 
varieties of process that are possible within a given international system.  Processes 
such as cultural exchange – located in the societal sector – require relatively low levels 
of interaction capacity, as ideas are generally easy to transport.  Trade in low-volume, 
high-status items requires somewhat more interaction capacity, making economic 
systems more susceptible to the limitations imposed by interaction capacity than are 
their societal counterparts.  Political interaction, such as the establishment of 
permanent embassies, requires high levels of interaction capacity.  Considerable 
physical technology is needed to allow embassies to communicate regularly with their 
metropolitan state and they require social technologies such as differentiated state 
institutions and knowledge of their hosts’ language and customs to support and make 
use of diplomatic processes.  If maintaining state representatives in foreign embassies 
requires considerable interaction capacity, then the maintenance of armies in the field 
requires even more.  War – located in the military sector – is therefore even more 
sensitive to interaction capacity than are the other sectoral processes mentioned so far.  
This is illustrative of the fact that, although interaction capacity is a fundamental 
property of all systems, its consequences vary from sector to sector, making sectors 
useful tools with which to identify and analyse the levels of interaction capacity 
present within functionally defined international systems.128 
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The Analytical Matrix 
Together, levels and sectors are useful tools with which to disaggregate the complexity 
of the global international system.  As ontological referents, levels locate explanations 
and outcomes at specific spatial scales in a nested hierarchy of systems, subsystems, 
units, subunits, and individuals.  Sectors divide international interactions into a number 
of analytical categories defined by the types of units, processes, and structures under 
investigation.  Different approaches to IR make use of these tools to describe different 
aspects of global affairs.   For example, Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
focuses on a systems-level explanation of interactions that take place among a specific 
type of societal actor.  Hans Morgenthau locates his explanations of international 
political systems at the individual level of analysis – explaining the international 
system as a function of the nature of the individuals whose interactions constitute its 
networks.  Most IR theorists have carved out a specific academic niche that can be 
described in terms of the levels and sectors included in their work.  In so doing, they 
locate their sources of explanation in different parts of the analytical matrix depicted 
below, emphasizing varieties of interaction and locating their explanations and 
outcomes at different ontological scales. (See figure 2.1) 
 
Levels/Sectors Economic Political Societal 
Individual  Morgenthau  
Subunit    
Unit Tilly  
Subsystem Strange  
System  Waltz Huntington 
Figure 2.1 – A matrix of levels and sectors in the analysis of international systems, locating selected IR theorists in 
their respective ‘boxes’129 
 
This matrix provides a useful starting point for analyses of international systems in the 
historical record.  As discussed earlier in this Chapter, international systems can be 
described in terms of three anthropocentric sources of explanation – interaction 
capacity, process, and structure.  As these terms are imported into each of figure 2.1’s 
boxes, they take on new meanings.  Kenneth Waltz describes systems in terms of 
                                                
129 Adapted from Ibid: 77.  See also Samuel Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs 72(3) 1992, 
pp. 22-50; Morgenthau (1993); Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: a theoretical analysis (Chichester: 
Columbia University Press, 2001) third edition; Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, 
in Bringing the State Back In, Peter Evans et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 169-187; Susan 
Strange, States and Markets (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1988). 
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system-level sources of explanation in the political sector.  For him, the interaction of 
political units – states – can be described in term of political processes – war and 
diplomacy – in a system defined by systemically-derived political structures – namely, 
international anarchy amongst functionally undifferentiated political units.  Each of the 
approaches listed in figure 2.1 generates its own internally-coherent image of the 
international system based on a specific understanding of the sectors and levels it 
prioritizes.  Each also pays a price for its precision.  By excluding some sectors, they 
mask the influence of the other functionally-defined international subsystems.  In 
doing so, they marginalize units, processes, and structures located in any but their 
preferred sector.  Likewise, the prioritisation of explanations and outcomes in a single 
level of analysis can diminish the perceived impact of influences emanating from 
others spatial scales.  Waltz’s prioritization of systems over units, for example, blinds 
him to the influence of units’ internal constitutions on their international behaviour.  
Limiting analysis to a single combination of sectors and levels forces many of IR’s 
dominant theories to make do with impoverished understandings of the complete 
international system they seek to describe, leaving them ill-equipped to account for the 
wide range of subsystems that have evolved within it and continue to affect the course 
of its social evolution.130   
The Evolution of International Systems 
 
If this project is to analyse Ecology's role in the evolution of Arctic international 
systems, it is important that we understand the relationship between the social and 
ecological environments in which those systems are embedded.  Evolution does not 
entail a process of improvement or betterment.  As Stephen Jay Gould explains, 
‘Evolution, to professionals, is adaptation to changing environments, not progress.’131 
Since IR’s anthropocentric turn following the Second World War, the discipline’s 
conception of the international system has focused on the impact of human action on 
human systems composed of human individuals and units.  Systemic evolution has 
therefore been a function of anthropogenic adaptations to changing social 
environments described in terms of social processes and social structures.  The story of 
social constraint developed by the ES – with its focus on the role of institutions – 
                                                
130 Buzan & Little (2000): 67. 
131 Stephen Jay Gould, Beautiful Life: The Burgess Shale and the nature of history (London: Vintage Books, 2000): 
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remains one of IR’s most compelling historical narratives, capable of capturing and 
explaining much of the dynamism that drives systemic evolution.  Like the rest of IR, 
however, its alienation of international units and systems from their physical 
environments has been problematic, leaving them floating in an ecologically 
decontextualized world.   
 
Contrary to what IR’s anthropocentrism would have us believe, the ecologies in which 
our lives are embedded have direct and perceptible influences on the evolution of the 
interaction capacities, processes, and structures that define our international systems.132  
This influence is reinforced by our tendency to modify our physical surroundings, 
often leading to the replication of ecosystems and biomes that suit the continued 
survival of existing social adaptations.  This socio-ecological relationship – in which 
ecological systems are modified to meet social needs while social systems 
simultaneously adapt to changing ecological conditions – has received little attention 
in IR.  Much of this may have to do with the relatively short timescales our discipline 
generally studies.  Given the relative stability of planetary systems over years and 
decades, a static view of Ecology does not present much a problem for systemic 
analyses that accept existing systems as historical givens.  The issue becomes more 
troublesome when one looks into their constitution, whose roots lay much deeper in 
the historical record and are therefore impacted by ecological changes that normally 
occur over the medium term and the longue durée.133  Instead of investigating this 
dynamic relationship between humans and their ecological environments, IR’s students 
and practitioners have generally assumed ecosystems to be either static or slowly 
depleting collections of resources, a misplaced presentism reinforced by the radically 
different timescales over which human and ecological systems normally evolve.134  
 
The sections that follow take steps to remedy this situation by considering how social 
and ecological factors combine to influence systemic evolution.  In human systems, 
                                                
132 Ecological systems describe the physical environments in which we live, including Earth’s biological 
communities and the physical and chemical systems that support them [Gordon Dickinson & Kevin Murphy, 
Ecosystems (Oxford: Routledge, 1998): 1-3.] 
133 In this case, the longue durée is used in the Braudelian sense to refer to the extended timeframe over which 
geographical and ecological systems impact the relatively stable institutional bases of human society.  It can be 
contrasted with episodic history, which occurs over the very short term, and social conjunctures, such as economic 
cycles, that can stretch over the medium term.  [Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World 
in the Age of Phillip II: volume I, Trans. Sian Reynolds (London: University of California Press, 1995): 23, 353-
354.] 
134 Buzan & Little (2000): 18-19. 
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continuity and change are not functions of social forces alone.  Ecological factors, 
exogenous to society, play an important role in driving and constraining social change.  
Understanding these dynamics is a necessary precondition for the historical analysis 
that follows in chapters Four, Five and Six.   
Social Factors in Systemic Evolution 
As discussed in the preceding sections, IR tends to discount material causes of 
systemic continuity and change, preferring to explain its evolution in anthropogenic 
terms.  As a result, systemic stability is generally thought to be rooted in endogenous 
evolutionary mechanisms that generate negative feedback and thereby constrain 
change.  The same holds true for the perceived roots of systemic dynamism in IR, 
whose anthropogenic causes have been linked to the influence of sectoral interference 
on the evolution of systems’ social environments, driving adaptation in their 
interaction capacities, processes, and structures.  Let us look at these negative- and 
positive- feedback mechanisms in turn. 
 
One of the fundamental characteristics of socially-constructed international systems 
such as those described in this thesis is their tendency to generate path dependent 
histories: self-reinforcing behaviours that can lead society down non-reversible 
evolutionary pathways.  In path dependent histories, past actions constrain a society’s 
range of possible futures.  Path independent processes are not so encumbered and can 
develop in any direction at any time without reference to past conditions. Path 
dependent evolution, meanwhile, excludes a set of alternatives from its range of 
possible future adaptations.  Path dependence reflects what in physics and maths is 
referred to as sensitivity to initial conditions, in which a system’s past plays a central 
role in shaping its future.135  Conceived of in terms of social systems, path dependence 
is a consequence of incentives and disincentives generated by repeated interaction.136  
In his study of the processes that drive technological innovation, W. Brian Arthur 
identifies four such self-reinforcing mechanisms: setup costs, learning effects, 
coordination effects, and adaptive expectations.137  Each refers to a set of incentives 
that promote social continuity by raising the political, economic, social, or cultural 
                                                
135 Paul A. David, "Path Dependence, its critics, and the quest for 'historical economics'", Working Papers 00011, 
(Stanford University: Department of Economics, 2000): 4, 6. 
136 Peter Hall & Rosemary Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Studies 44(5) 
1996, p. 941. 
137 W. Brian Arthur, ‘Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics’ in Kenneth Arrow & David Pines, The Economy 
as a Complex Evolving System (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1988): 10. 
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costs of deviant behaviour while, at the same time, raising the returns accruing to those 
who adapt to and adopt socially accepted behaviour.  While no mechanism can 
guarantee systemic stability, each helps to explain the evolutionary constraints that 
generate negative systemic feedback and thereby help processes and structures to 
persist over time, making them ‘sticky’.138     
 
Setup costs refer to the effort needed to generate new varieties of process, something 
that requires the adoption of novel practices and principles by members of a socially-
constructed system.  Arthur observes that once a pattern of behaviour is learned, it is 
only abandoned with difficulty.  Having borne the costs associated with its adoption, 
individuals and collective actors are unlikely to replace it with an entirely novel set of 
practices and principles so long as the process in question continues to fulfil its social 
functions.139  Setup costs therefore represent the power of social inertia: the resistance 
of a social process or structure to changes in its current state.  By this reasoning, it is 
much more difficult to generate a novel practice or principle than it is to adapt existing 
forms.  The practical result of setup costs is a general preference for gradual change 
over revolutionary upheaval.   
 
Learning effects also play a key role in generating path dependence and, therefore, 
systemic stability.  Once an actor has invested the capital required to learn and adopt 
practices associated with a particular process, she is unlikely to abandon them.  
Learning institutional skills requires an investment of time, labour, and/or capital.  As 
an actor becomes more familiar with a specific process, the political, economic, 
societal, or cultural returns she realizes from its use will likely increase, making 
dramatic reversals ever more unlikely.140  Thus, as the People’s Republic of China has 
become more aware of, and engaged with, processes associated with international 
trade, both the Chinese state and Chinese firms have translated their improved 
knowledge into increasing economic returns.  This reduces the likelihood of either the 
state or the firms abandoning what – to them – appears to be an increasingly profitable 
international economic system. 
 
                                                
138 G. John Ikenberry, ‘Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order’, 
International Security 23(2) 1998-1999, pp. 43, 55. 
139 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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At the level of interacting units, coordination effects reinforce path dependence and the 
stability of a human system by granting advantages to cooperating actors.141   The 
processes by which units in a system interact serve particular purposes in human 
relations.  At any time, units might choose to abandon current practices, so perceptions 
of their utility help to ensure their long-term survival.  In general, the principles of 
systemic membership and behaviour described earlier in this Chapter can be thought of 
as social technologies that circumvent the imperfect information that often hampers 
social interaction.  By replacing a potentially infinite range of actions with a bounded 
set of accepted behaviours, these ‘rules of the game’ limit social uncertainty and lower 
the costs – and risks – of cooperation.  The more widely a set of socially-constructed 
principles is accepted, the greater this effect and the less likely actors are to accept 
dramatic redefinitions of the ‘rules’ by which they regularise their interactions.   
 
This leads to adaptive expectations, Arthur’s fourth and final self-reinforcing 
mechanism contributing to path dependent social constraint.  Adaptive expectations 
result when widespread acceptance of a specific process – such as the exchange of 
diplomatic representatives – reduces uncertainty over its long-term durability.  This 
lowers actors’ perceptions of risk and makes them more willing to invest in the 
learning and coordination necessary to realize social returns.  Actors are therefore 
more likely to adopt the social and physical technologies required for systemic 
participation, and will coordinate their activities with other actors when they believe 
that the processes in question will be a durable part of their system for the foreseeable 
future.  These adaptive expectations feed back into Arthur’s other path dependent 
mechanisms, generating a negative feedback loop that bolsters the stability of the 
social systems in question.142 
 
Thanks to these constraints, even narrowly accepted processes – such as the use of 
Latin in the Roman Catholic Church – can endure over extended periods despite 
competition from other processes – such as the use of the vernacular.  Having paid the 
setup costs associated with the adoption of Latin, including education of the clergy and 
the translation of key texts, the Church was able to harness the learning and 
coordination effects of their lingua franca to cooperate in the pursuit of shared goals.  
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The long-term stability of Latin as the language of the Church lowered the risks run by 
individuals in pursuing a Latin education for the purpose of joining the clergy.  These 
then fed back into the system’s learning and coordination effects to help Latin survive 
for more than a millennium and a half after its decline in lay society.  In several 
regions of the world, path dependence has helped processes that evolved prior to the 
overlay of European international principles to endure as localized patterns of 
behaviour, differentiating their experiences of the international system by stabilising 
regional principles of membership and behaviour that differentiate them from the 
global system. 
 
The systemic continuity engendered by the constraints of path dependence must be set 
alongside endogenous sources of social dynamism.  One of the many strengths of 
Buzan and Little’s approach to the study of international systems is its ability to 
account for historical change.  Thus, even while systems’ processes and structures 
generate relatively stable path dependent histories, their evolution is continually being 
driven by alterations to their social environment caused by sectoral interference.  As 
described in the previous section, this occurs when causes or effects in one sector spill 
over to affect developments in another.   Even minor social changes tend to spill over 
the international system’s analytical divisions to impact its other functional 
subsystems.143  Sectoral interference therefore adds to systemic complexity and works 
against the stabilizing power of path dependence by generating emergent patterns – 
outcomes of structured systems that arise, unforeseen, from the interaction of their 
component parts.144  This positive feedback alters the social environment in which a 
system have evolved, altering the utility of its existing principles and thereby 
encouraging further adaptation.   
 
*** 
 
Social evolution is affected by at least two endogenous factors: path dependence and 
sectoral interference.  The first tends to constrain evolutionary adaptation by raising 
the costs of abandoning the status quo. The second describes how units, processes, and 
structures are continually buffeted by influences arising in other functional 
                                                
143 James March and Johan Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, International 
Organization, 52(4) 1998, pp. 954-955. 
144 Simmons (2007): 232. 
  P a g e  | 60 
 
subsystems.  By spilling over sectors’ analytical boundaries, these alter social 
environments and thereby affect the utility of systems’ existing adaptations, 
encouraging the adoption of novel practices and principles to meet new social 
conditions.  Together, these mechanisms can generate narratives of historical social 
change.  Without accounting for the evolutionary impact of exogenous factors, 
however, these narratives remain incomplete. 
Ecological Factors in Systemic Evolution 
Ecological context enters the story of international systems when human interactions 
are removed from their theoretical isolation and embedded in a specific historical 
environment.  This affects systemic evolution in at least three respects.  First, 
ecological context describes the initial conditions under which social systems evolve, 
with important ramifications for the future direction of their path dependent histories.  
Second, ecological systems tend to change across geological and climatic rather than 
human timescales, enabling and reinforcing path dependence by buttressing 
individuals’ adaptive expectations.  This encourages investments in existing processes, 
which are geared to the challenges and opportunities of existing physical 
environments.  Finally, rapid changes to an ecosystem can radically alter the utility of 
a given social adaptation, leading to moments of punctuated equilibrium in which an 
individual, unit, or system shifts abruptly from one state to another. Such instances 
force systems to adopt new behaviours or face the possibility of collapse when their 
principles of membership and behaviour prove unsustainable.  As the growing 
literature on social collapse indicates, physical environments have been prime movers 
in the transformation and downfall of international systems in world history.145  That 
being said, ecology has also been responsible for stabilizing and preserving humanity’s 
international systems.  Thus, there is a parallel body of work that looks at the role of 
relatively stable Holocene Era ecological conditions in enabling and encouraging many 
of the social adaptations on which international systems now depend.146 
 
As indicated in our previous discussion of path dependence, international systems are 
sensitive to the initial conditions in which they develop.  Ecosystems constitute the 
permissive material contexts in which international systems originate and evolve, 
defining the surpluses and deficits that a human unit or system has to manage in order 
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to reproduce itself.  For example, the floral communities of the Neolithic Near East 
and China provided a necessary material cause for their subsequent urbanization.  The 
presence of wheat, rye, and rice grains constituted an initial condition for the 
subsequent evolution of Near Eastern and Chinese agriculture by giving their early 
agricultural populations access to excellent sources of carbohydrates, protein, fats, and 
essential vitamins that could be domesticated and improved through selective 
breeding.  These floral communities permitted their associated human populations to 
accumulate sufficient caloric and nutritional surpluses to support urban polities and, 
via evolutionary processes reaching down to the present, the principles of the modern 
state.147  The more labour-intensive and protein-, fat-, and vitamin-deficient food 
sources available to early agriculturalists in New Guinea led them down different 
evolutionary pathways.  Their principal crop, harvested from the heart of the sago 
palm, is composed almost entirely of carbohydrates, with little protein, fat, or vitamin 
content.  The relatively small caloric and nutritional surpluses harvested from this crop 
forced large segments of New Guinean society to dedicate their time to agricultural 
production when compared to the more productive floral species of mainland societies.  
This initial condition limited the ability of New Guinean socio-economic systems to 
sustain urban populations, encouraging the evolution of a largely agrarian society in 
place of the urban polities of the Near East.148 
 
At the ecological extreme, the power of a human system’s physical environment to 
mould the course of its social evolution is even more apparent.  In the circumpolar 
Arctic, the tundra’s abiotic nutrient cycles have made the local development of 
agriculture almost unthinkable, affecting the course of its embedded societies.  Instead 
of locking organic matter in the soil, as occurs in agriculturally productive biomes, the 
majority of the tundra’s organic matter accumulates in surface deposits of peat and 
humus.  These support large herbaceous mammals, such as reindeer and muskox, 
which, in turn, constitute the primary prey species for the region’s large terrestrial 
predators.149  This nutrient cycle leaves tundra soils with very little surplus organic 
material to form the basis for agricultural production, which cannot develop until 
physical or social technologies are adapted to overcome this ecological constraint.  
Arctic ecosystems therefore set their embedded collective actors and systems on 
                                                
147 Simmons (2007): 56;  Hughes (2001): 30-2.   
148 Diamond (1997): 147-150. 
149 Molles (1999): 39-40. 
  P a g e  | 62 
 
historical pathways that incentivized social adaptations associated with hunting and 
gathering, such as mobility and population dispersal, while creating disincentives 
around agricultural institutions more suited to the world’s more temperate regions.150 
 
The impact of initial ecological conditions on the evolution of social principles has 
been reinforced by a second factor – human perceptions of time.  As we will discuss in 
the next Chapter, the ecological systems that we inhabit are never still. Rivers move 
and disappear, as the Saraswati is believed to have done during the late Harappan 
period of the Indus valley civilization.151  Coastlines grow through sedimentation and 
tectonic uplift and retreat through erosion and rising sea levels.  Mountains are thrust 
upward and worn away over the course of geological time.152  As we are now learning, 
even the chemical composition of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, and lithosphere are 
liable to change, influencing the distribution of ecosystems around the globe by 
shifting patterns of precipitation and temperature.153  These changes mark the 
ecological history of our planet.  They are also well beyond common human 
experience.  In terms of an individual human lifespan, the planetary ecosphere appears 
to be a stable system.  This is far from the case.  Ecosystems are constantly being 
transformed and remade.  Fortunately, since many of their components change over 
eras counted in many human generations, units and international systems normally 
have time to adapt to new ecological conditions without being forced into abrupt 
evolutionary step-changes.154  The longue durée over which ecological transformations 
often occur reinforces our expectations of ecological stability, constituting a 
permissive context without which societies’ adaptive expectations, and the path 
dependence they engender, could not develop. 
 
The impact of the Holocene Era on the units, processes, and structures that constitute 
our global international system is built into the evolutionary legacy of humanity’s early 
agricultural polities.  Since its beginning around 11,500 years ago [11.5kya], the 
Holocene has been marked by climatic stability and relatively high levels of 
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atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2).155  In contrast, the Pleistocene Era that preceded it 
was one of extreme climatic instability, including four major glaciations between 
1.8mya and 11.5kya that led to major reductions in global rainfall and CO2.  It was 
during the Pleistocene that homo sapiens first emerged from Africa, probably around 
120kya.  The first fully modern humans followed around 90kya, becoming the only 
surviving member of our genus by the time of the last glacial maximum (LGM) around 
22-20kya.156  For most of our history, humanity has been a species of hunters and 
gatherers.  Agriculture remains a brief experiment in human social organization.  The 
earliest archaeological evidence of domesticated crop production by settled groups is 
from Abu Hureya in Syria, occupied at the turning of the short-lived Younger Dryas – 
the final major cooling event of the Pleistocene – and the Holocene around 11.5kya.157   
Why, after at least eighty thousand years as hunters and gatherers, did human societies 
alter their organising principles?  Glacial and seabed cores give us a clue.  These 
demonstrate the extent of the Pleistocene’s extreme temperature variability, which 
featured significant decadal swings and thereby made the development of sustained 
agricultural societies highly unlikely.158 (See figure 2.2) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 - Temperature and CH4  concentrations in Greenland, Venezuela,  
and Globally, 100kya to present 159 
                                                
155 This thesis will utilize the abbreviation kya to denote ‘thousands of years ago’ and mya to denote ‘million years 
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156 Simmons (2007): 26. 
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158 Richerson et al. (2001): 391-392. 
159 R. B. Alley et al. ‘Abrupt Climate Change’, Science, 299(5615) 2003, pp. 2005-2010.  Paleoclimatic data 
showing abrupt climate changes, after (45) and other sources. The lower panel is the history of temperature in 
central Greenland over the last 110,000 years. Details of temperature for the Younger Dryas (YD) event and for the 
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important tropical sources. Gray-scale of a sediment core from the Cariaco Basin, offshore Venezuela, is plotted 
here so that a down-ward shift corresponds to the effects of stronger winds over the basin or decreased rainfall on 
  P a g e  | 64 
 
 
This variability became much less pronounced after the Younger Dryas (YD in figure 
2.2).  The Holocene’s relative stability is illustrated by comparison with the 20°C 
swings evident in Pleistocene temperature records from Greenland ice cores and 
sediment records from Venezuela’s Cariaco basin.  Following the end of the Younger 
Dryas, global temperatures stabilized around today’s levels, marking the end of the 
Pleistocene’s massive fluctuations.  This stability is particularly evident in the upper 
left hand panel of figure 2.2, which illustrates the most dramatic cooling event of the 
Holocene.  This saw global temperatures drop by an average of 6°C, massive by 
modern standards but small when set beside the enormous swings of the previous 
geological era.  
 
Holocene stability permitted the adaptation of physical and social technologies 
associated with agriculture, allowing early farmers to produce larger quantities of food 
and encouraging population expansion and further investments in agricultural 
adaptations.  Though not sufficient in and of themselves to explain the course of 
humanity’s social evolution, the Holocene’s ecological conditions are certainly a 
necessary cause.  Agriculture was not a viable socio-economic option in the ecological 
conditions that predominated during the late Pleistocene.  Dry and highly variable 
climates typified by low concentrations of CO2 and rapid, high amplitude temperature 
swings occurring over human timescales worked against its development.  Holocene 
ecology incentivised agriculture by providing an apparently stable physical 
environment in which populations could innovate and improve agricultural processes, 
giving rise to increasingly intensive forms of subsistence.160  Humans living prior to 
11.5kya were no stupider we are.  Indeed, we are physiologically identical.  Our 
ancestors merely faced ecological conditions that made agriculture and its associated 
units, processes, and structures unsustainable, incentivizing other modes of resource 
production.  The adoption of agricultural production during the Holocene was not 
inevitable.  Neither are endogenous social evolutionary mechanisms enough to explain 
its evolution.  Rather, agriculture arose in specific physical contexts enjoying relatively 
stable initial ecological conditions, affecting the direction of humanity’s path 
dependent evolution by constituting a stable physical environment in which specialised 
adaptations could develop.  
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While ecosystems are important sources of institutional stability, they can also drive 
processes of systemic change.  This is particularly true of punctuated ecological 
transformations, in which new ecological conditions force units to adapt their social 
and physical technologies or face the possibility of systemic collapse.  The 
introduction of Europeans’ portmanteau biota into the ecosystems of the Americas and 
its disastrous effect on the pre-international systems of America’s indigenous units 
constitutes one example of this phenomenon.  Europeans’ conquest of the Americas 
was notable for the key role played by the plants, animals, and pathogens that citizens 
of the ‘Old World’ brought with them to the ‘New’.  Flora, fauna, and microbes were 
at the vanguard of European expansion, undermining the ecological systems on which 
American systems depended for their survival.  By displacing native flora and fauna, 
including killing off large sections of the indigenous human population, these species 
helped to recreate ‘neo-European’ ecosystems, where units, processes, and structures 
from the Old World could operate in familiar physical surroundings.161   
 
The most effective foot soldier of European conquest was not Francisco Pizarro, 
Jacques Cartier, or Walter Raleigh, but the variola virus, the carrier of smallpox.  
Although the numbers of indigenous people whom it killed remains a hotly debated 
topic, smallpox’s effects are plainly written across the Native American systems it 
attacked.  Lacking natural immunity and without either the physical or social 
technologies needed to control its spread, these could not stop smallpox from running 
rampant across the continent.  Outpacing all but the quickest of its human fellow-
travellers, smallpox moved along existing trade routes from Hispaniola, north to the 
Great Lakes and south to the Pampas, burning back and forth through populations in 
the worst series of epidemics of recorded history.  Smallpox pulled units and systems 
apart at their seams.  Mortality rates, estimated above fifty percent in the continental 
United States west of the Mississippi, were probably far higher in the Andean 
highlands and the Valley of Mexico.162  When Hernando De Soto travelled along the 
Mississippi River between 1539 and 1542, he found a land of villages and city-states, 
featuring hierarchically and functionally differentiated societies, large-scale trade, and 
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monumental architecture.  When settlers began to penetrate the Mississippi region 
from New France and British North America over a century later, they found a very 
different scene.  Where De Soto had seen cities and fields of maize, all was wilderness.  
One-time centres of Mississippian culture were abandoned and overgrown, giving rise 
to the myth of a virgin continent untouched by human industry.163  What these 
incoming settlers saw was not a primordial forest however, but a post-apocalyptic 
wasteland stripped of its people by a punctuated environmental change – the 
introduction of a new biological population – with which their units, processes, and 
structures could not cope.   
 
Punctuated systemic change can also result from alterations to the physical and 
chemical processes on which biological populations depend, such as those that stressed 
Greenland’s Norse settlements to the point of collapse in the late medieval period.  
When Erik the Red discovered, explored, and settled the Southern and Western coasts 
of Greenland around AD982, he did so during a relatively short-lived climatic episode 
known as the Medieval Warm Period [MWP].  This occurred between the ninth and 
fourteenth centuries, with localized effects around the North Atlantic raising 
temperatures 0.5°C above those recorded in the first half of the twentieth century.164  
This apparently small change brought increased oceanic evaporation and precipitation 
to Western and Southern Greenland, shifting its distribution of ecosystems and 
creating productive niches amidst the island’s otherwise extreme Arctic biomes. This 
permitted Norse settlers to transpose their political, economic, and societal processes 
into these niches, whose terrestrial ecosystems experienced increased plant growth, 
precipitation, and lengthened growing seasons.  When the MWP sputtered out in the 
North Atlantic around AD1300, the marginal climatic conditions on Greenland became 
increasingly difficult for the Norse population to manage, a situation made worse by 
severe soil erosion stemming from the Scandinavians’ land use.165   
 
The Norse could not maintain their socio-economic practices in the Little Ice Age 
[LIA] that followed from around AD1300 to the middle of the nineteenth century.  
Refusing or unable to adopt alternative systemic principles, they were eventually 
                                                
163 Crosby (1986): 210-211. 
164 Malcolm Hughes, ‘Was There a Medieval Warm Period, and if so, Where and When?’, Climatic Change 26(3/4) 
1994, p. 116. 
165 T. Amorosi et al., ‘Raiding the Landscape: Human Impact in the Scandinavian North Atlantic’, Human Ecology 
25(3) 1997, pp. 495-496; J. Edward Schofield, ‘Environmental impacts around the time of Norse landnám in the 
Qorlortoq valley, Eastern Settlement, Greenland’, Journal of Archaeological Science 35(6) 2008, p. 1643. 
  P a g e  | 67 
 
outcompeted by Thule Inuit, who had been migrating eastward from the Bering Strait 
since around AD1000.  Climate change and soil erosion did not kill off the Norse.  It 
simply altered the relative utility of their units, processes, and structures, handicapping 
them in their relations with the cold-adapted practices of the Thule Inuit, who 
displaced their more technologically sophisticated Norse neighbours and came to 
dominate the region for the next three hundred years.166 
 
    
Figure 2.3 – temperature variations in the late Holocene (c.AD1 – AD2000),  
covering the Medieval Warm Period and the Little Ice Age, including 
 instrumental recordings for the period AD1856-1979167 
 
 
By radically altering the biotic and abiotic components of the ecosystems on which 
societies depend for their sustenance, punctuated environmental changes can challenge 
the sustainability of a social system’s most fundamental adaptations, forcing them to 
alter the constitution of their units, processes, and structures.  For much of the past 
eleven and half thousand years, moments of punctuated environmental change have 
been relatively rare, interspersed with long eras of relatively gradual social 
adaptation.168  As anthropogenic forcing continues to alter the composition of the 
planet’s chemical and physical systems, however, Earth’s ecology will become ever-
more prone to dramatic fluctuations, forcing its human systems to alter the ways in 
which they interact or face the possibility of similar crises.169 
 
                                                
166 P.D. Jones & M. E. Mann, ‘Climate Over Past Millennia’, Reviews of Geophysics 42(RG2002) 2004, pp. 13, 19; 
P.C. Buckland et al., ‘Bioarchaeological and Climatological Evidence for the Fate of Norse Farmers in Medieval 
Greenland’, Antiquity 70(267) 1996, pp. 94-95; Amorosi et al. (1997), pp. 505-509. 
167 Anders Moberg, ‘Highly variable Northern Hemisphere temperatures reconstructed from low- and high-
resolution proxy data’, Nature 433(7027) 2005, p. 616.  
168 Humanity’s social evolution has featured aspects of both gradual and punctuated change, the former closely 
associated with Charles Darwin’s original theory of evolution as outlined in The Origin of Species and the latter 
with Stephen Jay Gould’s twentieth century theory of punctuated evolutionary change, first published in 1972. 
[Hendrik Spruyt, ‘Diversity or Uniformity in the Modern World?  answers from evolutionary theory, learning, and 
social adaptation’, in Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics, Ed. William R. Thompson (London: 
Routledge, 2001): 114-116; Niles Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, ‘Punctuated Equilibria: an alternative to phyletic 
gradualism’, in Models in Paleobiology, Ed. Thomas Schopf (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & Co, 1972): 82-84; 
Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (London: William Pickering, 1988) sixth edition. [electronic copy] 
Charlottesville NC: InteLex Corporation, 2011.] 
169 K.E. Trenberth et al., ‘Observations: Surface and Atmospheric Climate Change’, in Solomon et al. (2007): 316. 
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*** 
 
The relationship between international systems and the ecosystems that they inhabit is 
complex and reciprocal.  Ecological systems reinforce societies’ path dependence and 
drive moments of punctuated change.  By the same token, ecosystems are continuously 
affected by their human inhabitants, who can radically redraw the ecologies in which 
they are embedded.  This mutually constitutive relationship cannot be described by 
reference to either anthropogenic or ecological factors alone.170  If this project is to 
describe the evolution of international units and systems in ecological terms, it must 
develop an analytical framework capable of capturing both sides of this socio-
ecological equation. 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution: the case for an 
ecological synthesis 
 
Humans’ capacity to affect the physical environment is a fundamental characteristic of 
our species.  The punctuated changes wrought on Native American societies by the 
introduction of smallpox were initiated by international processes that drove European 
expansion in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, including colonialism and trade.  
Earlier epidemics bear similar hallmarks of human causation.  As noted earlier, the 
migration of bubonic plague from its Central Asian heartland to the Far East, South 
Asia, Near East, and Europe depended on international political and economic systems 
that spanned Eurasia.171 Thus the economic, societal, and political processes that drove 
Europeans across the Atlantic and linked Eurasia’s centres of population were 
necessary causes behind their associated epidemics in much the same way as those 
epidemics were necessary causes behind to the subsequent international histories of the 
regions they ravaged.   
 
This relationship is indicative of the power of Socio-Ecological Coevolution: the 
mutually constitutive process by which human populations and ecological systems 
interact over time, with changes in one leading to changes in both.  Environmental 
History provides a particularly rich vein of examples of such interaction.  One of the 
earliest attempts to consciously alter a physical context is signified in the 
archaeological record by hominids’ use of fire to create and expand environmental 
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systems conducive to their particular mix of hunting and gathering units, processes, 
and structures.172  The adoption of fire as a tool around 1mya has been identified with 
homo erectus, who evolved in Africa between 1.8 and 1.5mya, and whose range 
stretched from East Asia to Europe by 500kya.173  Archaeological evidence indicates 
that, by this time, fire was already a terraforming technology being consciously applied 
to the planet’s ecosystems in order to modify and improve hominids’ natural 
environments.  From his observations of natural fire regimes, homo erectus would 
have learned about the effects of fire on his ecosystems, particularly on the grassland-
forest ecotone where he is thought to have spent the majority of his time.174  Natural 
fire is a common feature in this ecological environment and gave early hominids 
plenty of opportunities to learn about its effects on plant and animal life.  These are 
well worth observing.  Modern studies have shown that the quality and quantity of 
forage available to herbivorous ungulates such as antelope and elk increases by 300-
700% in deciduous forests following a fire.  Such productivity gave our hominid 
ancestors ample reason to harness this technology, making them the planet’s first 
known genus to consciously alter the ecosystems around them to improve their 
standard of living.175  
 
Coevolution implies a mutually-constitutive process linking international systems to 
the ecosystems in which they are embedded, with changes in either affecting the 
evolutionary course of both.  As discussed earlier, the introduction of virulent Old 
World pathogens into the Americas as part of the European portmanteau biota in the 
sixteenth century tore apart many of the continent’s existing social systems.  However, 
other outcomes should also be noted.  In the midst of the ecological transformations 
resulting from the introduction of Eurasian species, Coevolution provided some Native 
American units with new opportunities.  Microbes were only the vanguard of Europe’s 
socio-ecological expansion, emptying lands and opening ecological niches.176  Some of 
these were taken over by local fauna such as the bison, which shifted its habitat 
eastwards to the Mississippi and beyond.177  Others were filled by Europeans’ 
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portmanteau biota, particularly plants and animals first domesticated in Eurasia during 
the Neolithic Revolution of the early to middle Holocene.  Animals, including pigs, 
cattle, sheep, and horses, were intentionally released into the wild or escaped from 
European colonies and ranches, spreading beyond the bounds of European settlement.  
The introduction of the horse into the grasslands of North America was of particular 
significance in that it defined new ‘native’ cultures in the wake of the human tragedies 
of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.  Between 1680 and 1880, three 
dozen different North American First Nations adopted a horse-powered socio-
economic system based on bison hunting that allowed them to harvest far more of 
these massive herbivores than had previously been possible.  The horse’s arrival and 
adoption also changed the balance of power between the tribes of the North American 
plains.178  Unseen on the continent since its disappearance during the Quaternary 
Extinction Event that affected the Americas around 11kya, horses became the cultural 
and socio-economic focus the Great Plains’ indigenous units.  Their introduction (more 
properly, their reintroduction) to the Americas redefined native units’ relative status 
and the ways in which they related to one another.  The Comanche, in particular, 
benefitted from their decision to focus on processes incorporating the horse and the 
bison, allowing them to emerge as one of the most powerful tribal confederacies in the 
American West – an emergent systemic outcome of changes wrought on American 
ecology and its embedded human units and systems by the arrival of Europe’s 
portmanteau biota, itself a consequence of international processes connected to 
colonization and trade.179  
 
The causal link between international systems and the ecological contexts in which 
they are embedded is not marked by a simple, deterministic relationship in which 
either Ecology or IR can claim absolute priority.  Rather, path dependent evolution is 
initiated and reinforced by the ecologies they inhabit.  At the same time, human 
activities in a variety of sectors alter the ecologies in which human units and systems 
are embedded, transforming the environments in which they evolve.  This 
coevolutionary relationship generates emergent outcomes in our international and 
ecological systems alike.  An adequate description of international systems’ historical 
evolution must, therefore, incorporate aspects of social and ecological analysis if it is 
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to account for the true range of endogenous and exogenous factors that influence the 
units and systems at the heart of IR.   
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has sought to establish why IR needs to pursue ecological analyses of 
international systems, preparing the way for Chapter Three’s construction of a 
theoretical approach capable of applying coevolutionary principles to the historical 
record of the Arctic Basin.  It has done so by identifying the basic characteristics of 
human and international systems, illustrating ecology’s role in systemic evolution, and 
defining the process of Socio-Ecological Coevolution that lies at the heart of the 
analysis to follow.  
 
The analytical matrix devised by Barry Buzan and Richard Little is of central 
importance to this project’s goals, providing a powerful tool with which to describe the 
world’s international systems – constituted by the structured interaction of collective 
actors at the international scale – in terms of the levels and sectors in which their 
interaction capacities, processes, and structures operate.  Of proven value to systemic 
analyses, their approach has little to say about the role of ecology in the constitution of 
international systems; a relationship masked by the anthropocentric ontology in which 
our discipline is rooted.  As a result, their analytical matrix is blind to the fact that 
international and ecological systems are mutually constituted, with each contributing 
its own forms of positive and negative feedback to the dynamic relationship that links 
international systems to the ecological contexts in which they are embedded.  These 
evolutionary mechanisms include the dynamic influence of sectoral interference and 
ecological transformation, and the constraining influence of initial ecological 
conditions, social path dependence, and the relative stability of ecological systems 
over human timescales. Socio-Ecological Coevolution is the key process that links 
these mechanisms together, explaining the mutual constitution of international and 
ecological systems over time.  Before we move on to explore the ways in which 
Coevolution has affected the development of international and ecological systems in 
the Arctic Basin, we therefore need to synthesize its central tenets into Buzan and 
Little’s analytical matrix.  This will be the main goal of the next Chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
How to Integrate Socio-Ecological Coevolution into Analyses of International 
Systems? 
 
 
Having established why ecological relationships should be integrated into IR’s 
analyses of international systems, this Chapter considers how to go about synthesizing 
the two halves of Socio-Ecological Coevolution.  It approaches the problem in three 
steps.  First it looks at the possibility of using existing tools in Buzan & Little’s matrix 
to do the job.  Unfortunately, sectors and levels prove unsuited of the task, based as 
they are on a fundamental misreading of the relationship between international and 
ecological systems.  Explaining this relationship therefore falls to the second section, 
which uses a brief introduction to Ecology – particularly the dynamics of New 
Ecology – to frame its arguments about the relationship between international systems 
and the ecological contexts in which they are embedded. This reveals the need for an 
ontological lens capable of capturing humanity’s place as one biological population 
amongst the many that inhabit the planetary biosphere.  This lens is provided by 
context, defined in the third section of the Chapter as the social and/or material 
environment within which evolution takes place.  Grafting a contextual axis onto 
Buzan and Little’s existing matrix forces students and practitioners of IR to explicitly 
state which social and/or ecological factors they consider in their analyses, unmasking 
the ways in which our discipline conceptualizes international units and systems 
without forcing all IR scholars to become ecologists.  Finally, by embracing ecological 
context, this Chapter reconstitutes the matrix in such a way as to highlight the 
interactions that take place between international and ecological systems, producing 
three new sources of explanation with reference to which subsequent chapters will 
trace systemic evolution in the circumpolar North – ecological capacity, socio-
ecological coevolution, and biogeographical structure. 
Existing Frameworks: why not an ecological 
sector or level? 
 
Given the constitutive relationship between ecological and international systems, how 
can we go about integrating the influence of the former into our analyses of the latter? 
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Two possibilities immediately suggest themselves from the matrix in Figure 3.1 (see 
below).  The first is the construction of an ecological sector, the strategy employed by 
Buzan and Little.  As discussed earlier, sectors are analytical tools that disaggregate 
and describe functionally defined international subsystems.  They are therefore ill-
suited to the task of socio-ecological synthesis, which is an ontological rather than an 
analytical problem.  Levels of analysis – the ontological axis used by Buzan and Little 
to trace the historical evolution of international systems – might be better suited to our 
needs.  Unfortunately, the ways in which levels divide reality into nested spatial scales 
at which sources of explanation and outcomes can be located is unlike the approach 
needed for ecological analysis.  Socio-Ecological Coevolution – the process that 
describes the mutual constitution of human and ecological systems – does not occupy 
an ontological level above or below that of the individual, subunit, unit, subsystem, or 
system.  Neither does it occupy any one sector. It affects the development of 
international systems across all sectors and all levels of analysis.  Its influence cannot 
be limited to a single column or row of Buzan and Little’s matrix, necessitating a 
rethink of the ways in which we conceive of socio-ecological interaction.   
 
 Economic Political Societal 
Individual IC/P/S IC/P/S IC/P/S 
Subunit IC/P/S IC/P/S IC/P/S 
Unit IC/P/S IC/P/S IC/P/S 
Subsystem IC/P/S IC/P/S IC/P/S 
System IC/P/S IC/P/S IC/P/S 
Figure 3.1 – Buzan and Little’s Analytical Matrix.180 
An Ecological Sector? 
The x-axis of the analytical matrix in figure 3.1 disaggregates the global international 
system according to the functional variety of interaction of interest to the analyst – be 
it political, economic, or societal.  The systems constituted by these interactions 
include networks such as the international economic system and the international 
political system, each of which highlights a different variety of international unit 
interacting through a sectorally differentiated set of processes and structures.181  Buzan 
and Little make the case for an analytically distinct ecological sector that describes 
‘the relationship between human activity and the planetary biosphere as the essential 
                                                
180 Buzan & Little: 77.  Note the sources of explanation listed in each ‘box’ of the matrix, including interaction 
capacity (IC), process (P), and structure (S). 
181 Braudel (1984): 17.   
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support system on which all other human enterprises depend.’182  This adds an 
ecological column to their matrix, expanding the range of functionally defined 
subsystems described by its x-axis to include an international ecological system, 
analytically distinct from its economic, political, and societal fellows. (See figure 3.2)  
Though attractive insofar as it proposes an elegant solution to the problem of 
ecological analysis, the construction of an ecological sector and its associated 
international ecological subsystem throws up as many problems as it solves. 
 
 Economic Political Societal Ecological 
Individual Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S Ecological IC/P/S 
Subunit Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S Ecological IC/P/S 
Unit Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S Ecological IC/P/S 
Subsystem Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S Ecological IC/P/S 
System Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S Ecological IC/P/S 
Figure 3.2 – A hypothetical analytical matrix describing international systems’ interaction capacity (IC), process 
(P), and structure (S) in terms of four sectors (x-axis), including one dedicated to ecological interactions.183 
 
The most important of these has to do with the sources of explanation.  According to 
ISWH, all sectorally defined international interactions can be described in terms of 
interaction capacity, process, and structure.  For an ecological sector to be analytically 
effective, it must be able describe the international ecological system in terms of these 
variables.  Unfortunately, as Buzan and Little admit, the ecological sector is of no help 
in attempts to describe structure in ecological terms.  The same is actually true for all 
three sources of explanation, which are hampered by a fundamental misreading of the 
relationship between international systems and the wider and older ecological systems 
in which they are embedded.  Unlike international economic, political, and societal 
systems, those located in an ecological sector would not be constituted by the 
interaction of human actors.  Instead, they would generated by the interaction of 
human communities with the biological, chemical, and physical systems in which they 
are embedded.  Ecological units, processes, and structures are fundamentally different 
from those found in other sectors insofar as ecological systems necessarily include the 
interactions of all biological populations with the non-living systems that support 
them. As argued in previous chapters, political, economic, and societal international 
systems generate social structures through the repeated interaction of human actors.  
An ecological system, however, would necessarily include a mixture of social and 
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mechanical interactions. This leads to significant problems for a sectoral approach to 
ecological analysis.   
 
Chapter Two made the case that the use of sectors requires two steps in order to be 
successful.  First, the researcher isolates and analyses patterns of interaction in one or 
more sectors, each of which describes a variety of functionally defined international 
subsystem. The analyst then reassembles a broader international system from the 
constituent sectors into which it was divided in order to understand the relationships 
that link the selected subsystems together.184  This second step is relatively 
straightforward for the anthropocentric sectors that fill the first three columns of figure 
3.2.  Each describes an element of a socially defined totality and, therefore, a system 
constituted by similar processes and structures.  Indeed, one could imagine a much 
wider range of sectors than those listed in the current matrix, including military, 
ideological, and cultural varieties.  Each would divide the international ‘set of sets’ 
according to a different analytical logic, yet each would describe essentially similar, 
socially-constituted referents.185  By comparing anthropocentric apples with 
anthropocentric apples, the economic, political, and societal (and military, ideological, 
and cultural) sectors are relatively easy to recombine.  An ecological sector would 
throw nonanthropocentric oranges into the mix, making the reconstitution of a 
coherent and wider system highly problematic.  Buzan and Little’s socially-
contextualized approach to international systems in world history simply cannot 
embrace the ecological sector’s mechanical interactions.  Instead, it relegates them to 
instrumental status in the constitution of international systems, allowing them to affect 
the means by which units and systems pursue their goals without affecting the 
constitution of the units or systems themselves.   This exclusion has its roots in the 
European Enlightenment and IR’s anthropocentric turn after 1945, and has been at the 
heart of IR’s understanding of international systems ever since.186  By removing non-
human factors from the roll of causes and effects that constitute an international 
system, anthropocentrism remains the single biggest stumbling block in the way of 
effective ecological analyses. Until IR deals with this ontological issue, a successful 
incorporation of ecological units, processes, and structures into its systems analysis 
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will continue to elude the discipline.  What we need is an ontological device capable of 
extending IR’s worldview to include the biological, chemical, and physical contexts in 
which humanity’s international systems are embedded.  Sectors – as analytical devices 
– are simply not designed for the job.  We must look elsewhere for the right tool.  
An Ecological Level of Analysis? 
Given these ontological roadblocks, the levels of analysis might represent a solution to 
our anthropocentric problem.  Levels in IR are nested ontological referents that 
categorize the world according to the spatial scales at which an analyst locates the 
explanations and outcomes of international behaviour.  Someone who focuses on 
individual-level analyses will locate the causes of unit and system behaviour in the 
character of the individual actors who constitute their most basic components.  Ideas of 
human nature as essentially combative, competitive, and cooperative often play a 
central role in these sorts of narratives.  A systems-level analysis inverts these sources 
of explanation and outcomes, describing individual and unit behaviour in terms of 
systemic influences and pressures that exist outside of any one individual or unit.  The 
central role played by society’s mode of production in determining Marxist analyses of 
socio-economic systems is one such systemic case, with individual behaviour being a 
function of the class to which she or he belongs – a typology which is itself determined 
by the class’s position in its society’s overall mode of production.  As described in 
Chapter Two, the levels of analysis include: 
 
1. The Individual, 
2. The Subunit, 
3. The Unit, 
4. The International Subsystem, and  
5. The International System.187 
 
In this scheme, each level can be embedded in the levels below it or disaggregated into 
components described by the levels above it.  Analyses rooted in the subsystem level 
are therefore interested both in the ways that subsystems combine to constitute the 
wider international system, and in the ways that units’, subunits’, and individuals’ 
behaviours are influenced by the subsystemic processes and structures in which they 
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are embedded.  Given this project’s regional interest in the systems of the circumpolar 
Arctic, much of the analysis to follow is located at this ontological level. 
 
The quest for eternal laws of international behaviour has led to a preference within 
parts of the discipline for the study of ahistorical global systems that are thought to be 
stable across space and time.  Although many such traditions – including Neo-Realism 
– argue that human interactions incorporate mechanical relationships, the historical 
record makes clear that all human-to-human relations are intrinsically social.  They are 
not ruled by non-negotiable, externally devised rules of behaviour and membership 
that emanate down from a static system-level of analysis.  Rather, the human 
interactions that constitute an international system generate social content in the form 
of patterned processes and social structures.188  This social content, continuously 
renegotiated by a system’s constituents, generates the system’s interaction capacities, 
processes, and structures: the three sources of explanation used by Buzan and Little to 
analyse systems’ evolution.  Stripping human interactions of their social content 
simplifies theoretical explanations of systemic behaviour by implying the existence of 
general laws to describe human behaviour across time and space – a pseudo-scientific 
conceit that has led to the ahistorical trend in IR noted and derided in ISWH.189  
 
Buzan and Little avoid this particular pitfall by inserting intermediary spatial scales – 
the subunit and the subsystem – between the three spatial categories included in 
Kenneth Waltz’s classical rendering of the levels of analysis.  These new referents, 
particularly subsystems, help to address IR’s fixation with global systems and the 
marginalization of regional and sub-global networks.190  Through the vast majority of 
human history, historical international systems have been regional rather than global, 
with systems in China, the Mediterranean, and Mesoamerica separated by vast 
distances and imposing physical and social obstacles.  Armed with relatively 
unsophisticated transportation and communications technology, few inter-regional 
international systems were able to develop before the modern age.  Those that did were 
focused around sectors that required relatively low interaction capacity, such as 
exchanges of ideas and economic trade in low-bulk, luxury goods. Intermediary levels 
address an ontological shortcoming in IR’s interpretation of the historical record by 
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unmasking the regional subsystems heretofore hidden beneath the historically novel, 
global international system.  Buzan and Little’s addition of subsystems to the levels of 
analysis presents students and practitioners of IR with an explicit ontological choice: to 
include or exclude regional subsystems from their analyses of contemporary IR. Could 
an ecological level of analysis do a similar job, opening space in which to consider 
ecological relationships heretofore masked by IR’s anthropocentric ontology? 
 
The inspiration for such a step might be found in Ecology, which – like IR – uses a set 
of vertically nested levels of analysis to identify scales at which sources of explanation 
and outcomes are located in the natural world. Ecology’s levels of analysis bear 
marked similarities to those described by Buzan and Little.  In ascending order of 
scale, they include: 
 
1. The Organism, which is an individual life form and the most basic unit of 
ecological study; 
2. A Population, which is a group of individuals from a single species, often 
inhabiting a specific area and differentiated on the basis of location and/or 
behaviour; 
3. A Community, which is a group of interacting and interdependent 
populations inhabiting a defined area;191 
4. An Ecosystem, which is a geographically defined environment consisting of 
a biological community and the chemical and physical systems that support 
and enable their interactions; and192 
5. The Ecosphere, which is the totality of all the Earth’s ecosystems, including 
their constituent biotic communities and the chemical and physical systems 
that support them.193 
 
A preliminary synthesis of Ecology’s levels of analysis with those described in ISWH 
is informative.  At their narrowest scales, both schemes accept an individual organism 
as their basic unit of study, the main difference being that Ecology does not require 
this referent to be human.  The synthesis continues at the level of international units 
and biological populations.  Buzan and Little’s subunits and units are differentiated 
from one another by their memberships and the ‘thickness’ of the social content 
                                                
191 Molles (1999): 303-304. Taken together, all of Earth’s biological communities constitute the global biosphere. 
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generated by their internal and external relations, delineating units’ insides and 
outsides.  In a similar vein, biological populations are differentiated from one another 
by a combination of physical and behavioural characteristics, depending on whether 
the researcher wishes to focus on an entire species (unit), or a component population 
defined by its geographical range or behaviour (subunit).  Like units and subunits, 
populations have insides and outsides, with some organisms included and others 
excluded from a group by their location and/ or physical and behavioural 
characteristics. In ecological terms, the units that inhabit the international system 
represent distinct ecological populations interacting to create a biological community. 
 
An ecological analysis of international systems will associate Buzan and Little’s 
bottommost levels with ecological communities.  International systems and subsystems 
and ecological communities alike evolve processes and structures through the repeated 
interaction of their constituent units/populations. The structural effects of ecological 
interaction can be traced through its impact on the number of populations that 
constitute a community, the variety and relative abundance of those populations, and 
the ways in which they relate to one another.194  These are remarkably similar to the 
structural effects described by Waltz in reference to international systems, including 
the principles by which units are arranged into a system, how they are differentiated, 
and how they stand relative to each other in terms of capabilities.195  Even IR’s 
differentiation of various subsystems is echoed by Ecology’s disaggregation of the 
global community of life into its component communities, on the basis of geographical 
range (equated with regional subsystems) or behaviour (equated with functional 
subsystems).  Together, the planet’s component communities constitute the global 
biosphere, a totality equated with the global international system. 
 
Ecology’s first three levels of analysis – the organism, the population, and the 
community – concentrate on nested spatial scales of biological interaction, focusing on 
relationships such as a community’s predator-prey dynamics or a population’s growth 
rates.  These ecological referents align remarkably well with IR’s levels of analysis, 
which focus on the ontological scales at which humans, units, and systems interact.  
Important differences emerge only when we venture into Ecology’s deepest levels.  
Ecosystems and the ecosphere are fundamentally dissimilar from the levels above 
                                                
194 Butzer (1982): 14, 252. 
195 Waltz (1979): 79-81. 
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them.  They integrate biological communities into the physical and chemical systems 
that support them.  At these levels of analysis, non-living planetary systems – such as 
the water and carbon cycles – constitute dynamic mechanical contexts in which 
biological interactions take place.  These non-biological contexts differentiate 
ecosystems from the communities and populations that inhabit them.  Communities 
and ecosystems do not necessarily vary by their geographical ranges.  They can be, and 
often are, coterminous.196  Rather than being differentiated on the basis of spatial scale, 
Ecology’s deepest levels of analysis are differentiated from their shallower fellows by 
the incorporation of factors that do not emanate from its most basic unit of analysis: 
the organism.  Without this ontological leap, Ecology would exclude the planet’s 
chemical and physical systems from its analyses of living organisms, populations, and 
communities.  In doing so, it would fall into a biocentric trap equivalent to the 
anthropocentric one that continues to limit analyses of non-human factors in IR. 
 
With this difference in mind, we might revise IR’s levels of analysis to incorporate the 
influence of non-human ecological factors at a level beneath that of the socially 
constituted system. This would leave Buzan and Little’s five levels intact, with 
individuals embedded in subunits, subunits in units, units in subsystems, and 
subsystems in systems.  To achieve a synthesis like that in Ecology, IR’s socially 
constructed international systems would need to be embedded in the planet’s 
mechanically constituted ecological systems.  These would occupy levels ‘below’ that 
of the international system, embedding IR’s social referents in the biological, 
chemical, and physical contexts that constitute their ecological surroundings. (see 
figure 3.3)   
                                                
196 John Kricher, ‘Lecture 1: Ecology and the Big Picture’, The Ecological Planet: An Introduction to Earth's Major 
Ecosystems, Recorded at Wheaton College, Norton MA, 2008. The habitat of the marten, for example, includes the 
entire range of the boreal ecosystem that rings the planet at subarctic latitudes in Russia, Canada, Alaska, and 
Fennoscandia. [John Kricher, ‘Lecture 7: Boreal Forest’, The Ecological Planet: An Introduction to Earth's Major 
Ecosystems (2008)] 
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 Economic Political Societal 
Individual Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S 
Subunit Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S 
Unit Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S 
Subsystem Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S 
System Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S 
Ecosystem Economic IC/P/S Political IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S 
Ecosphere Economic IC/P/S Political   IC/P/S Societal IC/P/S 
Figure 3.3 – A hypothetical analytical matrix describing international systems’ interaction capacity (IC), process 
(P), and structure (S) in terms of six levels of analysis (y-axis), including two dedicated to regional and planetary 
ecological interactions.197 
 
At first glance, the construction of an ecological level of analysis achieves a number of 
goals: emphasizing the importance of ecological factors to the constitution of 
international systems while leaving students and practitioners of IR free to include or 
exclude them from their analyses.  It does so by separating ecological interactions – 
with their messy non-human components – from those of human systems, units, and 
individuals. The relationships of interest to Buzan and Little’s ecological sector, 
meanwhile, fall to level occupied by the ecosystem and ecosphere.  This avoids the 
thorny issue of systemic reconstitution discussed in reference to the creation of an 
ecological sector. 
 
However, the construction of ecological levels separate from those that describe 
socially constituted human systems imposes costs that outweigh their added value to 
IR theory. Socio-Ecological Coevolution impacts individuals, units, and systems alike.  
As discussed earlier, the initial development of the urban units that helped to define the 
international systems of the ancient Near East depended on the productive flora and 
fauna then available for domestication and large-scale agricultural production.  Units 
in the New Guinean highlands, meanwhile, were constrained by their much lower 
ecological capacity – influenced by the crops, animals, and social and physical 
technologies available.   This limited the amount of energy available to sustain their 
processes and structures, leaving them more prone to adopt agrarian forms of social, 
economic, and political organization than their Mesopotamian contemporaries. This 
unit-level development, influenced by the ecological context in which it took place, 
would be masked by the construction of an ecological level of analysis below that of 
                                                
197 Adapted from Buzan & Little (2000): 77. 
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the international system – a step which would associate all coevolutionary 
developments with developments at the systems level.  Because of the importance of 
spatial scale to IR’s levels of analysis, a clear synthesis with Ecology’s own 
formulation is of limited value, undermining as it does the clarity of Buzan and Little’s 
matrix.   
 
IR’s and Ecology’s levels of analysis divide the world according to different logics.  
The construction of an ecological level below that of the international system therefore 
fails to bridge the conceptual gap between Ecology and IR any more effectively than 
an ecological sector.  Because Coevolution affects individuals, units, and systems 
alike, every spatial scale in Buzan and Little’s scheme must have its ecological 
counterpart.  These counterparts need to incorporate both non-human actors (flora, 
fauna) and the physical and chemical systems on which they depend.  The construction 
of a single ecological level only serves to further alienate individuals and units from 
their ecological contexts by locating all ecological interactions below the level of the 
international system.       
 
*** 
 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution affects international systems across all levels and all 
sectors.  As a result, it cannot be adequately described by reference to either axis of 
figure 3.1 in isolation.  Coevolution is a universal process that affects human 
interactions – be they unit-level or systemic, political or economic – and the ecological 
contexts in which they are embedded.  Sectors and levels fail to capture this dynamic 
because they misinterpret the relationship between humanity and Ecology, either 
embedding the latter as one variety of functional international subsystem or limiting 
Coevolution’s effects at the broadest levels of IR analysis.  By misreading humanity’s 
relationship with our ecological surroundings, both options fail to fold the concept into 
Buzan and Little’s matrix.  Understanding humanity’s relationship with our ecological 
surroundings is, therefore, a necessary precondition for Coevolution’s integration into 
our analyses of international systems in world history. 
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Ecological Systems: an introduction to key 
concepts 
 
The failure of sectors and levels to integrate Socio-Ecological Coevolution into Buzan 
and Little’s analytical matrix is due to fundamental flaws in the way that IR 
understands Ecology.  For example, an ecological sector implies the existence of an 
ecological subsystem within the ‘set of sets’ that constitutes the international system. 
198  This locates the ecosphere as a subsystem of the international social system, 
inverting the true relationship between them.  In reality, international systems 
constitute embedded aspects of wider and older ecological contexts.  Locating 
planetary ecology as one variety of international subsystem creates a logical paradox, 
like trying to fit an egg inside of its own yolk, fatally weakening the ecological sector 
as a tool for ecological analysis.  Attempts to construct an ecological level are 
similarly flawed in that they reinforce the walls that divide human relations from the 
physical contexts in which they are embedded.  This alienates Coevolution’s 
constitutive effects from the individuals, subunits, units, and subsystems that exist 
above it in IR’s nested typology of ontological referents, masking ecology’s 
relationship with these narrower spatial scales.   In the end, both strategies are 
hampered by IR’s misreading of ecological concepts.  We would therefore do well to 
take some time to understand the ways in which Ecology understands the world around 
us.   
 
Humanity constitutes one biological population amongst the many that can inhabit an 
ecosystem – a geographically defined environment consisting of a biological 
community and the chemical and physical systems that constitute a dynamic physical 
context for its interactions.  The size of an ecosystem is arbitrary, defined by the object 
that one wishes to study.199  It can vary in scale from a puddle to an ocean, the main 
criteria being the presence of a biological communities and non-living chemical and 
physical support systems.   Because of this project’s regional interest in the 
circumpolar Arctic, the ecosystems of most immediate interest are the tundra and taiga.  
These are two of the planet’s main biomes: functionally defined ecosystems that will 
                                                
198 Ibid: 73-74. 
199 G. Tyler Miller, Living in the Environment: principles, connections, and solutions (London: Brooks-Cole 
Publishing, 2000) eleventh edition: 83-84, 87.   
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be seen to play a major role in constituting the boundaries of their related international 
systems.200 Figure 3.4 outlines the main biomes of the planet. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 – A map of the main terrestrial biomes of the planet, overlaid on a political map of state borders201 
 
Though much of the analysis to follow will be interested in the mutual adaptations 
undertaken by international and ecological systems, we should not make the mistake of 
thinking that there is an optimal equilibrium towards which these systems are 
evolving.  The study of Ecology has been fundamentally transformed since the 1980s 
by an increasing focus on disequilibria and dynamic instabilities in biophysical 
environments, moving away from earlier theories that sought to identify natural 
equilibria and homeostasis in the natural world.202  This New Ecology – no longer as 
‘new’ in the second decade of the 21st century – altered many of the accepted truths of 
environmental science.  Its understanding of historical change is particularly important 
to the current study. By explaining adaptation in terms of a static set of environmental 
conditions, traditional systems ecology favoured narratives of homeostasis and 
stability over those of dynamism and change.  Its image of evolution was teleological, 
explaining past developments as necessary steps towards present – presumably stable – 
conditions.  As a result, traditional systems ecology ran into difficulty when faced with 
rapidly changing ecological conditions, the ‘new normal’ in the present age of GEC.  
New Ecology presents a different understanding of the world – one in which irregular 
periodicities rather than the regular, cyclical developments define systemic evolution.  
New Ecology ‘turns toward evolutionary and organismal biology and away from 
                                                
200 Butzer (1982): 15. 
201 Ville Koistinen, "The Main Biomes in The World" Wikimedia Commons: Vegetation.png. 2007. [online] 
November 2, 2011. <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vegetation.png.> 
202 A good introduction to traditional systems ecology can be found in H. Odum, Fundamentals of Ecology (New 
York: Wiley Publishing, 1971) third edition. 
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ahistorical systems ecology; toward individual organisms, species and populations… 
and away from undifferentiated ecosystems.’203  It asserts that as a population adapts to 
meet environmental conditions, it alters the very environment that is affecting it, 
spurring further adaptation and environmental change.  This ecological variation on 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle ensures that neither organisms nor ecosystems will 
achieve a stable equilibrium, but will be constantly dynamic and changeable.  It also 
bears a marked similarity to the fundamental principles of Environmental History and 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution. 
 
The evolving concept of carrying capacity illustrates both the shortcomings of 
traditional systems ecology and the means by which New Ecology has improved the 
science’s understanding of historical change.  Traditional systems ecology postulates 
that an ecological site – a particular locale within an ecosystem – will eventually exist 
in equilibrium with the biological communities that inhabit it, resulting in a regular 
demographic pattern fluctuating around an upper value k that represents the limits of 
the site’s carrying capacity. Traditional systems ecology argues that it should be 
possible to calculate the k value for each population inhabiting a site – a measurement 
that can then be generalized across the entire ecosystem of which the site is a part.  
Neither hypothesis has been borne out by empirical evidence.  Population dynamics 
and the spatial distribution of environments are highly variable across space and time, 
affected by a combination of cyclical and aperiodic developments in biological, 
chemical, and physical systems.  Generalized carrying capacity is therefore affected by 
the spatial and temporal unevenness of the sites in which it is measured.  New Ecology 
replaces the teleological narratives favoured by traditional approaches with more 
dynamic and historically grounded narratives that have since come to define the 
discipline.204  It is this historically sensitive form of Ecology, itself the basis for much 
of the Environmental History that has emerged since the 1980s, that will constitute the 
foundation for the discussion of ecological systems that follows.205  IR can learn from 
this development by acknowledging the heterogeneity of ecological spaces across the 
planet, possibly indicating a related heterogeneity in the international systems that 
inhabit them. 
                                                
203 Karl Zimmerer, ‘Human Geography and the “New Ecology”: the prospect and promise of integration’, Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 84(1) 1994, p. 111. 
204 Ibid, pp. 112-113. 
205 I.G. Simmons, ‘Human Societies and Change: The Long View’, in R.J. Johnson, The Challenge for Geography: 
a changing world, a changing discipline (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993): 110. 
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Though ecosystems, such as the biomes depicted in figure 3.4, are often shown as 
neatly delineated ecological units, the preceding discussion indicates that this is not 
truly the case.  Natural ecosystems do not have distinct boundaries.  They are separated 
from one another by ecotones – transitional zones between ecosystems in which the 
biological, physical, and chemical systems of one give way to those of another.206  
These frontiers can vary in width from a few centimetres, such as that found along the 
shoreline of a lake, to over a hundred kilometers, such as that found along the northern 
treeline of the boreal forest.207  Within these boundary zones, ecological conditions 
gradually shift from one biome to the next.  Moreover, biomes themselves can be 
divided into an almost infinite number of overlapping habitats and sites – locally 
defined ecological systems with subtly different biological, chemical, and physical 
constituents.  They are never homogenous, but vary over small and large scales.  At the 
same time, they are interconnected features of a single, planetary system.  This 
interconnectedness is a fundamental premise of modern Ecology.208 
 
Ecosystems describe a combination of biological, chemical, and physical systems: the 
biotic and abiotic components of any physical environment.  If we are to use these 
composite systems in our analysis of IR in the circumpolar North, we would do well to 
appreciate some of the concepts by which they are understood.  Key abiotic variables 
in terrestrial ecosystems include (i) the amount of photosynthetically active radiation 
(PAR) available to their primary producers, (ii) available soil nutrients, (iii) 
temperature levels, (iv) available precipitation, and (v) the seasonality of their 
climates.209  Together, these determine an ecosystem’s total energy allowance, 
impacting the number, variety, and relationships of the species within it.  A rough 
approximation of an ecosystem’s energy allowance is given by its Net Primary 
Productivity (NPP), the rate at which primary producers – mainly photosynthesizing 
plants – are able to fix atmospheric carbon, measured in terms of weight per square 
meter per year.  This is important insofar as primary producers, by fixing solar energy 
through photosynthesis, provide the main source of energy to a site’s consumers and 
                                                
206 Miller (1990): 87-89. 
207 Timoney et al. (1992), pp. 5-6. 
208 Victor Shelford, The Ecology of North America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963): 1-2. 
209 Primary producers are those organisms that make their own food from compounds obtained from their ecological 
surrounding.  On land, the vast majority of these are green plants that use photosynthesis to convert carbon dioxide, 
water, and sunlight into sugars and oxygen. [Miller (1990): 91.] 
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decomposers.  In a terrestrial ecosystem, NPP is constrained by at least two main 
factors: the nutrient availability of its soil, and local rates of evapotranspiration – a 
combined measurement of temperature and water availability.210  Though only an 
approximation of productivity across large-scale ecosystems, NPP provides a useful 
synthesis by which to gauge the constraints and opportunities presented by ecological 
systems at a given site.  Figure 3.5 provides a global overview of NPP.  Note its 
uneven distribution across several of the biomes mapped in figure 3.4.  Even at this 
very broad scale, these discontinuities illustrate a fundamental flaw in the equilibrium 
assumptions of traditional systems ecology.  Rather than representing firmly 
demarcated ecological zones, the biological, chemical, and physical systems that 
describe the planet’s biomes vary both within and across the ecotones that bound them.  
They likewise vary over time, as shifting ecological conditions alter locations’ 
productivity. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Global Terrestrial Net Primary Productivity211 
 
NPP plays an important role in our ecological analysis of international systems in the 
circumpolar North.  The extreme seasonality of the ecosphere at high latitudes, which 
brings with it low temperatures and low levels of photosynthetically active radiation 
(PAR), represents the main constraint on its energy allowances.212  NPP is therefore 
                                                
210 Molles (1999): 343-346.  Evapotranspiration predicts that the highest levels of productivity will occur in warm, 
wet ecosystems.  Ecosystems with deficits in wither category will experience lower NPP.  A severe deficit of both, 
as occurs in the high Arctic tundra, will negatively impact those biomes’ overall energy allowance.  
211 Centre for Sustainability and the Global Environment (SAGE), ‘Global Net Primary Production’, in Atlas of the 
Biosphere: Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin – Madison. [online] Last updated 
2002. < http://www.sage.wisc.edu/atlas/data.php?incdataset=Net Primary Productivity> (accessed September 12, 
2010).  See also C.J. Kucharik et al., ‘Testing the performance of a dynamic global ecosystem model: water 
balance, carbon balance and vegetation structure’, Global Biogeochemical Cycles 14(3) 2000, pp. 795-825. 
212 Molles (1999): 137-138. 
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depressed across all varieties of tundra – the dominant biomes of the northern polar 
basin.  Its productivity varies from less than one hundred grams of organic material 
fixed per square meter per year (<100 g m-2yr-1) in the polar desert, to 100-250 g m-2yr-
1 in the high tundra, to 250-500 g m-2 yr-1 in areas closest to the tundra-taiga ecotone.  
In comparison, the mean NPP of a hot desert dune is between 100-150 g m-2yr-1.213  
Other biomes’ NPP varies upward, with 650-2000 g m-2yr-1 of carbon fixed in a 
temperate deciduous forest, and over 2000 g m-2yr-1 fixed in the tropical rain forests of 
Thailand.214  In marine environments, nutrient availability is a much more important 
limiting factor than temperature, making Arctic waters relatively productive thanks to 
vertical mixing in the water column.  The productivity of Arctic waters complicates 
what – in traditional systems ecology – might be thought of as a straightforward North-
South axis of increasing NPP.  The resulting, patchy distribution of productivity helps 
to explain the uneven spread of international units and processes in the Arctic Basin, 
providing an empirical basis for measurements of Ecological Capacity – a socio-
ecological source of explanation that will be discussed in more depth in the next 
section. 
 
Now that we have considered a few of Ecology’s main concepts, let us return to the 
problems associated with ecological sectors and levels.  Earlier, this Chapter claimed 
that the failure of the ecological sector to integrate Coevolution into its analyses of 
international systems is due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship 
between humans and the ecological systems in which we are embedded.  Sectors 
describe functional varieties of international subsystems.  An ecological sector 
therefore locates ecological relationships as a subset of the international system with 
which they interact.  In reality, Ecology is not an embedded component of any 
international system.  Rather, international systems are embedded components of 
ecologies.  The inversion of this socio-ecological relationship reflects IR’s 
anthropocentric ontology, which limits its ability to understand the place of Ecology in 
its analyses.  An ecological sector would embed the biotic and abiotic components of a 
complete ecological system within a system constituted by just one of its biological 
                                                
213 Patrick Webber, “Tundra Primary Production” in Jack Ives & Roger Barry, Arctic and Alpine Environments 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1974): 447-9, 455-6, 459. 
214 Charles Krebs, Ecology: the experimental analysis of distribution and abundance (New York: Harper Collins 
College Publishers, 1994): 609. 
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communities – a logical paradox that fatally undermines the utility of a sectoral 
approach to ecological analysis.215   
 
The construction of an ecological level is likewise undermined by IR’s misreading of 
ecological realties.  Unlike the nested ontologies of IR’s levels of analysis, an 
ecosystem does not need to be inclusive of the levels above it.  An ecologist may 
define the boundaries of an ecosystem as she sees fit, the only criteria being that she 
considers both biotic and abiotic components in her analysis.  A drop of water 
containing a population of amoebas can be defined as an ecosystem so long as the 
researcher analyses the relationships between the drop’s biological populations and the 
non-living chemical and physical systems on which they rely.   Rather than being 
differentiated by their superior or subordinate position in a nested set of ontological 
referents, ecosystems are differentiated from their neighbouring levels by the inclusion 
of alternative sources of explanation.  IR’s levels of analysis – a nested set of 
ontological referents that describe the spatial scales at which one locates explanations 
and outcome – divide the world according to a different logic than their Ecological 
alternatives.  Moreover, they utilize a single set of social sources of explanation – 
interaction capacity, interactive process, and social structure – to explain the 
development of international systems in world history.  The construction of ecological 
levels of analysis below that of the international system will do nothing to redraw these 
sources of explanation and effectively limits Socio-Ecological Coevolution to the 
widest of IR’s ontological scales.    
Ecological Context: creating and 
operationalis ing a new ontological axis 
 
In order to facilitate my ecological analysis of international systems in the circumpolar 
North, I propose to add a third axis to the analytical matrix pictured in figure 3.1.  This 
new ontological category will describe the context in which human interactions take 
place, providing a means by which the different sources of explanations important to 
various social or ecological environments can be considered.  Though the range of 
contexts surrounding international systems is potentially vast, this thesis will focus on 
two – the social and the ecological.  These impact systemic evolution across all sectors 
                                                
215  Chaudhuri (1990): 431. 
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and levels, shaping the sources of explanation by which we trace the development of 
their embedded international systems.  Buzan and Little’s three sources of explanation 
– interaction capacity, process, and structure – reflect the social context in which they 
locate their historical analysis.  By embedding the analysis that follows in its 
ecological context, I propose a second troika of sources – ecological capacity, 
coevolutionary process, and biogeographical structure – that will hereafter be used to 
trace the coevolution of Arctic international and ecological systems in the historical 
record.   
Defining Context 
Contexts are ontological referents used to locate the explanations and outcomes of 
international phenomena in terms of the environments in which they take place.  They 
come in many varieties, ranging from the parsimonious to the complex.  For the 
purposes of this project, I identify two dominant forms: social context and ecological 
context.  The former describes the ontological approach of writers like Watson, Bull, 
James, Buzan and Little, and Wendt.  In a socially contextualized world, international 
behaviour at every level of analysis and in every sector is affected by the patterned 
interactions of human individuals, units, and systems.  The matrix described in the last 
Chapter is rooted in this social milieu, from which its three socially-constructed 
sources of explanation emanate.  Ecological context functions in a similar manner, 
highlighting ways in which physical environment affect the constitution of their 
embedded international systems.  
 
Theoretically, the range of contexts that might be used to describe systemic evolution 
is vast.  Some are mind-bogglingly difficult to capture. Cosmological context, for 
example, might describe the influence of stellar phenomena – such as sun spots and 
planetary orbits – on international systems, a goal well beyond the scope of this thesis.  
At the other end of the scale, one might adopt an atomistic definition of context, in 
which actors are alienated from all aspects of their social and physical environments.   
In such a world, atomistic actors – indivisible and autonomous – see one another as 
means to their own ends, their interactions failing to generate any repeated social 
processes or structures.  They are therefore contextualized only by their relative 
material capacities, which determine their ability to resist or dominate others.  This is 
the most parsimonious of worldviews, alienated from the social and ecological 
environments that actually influence all human interactions. The mechanical systems 
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described by Neo-Realism come close to this atomistic interpretation of IR, 
marginalising most discussion of socially constructed practices and principles in 
favour of studies into units’ relative power capabilities. Though difficult to visualize 
given its stark simplicity, the old trope of billiard balls rolling around on a green baize 
table illustrates the basic mechanics of this atomistic world.  As shown by Neo-
Realism’s insights over the past forty years, this image has its place in systems 
analysis so long as you are content to forget the influence of the rules of the game and 
room’s slanting floor on the course of play.    
 
Embedding an international system in its social context is a necessary step towards the 
construction of a historically coherent image of the world.  Social context is described 
by the ‘common interests and common values’ that regularize and order relations 
between actors, providing a level of explanation for the patterns of continuity and 
change that describe systems’ evolution. 216  Historical Sociology is a rich source of 
such historical narratives.  Michael Mann’s description of human societies as 
individuals linked by overlapping networks of ideological, military, economic, and 
political interaction is one example – describing the evolution of socially-constructed 
systems across all sectors, with sources of explanation that highlight the evolutionary 
influence of one’s social milieu.217  The English School (ES) shares a lot with Mann’s 
multi-sector approach, though the ES tends to locate its explanations of international 
phenomena at the systems level.  The ES describes its international societies in terms 
of their institutions.  These are principles and practices that emerge out of repeated 
interactions between units, describing both who is included in the society (principles of 
membership), and how they should act towards one another (principles of 
behaviour).218  An international system analysed in its social context corresponds 
closely to the ES understanding of an international society, focusing on ways in which 
shared social practices and principles constrain and incentivize actors’ choices of ends 
                                                
216 Bull (1995): 13. 
217 Mann (1986): 1-4.  See also Bull (1995): 13.  Subsequent approaches to Historical Sociology in IR, particularly 
those identified with the ‘eventful’ approach to International Historical Sociology (IHS), have highlighted how 
inter-social relations produce different pathways of historical development and ‘how historical events enable social 
formations to emerge, reproduce, reform, transform and break down.’  The coevolutionary approach adopted in this 
project may contribute to this strand of historical analysis in IR by providing an additional form of  socio-ecological 
‘event’ through which to observe continuity and change in the historical record. [John Hobson, George Lawson & 
Justin Rosenberg, ‘Historical Sociology’, in The International Studies Encyclopaedia (Wiley-Blackwell / 
International Studies Association, 2010): 25 [online book section] accessed February 26, 2012 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28016/>.] 
218 These have been referred to in many ways by ES theorists over the years: as primary and secondary institutions 
and as fundamental and procedural institutions to name but two variants. [Buzan (2004): 172.] 
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and means.219  Whereas atomistic contexts paint actors as fully autonomous units, 
social contexts force us to focus on an international system in terms of the shared 
practices and principles that shape actors’ roles and behaviours within it.  Though not 
avowed members of the English School or dedicated historical sociologists, Buzan and 
Little’s approach is clearly influenced by their socially-embedded understandings of 
international history.  This is illustrated by the three sources of explanation they use to 
trace and explain historical patterns of systemic behaviour – interaction capacity, 
process, and structure – each of which is constituted by the patterned interaction of 
human individuals, units, and systems.  
 
Buzan and Little’s contention that ‘systems defined in military-political terms are 
normally embedded in economic and societal systems that are often wider in extent 
and earlier in formation’ identifies the role that they ascribe to social interaction in 
international history.220 It also sets the pattern for my own claim that these socially-
constructed international systems can be embedded in even wider and older ecological 
contexts.  The challenge facing this claim is how to embrace ecological context 
without abandoning the strengths of the social approaches already discussed.  Rather 
than throwing the baby out with the bathwater, I want to retain the analytical strengths 
of Buzan and Little’s social approach while grafting an additional level of explanation 
onto its evolutionary narratives.  It is a matter of complementing rather than replacing 
their analysis.  Embedding international systems in their ecological context is not a 
matter of replacing social explanations of international phenomena with some form of 
monocausal ecological determinism.  Early works by Mackinder – who goes much 
farther than many subsequent geopolitical writers in recognizing the heterogeneity of 
the planet’s physical environments – make this mistake by focusing on ways in which 
physical contexts influence systems’ development without considering the influence of 
humanity’s social systems on the geographies and ecologies in which they are 
embedded.221  To avoid this deterministic trap, any move from a socially to an 
ecologically contextualised image of systemic evolution must preserve the integrity of 
international systems’ social context, which continues to influence their development 
even after they are embedded in their ecological milieu.  Rather than replacing IR’s 
social narratives, ecological analysis should be used to redress IR’s anthropocentric 
                                                
219 Holsti (2004): 19.  
220 Buzan & Little (2000): 78. 
221 Mackinder (1895),  p. 376, passim. 
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biases, incorporating social analyses into a wider understanding of the ways in which 
ecological conditions affect the development of interaction capacities, processes, and 
structures at the international scale.  
 
To achieve this synthesis, I propose adding a new ontological axis onto Buzan and 
Little’s existing matrix.  By forcing students and practitioners of IR to explicitly 
include or exclude contextual elements from their analyses, this axis has the potential 
to open new avenues of inquiry to IR – questions heretofore masked by the discipline’s 
relegation of Ecology to instrumental status in the constitution of its atomistic and 
social international systems.  Sectors and levels, used to disaggregate and analyse the 
explanations and outcomes of evolution in Buzan and Little’s matrix, continue to play 
this role in ecologically-contextualised analyses.  After all, the purpose of analysis 
remains the same despite its new ecological grounding: to understand the patterns of 
continuity and change that describe the development of international systems in world 
history.  Instead of affecting the matrix’s analytical and ontological divisions, 
ecological contextualization transforms the sources of explanation by which the 
evolution of levels and sectors is understood.  This allows ecological factors to be 
effective across all sectors of interaction and levels of analysis – a requirement 
identified in the first section of this chapter – while embedding systems’ social 
interactions within the wider and older ecological realities of which they are a part.  
The added value of this axis is to transform the sources of explanation by which Buzan 
and Little trace systemic development.  This transformation will be discussed further 
in the next section.  For now, however, figure 3.6 illustrates the basic shape of a 
contextualised approach to the study of international systems in world history.  Note 
the continuing importance of levels and sectors as tools with which to disaggregate and 
study specific aspects of ecologically-contextualised international systems. 
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Figure 3.6 – The revised matrix used in the analysis of international systems, 
including sectors (x-axis), levels (y-axis), and contexts (z-axis)222 
 
 
Ecological contextualization opens space in which we can trace the patterns and 
discontinuities linking the international and ecological systems in which our lives are 
embedded.  As nested ontological referents, contexts can be organised according to the 
diversity of features and influences that they take into account.  Contexts are 
complementary – with each continuing to operate when embedded in an ever-
expanding set of ontological vistas.  Organised hierarchically from most parsimonious 
to most complex, we might imagine our choice of contexts to include: 
 
1. Atomistic context, in which the inhabitants of a system are evaluated according 
to their relative capabilities rather than any socially constructed processes or 
structures; 
2. Social context, in which systems – while still possessing different relative 
capabilities – are also influenced by processes and structures generated by their 
ongoing social interaction; and 
3. Ecological context, in which systems – while still possessing different relative 
capabilities and influenced by socially constructed processes and structures – 
are also affected by the influence of the ecological systems in which they are 
embedded. 
 
                                                
222 For the sake of visual simplicity, this schematic lacks the subunit and subsystem levels of analysis described by 
Buzan and Little (2000).  However, both should be read as present and active in any subsequent use of the levels of 
analysis.   
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Though far from an exhaustive list, this describe the three varieties of context of most 
immediate interest to the present study.  Of the three, this project sees little use for 
atomistic conceptions of international systems in world history.    An atomistic view of 
IR recycles the misconceptions of traditional systems ecology, with its focus on stable 
equilibria and homogeneity.  Like the New Ecology movement of the 1980s, this 
project denies the historical reality of either of these concepts in systemic evolution, 
opening space in which IR can consider the influence of the planet’s dynamic and 
heterogeneous social and ecological systems on the evolution of its embedded human 
populations.   
 
The relative influence of ecological and social context is impossible to generalise – 
each side of the socio-ecological equation being constitutive of the other.  Contexts are 
nested ontological referents without any necessary order of priority.  As a result, their 
relative influence varies over time and space.   Over the course of our analysis, 
however, a few trends will be observed.  First, systems with relatively low levels of 
social and physical technology are generally more exposed to local ecological 
pressures than are those with more sophisticated toolkits.  Second, societies embedded 
in extreme ecosystems will be more exposed to ecological effects than those of similar 
sophistication in more productive biomes.  Finally, societies that encounter novel 
ecological conditions, be it through migration or ecological change, often find the 
utility of their existing social and physical technologies compromised – forcing them 
to adapt to new conditions.   
Operationalizing Context 
The added value of ecological context comes from its redefinition of the sources of 
explanation used to explain systemic evolution.  These shed new light on the 
coevolutionary relationship that links the evolution of international and ecological 
systems, a process heretofore masked by IR’s anthropocentric ontology.  Ecological 
context transforms Buzan and Little’s sources of explanation (interaction capacity, 
social process, and social structure), recasting them as ecological capacity, 
coevolutionary process, and biogeographical structure. Whereas interaction capacity 
describes the ability of an international system to move ideas, goods, and people across 
space, ecological capacity describes the ability of an international system to sustain 
itself and its principles of membership and behaviour across physical environments of 
varying ecological productivity.  Among its many effects are an influence on the 
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variety and distribution of units and systems across different habitats.  In socially 
contextualized analyses of international systems, process represents the means by 
which collective actors relate to one another – and can include interactions such as 
diplomacy and trade.  Ecological contextualization shifts our focus to coevolutionary 
processes, which describe the pervasive influence of Socio-Ecological Coevolution on 
(i) the ways in which ecologies affect how we relate to one another and (ii) the ways in 
which those relationships affect the ecologies in which we are embedded.  Finally, 
whereas structure in a social context refers to socially-constructed behavioural 
constraints and incentives that result from human interaction, biogeographical 
structure describes the impact of the planet’s ecological divisions on the principles by 
which units are arranged into a system, pointing towards the possible link between the 
ecological construction of the ecosphere and the social construction of its embedded 
international social system.  The effects of this transformation on Buzan and Little’s 
sources of explanation is visualised in figure 3.7 and discussed in greater detail below. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 – Illustrating the effects of embedding Buzan and Little’s socially constituted analytical matrix [A] in its 
ecologically context, transforming their socially-contextualised sources of explanation [interaction capacity (IC), 
social process (P), and social structure (S)] into their socio-ecological counterparts [ecological capacity (EC), 
coevolutionary process (CP), and biogeographical structure (BG)].223 
 
 
i .  Ecological Capacity 
Where interaction capacity describes the ability of a system to move ideas, goods, and 
people across space, Ecological Capacity (EC) refers to a system’s ability to sustain its 
population and organising principles in a given habitat.  It is a socio-ecological source 
                                                
223 For the sake of visual simplicity, this schematic lacks the subunit and subsystem levels of analysis described by 
Buzan and Little (2000).  However, both should be read as present and active in any subsequent use of the levels of 
analysis. 
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of explanation, determined by the amount of energy available in a given habitat and 
the kinds of physical and social technologies available to extract and supplement it.   
 
The distribution of EC is not homogenous across space or time.  Spatially, it is 
complicated by the fact that energy availability, measured in terms of NPP, varies 
widely between and across ecosystems.  Even apparently insignificant variations in 
local ecological conditions can lead to significant differences in net productivity.  A 
small increase in altitude or the colonization of a particular slope face can expose 
arctic and alpine biota to extreme swings in temperatures and wind conditions, 
constraining the growth of floral populations and their associated consumers and 
decomposers.224  This ecological heterogeneity is complicated by the fact that 
international units and systems possess different varieties of physical and social 
technology with which to overcome energy constraints by harnessing additional 
sources of local NPP or by subsidizing shortfalls from surpluses located elsewhere.  
Buzan and Little measure the interaction capacity of international systems on the basis 
of three mediating factors: 
 
i) whether geographical factors make movement easy or difficult; 
ii) what physical technologies are available for transportation and communication; 
and 
iii) what social technologies are available for transportation and communication.225 
 
I propose a similar set of mediating factors to assess their EC: 
 
i) whether local levels of ecological productivity, measured in terms of NPP, 
make the sustainability of specific international units and systems easy or 
difficult; 
ii) what physical technologies are available for the extraction and utilization of a 
habitat’s energy reserves; and 
iii) what social technologies are available for the extraction and utilization of a 
habitat’s energy reserves. 
 
Different international units and systems require different levels of ecological 
productivity.  As Joseph Tainted argues, more complex units – measured in terms of 
                                                
224 Roger Barry & Jack Ives, ‘Introduction’, in Ives & Barry (1974): 3. 
225 Buzan & Little (2000): 81. 
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their population sizes and levels of functional and hierarchical differentiation – require 
more energy to maintain their processes and structures.226  Highly differentiated 
territorial states with large populations, developed divisions of labour, and 
differentiated socio-economic hierarchies require higher levels of ecological 
productivity than do small, nomadic bands of hunter-gatherers.  The same is true for 
the systems constituted by their interactions.  Where local NPP is insufficient for their 
maintenance, modern units and systems must turn to physical and social technologies 
to supplement energy deficits by accessing additional sources of local NPP or by 
subsidizing shortfalls through energy importation.  EC helps to describe the types of 
international unit and system that can be supported in any given locale.   
 
Just as interaction capacity is fundamental to our idea of an international system – 
describing the amount of communication, trade, and migration that is possible within it 
– EC must be fundamental to our understanding of a socio-ecological system – 
describing the sustainability of human units and systems in a given physical 
environment.  Without sufficient EC, it is impossible to maintain high-energy units 
such as cities and states. Even where technologies are available to expand or subsidize 
local NPP, the cost of sustaining high-energy units and systems in otherwise 
inhospitable environments can prove prohibitive.  The thin international economic 
system that linked the fur trading posts of the subarctic taiga and low tundra from the 
sixteenth to the twentieth centuries was relatively easy to maintain in those low- to 
moderate-energy habitats.  The industrial systems of the twentieth-century tundra and 
taiga have a more troubled history.  Even where physical and social technologies exist 
to support their complex units and processes, their cost is often such that they prove 
unsustainable over the medium- to long-term.  The consequences of unsustainability 
are scattered across Arctic Siberia, much of it in the form of empty and decaying 
cities.227  In ecologies as unproductive as those found throughout much of the 
circumpolar world, the establishment and maintenance of highly differentiated 
international units and systems has proved challenging and expensive, requiring high 
levels of technological intervention to overcome local energy constraints.   
 
                                                
226 Tainter (1988): 1-3; Joseph Tainter, ‘Sustainability of Complex Societies’, Futures 24(4) 1995, pp.398-399. 
227 Hill & Gaddy (2003): 198-199. 
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Disaggregating the Arctic’s regional international system by sector produces a general 
pattern that describes the expansion of Europe’s international system into the region.  
In it, subsystems that require relatively low levels of EC run ahead of those with higher 
energy requirements, acting as a vanguard for the expansion of more energy-intensive 
sectors.  While EC is not differentiated by sector – energy requirements being a 
fundamental property of all economic, political, and societal systems – its 
consequences are.  Because of their lower energy requirements, societal and economic 
networks generally run ahead of more energy-intensive political and military 
interactions.  As examples over the next three chapters will show, EC has had 
perceptible effects on the distribution of both indigenous and European units and 
systems, including: (i) a bunching of European and neo-European actors along 
corridors of ecological productivity that has left indigenous peoples to make do in less 
productive habitats, and (ii) the empowering of non-state units in less energy-intensive 
economic and societal sectors to act as proxies for states claiming sovereign authority 
over relatively low-energy hinterlands. 
 
i i.  Coevolutionary Process 
In socially contextualized analyses of international systems, processes describe the 
means by which individuals, units, and systems interact.  These include trade, tribute, 
war, and diplomacy.  Ecological analyses concern themselves with the mutually 
constitutive relationship between human units and systems and the ecologies in which 
they are embedded.  This relationship describes Socio-Ecological Coevolution, the 
process by which humanity interacts with the planet’s biological, chemical, and 
physical systems.  It is of fundamental importance to both EC and biogeographical 
structure, representing the means by which each of these sources of explanation 
operate.  It will therefore take priority in the three empirical chapters to follow. 
 
Drawing on this Chapter’s bank of ecological concepts and our recent discussion of 
EC, processes associated with Socio-Ecological Coevolution can be described with 
reference to four general principles: 
 
1. international systems react to ecological changes by adapting their physical 
and social technologies to address new ecological contexts;   
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2. biological, chemical and physical systems are themselves altered by the 
technological adaptations of their embedded human populations, creating an 
on-going dynamic of mutually constitutive social and ecological change;  
3. the relative impact of ecology and society on one another tends towards 
increasing human influence as humans become more technologically 
sophisticated, bolstering social systems’ ability to alter the natural systems in 
which they are embedded; and  
4. IR and Ecology respond to Coevolution at varying rates, with effects radiating 
down their levels of analysis from individuals and organisms to the 
international systems and the planetary ecosphere.  These general principles 
describe the coevolutionary processes by which our units and systems interact 
with the ecological contexts in which we live. 
 
Many in IR, particularly members of the English School, have observed that the ways 
in which international actors relate to one another change over time. As shown by Bull, 
Watson, Holsti, and Buzan and Little – and discussed at length in Chapter Two – one 
of the advantages of a socially contextualized image of international systems over its 
atomistic counterpart is its ability to explain endogenous sources of systemic change.228  
Coevolution adds to the depth of IR’s existing evolutionary narratives by highlighting 
the importance of ecological location to actors’ interactions, making where as 
important a question as when in determining a system’s dominant units, processes, and 
structures.   The processes that define regional subsystems will differ from habitat to 
habitat.  Where units interact affects how units interact.  
 
Coevolution suggests that international systems change unevenly over space and time, 
with processes hanging on in some parts of the world long after they have been 
abandoned in others.  Processes that have disappeared near the core of the global 
international system may continue to operate at its ecological peripheries, insulated 
against change by their suitability to the ecological challenges and opportunities 
presented by specific habitats.  Imperialism is a good example of this phenomenon.  
Once a preferred means of interaction between European and non-European units, it 
has declined as a primary process within the global international system.229  
                                                
228 See Watson (2009);  Holsti (2004); Bull & Watson (1984).  
229 James Mayall, World Politics: progress and its limits (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000): 20-22. 
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Nevertheless, it continues to exist in many regions of the globe.  In the circumpolar 
Arctic, the sovereign claims of the littoral states mask the continuing existence of 
imperial structures in the region, where ‘inclusive systems of order [are] organized 
around a dominant state whose role is accepted as being quite indispensable to the 
functioning of the system as a whole’.230 As will be argued in Part Two, this 
persistence has been enabled by the Arctic’s unforgiving ecologies, which have 
encouraged the region’s littoral states to remain imperial systems in all but name in 
order to address the ecological challenges posed by the circumpolar basin. 
 
If EC is concerned with the sustainability of units and systems in particular habitats, 
then coevolutionary process analyses the mutually constitutive relationship between 
the planet’s biological, chemical and physical systems, and the units and systems at the 
heart of IR.  Socio-Ecological Coevolution is predicated on the idea that international 
units and systems adapt their social and physical technologies to meet the challenges 
and opportunities presented by their ecological contexts, altering those contexts in the 
process.  As physical and social technologies develop, their ability to alter their 
ecological environment increases, reducing their exposure to its immediate effects.  
The effects of these alterations filter back through ecological and international systems 
at different rates, leading to staggered feedbacks as impacts radiate down the levels of 
analysis.  It is important to note that mankind’s ability to change an environment is not 
tantamount to controlling it.  Changing an environment often leads to unanticipated 
consequences for those instigating a change.  Contemporary GEC, a delayed 
atmospheric feedback relating to mankind’s centuries-long use of fossil fuels to 
subsidize local energy shortfalls, is a case in point.  Few would argue that the dramatic 
changes now underway in the planet’s atmosphere are examples of increased human 
control over the ecosphere.  Rather, GEC is indicative of our increased ability to alter 
the biological, chemical, and physical systems in which we are embedded – changes 
whose complexity have led to unanticipated consequences and emergent ecological 
outcomes. 
 
i i i .  Biogeographical Structure 
The preceding discussions of EC and Socio-Ecological Coevolution illustrate two of 
the ways in which ecological systems affect the distribution of international units and 
                                                
230 Michael Cox & Ken Booth, ‘Introduction’, in Empires, Systems and States: great transformations in world 
politics, Eds. Michael Cox, Tim Dunne & Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 12. 
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systems.  Both illustrate the idea that ‘ecology matters’ insofar as where a system is 
located will help to determine the challenges and opportunities with which it must 
grapple.  In low-energy habitats, social and physical technologies are needed to 
subsidize the energy requirements of ‘complex’ units, such as territorial states, and the 
systems constituted by their interactions.  Where technological solutions prove 
unsustainable, units and systems often retreat into more productive ecosystems, evolve 
towards lower-energy forms, or disappear altogether.  Coevolution highlights the fact 
that Ecology also matters insofar as where one is located will help to determine the 
preferred processes by which they interact with units around them.  War and trade in 
bulk commodities are unlikely to emerge as dominant processes in ecosystems that 
lack the ecological capacity to maintain large armies in the field or permit easy 
transportation across sea or land.  These realities are indicative of the role played by 
the planet’s biogeographical structure in shaping the principles that define its 
international social systems.   
 
The planet’s biogeographical structure, it turns out, is a fair predictor of the kinds of 
international system that may develop in a given location.   By encouraging units to act 
in ways that may be at odds with their internal processes, structure helps to explain:  
 
(i) the principles by which units are arranged into a system,  
(ii) the ways in which they are differentiated from one another, and  
(iii) how they stand in terms of their relative capabilities.231    
 
Most international systems analysis accepts structure as a social construct generated by 
the patterned interaction of human individuals, units, and systems.  When placed in its 
ecological context, structure reveals itself to be even more complex in its causes and 
effects.  The structures that shape unit action in an international system are generated 
by the patterned interaction of individuals, units, and systems in specific biological, 
chemical, and physical – that is, biogeographical – surroundings.  As already argued, 
ecological context helps to determine a unit’s choice of social and physical technology 
and the processes by which it interacts with other units.  It is impossible for a unit or 
system to act with complete disregard for its habitat without endangering its own, and 
its habitat’s, sustainability.  Units’ ecological surroundings will therefore affect the 
                                                
231 Buzan & Little (2000): 84. 
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way in which they are organised into an international system – be it a hierarchical 
imperial system or an anarchical states system – the ways in which they are 
differentiated – whether units are distinguishable by status or function – and how they 
stand in terms of their relative capabilities – for example, whether they are in the core 
or periphery of a given system. 
 
Environmental History is a rich source of narratives dealing with issues of systemic 
organization, differentiation, and capabilities.  One of the most important attempts to 
describe international history in terms of its structural relationship with the planetary 
ecosphere is Crosby’s account of Europe’s ecological imperialism.  He generates a 
particular image of Europe’s post-Columbian overseas expansion by pointing out 
Europeans’ preference for familiar, neo-European biomes – ecosystems in which 
existing social and physical adaptations, particularly the plant and animal communities 
domesticated during the Neolithic Revolution, retain their utility. This preference, he 
argues, produces a structural relationship that has seen European settler colonies 
established in biomes that resemble those of their metropolitan states, permitting 
existing social and physical adaptations to be imported with little need of further 
adaptation.232  Through the ensuing centuries, these colonies have gained a measure of 
independence from their metropoles, becoming territorial states in the European 
model.  On the flip-side, Europeans have been less likely to settle in non-European 
biomes unless drawn to them by the presence of specific resources, such as fur, gold, 
and oil, which might be traded for the ecological surpluses of more productive sites.233  
The effect of this socio-ecological relationship on Arctic international systems has led 
to the creation of a hybrid international system comprising imperial and Westphalian 
elements across its neo-European and non-European ecosystems. 
Conclusion 
 
The anthropocentrism that continues to impede ecological analyses of international 
systems is a function of IR’s decontextualized image of the planetary ecosphere, which 
the discipline generally assumes to be static and homogenous across space and time.  
                                                
232 Crosby (1986): 1-35 passim. 
233 As argued by New Ecology, biomes are made up of multiple overlapping habitats and niches and defined by 
spatial and temporal heterogeneity.  Nevertheless, particularly at broader spatial scales,  their functional unity makes 
them a fair indicator of a site’s biogeographical structure, making them a useful tool for tracing the impact of 
ecological structure on IR in the Arctic Basin. [Butzer (1982): 15.] 
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This Chapter has investigated some of the ways in which IR can overcome its 
ontological blind spot by integrating ecological factors into the matrix developed by 
Buzan and Little for the study of international systems in world history.  Neither 
sectors nor levels prove well suited to the task of socio-ecological integration.  As an 
analytical tool, the former cannot overcome the ontological inversion of international 
and ecological systems that results from the latter being identified as a subset within 
the former.  Levels, though initially promising, also prove ill-suited of the task at hand 
by virtue of the way in which they divide reality into a nested set of anthropocentric 
individuals, units, and systems.  Moreover, neither move can transform the social 
sources of explanation used by Buzan and Little to trace systems’ evolution.  What we 
need is an ontological tool that divides reality on the basis of the environments in 
which international systems are embedded, be they atomistic, social, or ecological.  
These contexts describe the impact of a system’s environment on the sources of 
explanation used to trace its evolution.  In a socially contextualised system, sources of 
explanation – interaction capacity, process, and structure – are shaped by the 
interaction of human individuals, units, and systems.  In an ecologically contextualized 
system, these are replaced by ecological capacity, coevolutionary process, and 
biogeographical structure, each of which describes one aspect of the mutually 
constitutive relationship between international systems and the ecologies in which they 
are embedded.  The three chapters that follow trace these sources of explanation 
through the international and environmental history of the circumpolar North, 
analysing at their impact on the Arctic’s dominant evolutionary dynamics and 
establishing a baseline understanding of the units and systems that define IR in the 
region. 
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Part Two 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution: a historical analysis of international systems in the 
circumpolar Arctic 
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Chapter Four 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution: axes of productivity, convergent evolution, and the fur 
trade era in the circumpolar North 
 
 
Over the course of the next three chapters, this project will apply its matrix to analyse 
the influence of ecological systems on the evolution of international systems in the 
circumpolar Arctic.  This Chapter explores the primary process by which this influence 
operates – Socio-Ecological Coevolution – illustrating the mutually constitutive 
relationship between the Arctic’s international units and systems, and the ecological 
systems in which their interactions are embedded.  In Ecology, Coevolution describes 
cases in which two or more biological populations affect one another’s development 
through a process of mutual constitution based on repeated interactions.234  In this 
project, it is used in a manner similar to that first introduced by Richard Norgaard in 
the field of Ecological Economics to describe complex, reciprocal relationships 
between human systems and the ecological contexts in which they are embedded.235  
Its principal insight for IR is that the development of international and ecological 
systems is always contingent on influences emanating from the ‘other side’ of the 
socio-ecological equation.  Humanity’s long history of ecological manipulation and the 
fact of the planet’s ecological interconnectedness ensure that neither humans nor 
nature hold a claim to absolute priority in the chain of causation that links us to the 
biological, chemical, and physical systems of which we are a part.  As one animal 
population among many, humanity both affects and is affected by the planetary 
systems in which we live.  Neither human nor ecological factors are exogenous to the 
evolutionary process that guides our adaptation to our changing physical environment.  
This fact must be at the heart any attempt to integrate Ecology into IR’s analyses of 
international systems in world history.236 
 
The development of arctic international and ecological systems reflects the four 
principles of Socio-Ecological Coevolution discussed in Chapter Three.  First, human 
societies react to their ecological contexts by adapting social and physical technologies 
                                                
234 Thompson (2001). 
235 Norgaard (1994): 35-37; Norgaard (1984), p. 528;  Winder et al. (2005), pp. 353-355; Giorgos Kallis, ‘When Is 
It Coevolution?’, Ecological Economics 62(1) 2007, pp. 1-2; Giorgos Kallis & Richard Norgaard, ‘Coevolutionary 
Ecological Economics’, Ecological Economics 69(4) 2010, pp. 691-692. 
236 Pirages (1997): 53. 
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to address challenges and opportunities that emerge from their social and ecological 
environments.  Second, ecosystems are altered by the social and physical technologies 
adopted by their embedded human populations.  This generates the mutually 
constitutive cycle that defines Socio-Ecological Coevolution.  Third, the relative 
impact of ecology and humanity on one another’s evolution tends towards increasing 
human influence as our societies become more differentiated and technologically 
sophisticated.  What Joseph Tainter identifies as complex physical and social 
adaptations provide us with increasingly powerful tools with which to mediate the 
impact of ecological constraints, though at the cost of higher energy requirements that 
must often be met by subsidizing local energy deficits from the surpluses of other 
ecosystems.237 Fourth, Ecology and IR react to one another’s influences at varying 
rates, with effects radiating down each discipline’s levels of analysis.  In Ecology, 
individual organisms respond to humanity’s inputs more rapidly than the populations 
they constitute.  Communities – groups of interacting and interdependent populations 
inhabiting a defined area – react more slowly still, with effects being felt last at the 
widest levels: the ecosystem and the ecosphere.  This means that the planet’s 
biological systems will react to human influences before the chemical and physical 
systems that support them, a premise now being corroborated by our experience of 
Global Environmental Change (GEC).238  The human corollary to this principle points 
out that – in human systems – individuals react to ecological influences more rapidly 
than units, which in turn react more rapidly than the broader systems constituted by 
their interactions. Thus, as individuals and units adapt their social and physical 
technologies to meet environmental challenges and opportunities, the systems-level 
social and ecological structures that constrain their behaviour tend to remain relatively 
stable, continuing to influence the evolutionary constraints discussed with reference to 
path dependence in Chapter Two.  
 
It is important to remind ourselves that ‘evolution’ does not mean ‘improvement’ in 
any normative sense.  Hendrik Spruyt captures this lesson neatly when he argues, 
following Stephen Jay Gould, that,  
 
                                                
237 Joseph Tainter, ‘Energy, Complexity, and Sustainability: a historical perspective’, Environmental Innovation and 
Societal Transitions 1(1) 2011, pp. 89-90; Joseph Tainter, ‘Social Complexity & Sustainability’, in Ecological 
Complexity 3(2) 2006, p. 92; Tainter (1988): 23. 
238 Molles (1999): 303-304; Miller (1991): 63-65. 
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Contrary to some popular interpretations of Darwinist theory, evolution thus does not 
entail progress.  There is no reason to believe that later stages in evolutionary phases 
yield more complex, or more intricate solutions to environmental challenges.  The 
visual conceptualization of an evolutionary ladder is mistaken.  All evolution is 
contingent, and consists of random mutation to the external environment.239 
 
Thus, Coevolution in IR does not imply that international units and systems are either 
improving or moving toward some ideal equilibrium.  As indicated by our earlier 
discussion of New Ecology, such equilibria are anathema to the natural world and 
should be viewed likewise in IR.  Although units and systems – ecological and social – 
may appear stable over long periods of time, change and variability are ever-present 
aspects of their existence.  Variability, rather than any inevitable march toward 
uniformity in the social principles that define systemic boundaries, seems to be the 
natural condition of every international system.240 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to observe the basic mechanisms of Coevolution in 
action in the pre-contact and early modern history of the circumpolar Arctic.  It begins 
with a short introduction to the ecology of the Arctic Basin.  It then considers the 
influence of Coevolution on the distribution and organisation of the Arctic’s pre-
international indigenous populations, whose interactions with their ecological contexts 
were largely unmediated by sophisticated social or physical technology.  As implied 
the third principle of Coevolution and our definition of Ecological Capacity, this left 
them exposed to the full impact of their habitats’ limited productivity, measured in 
terms of Net Primary Production (NPP).  As a result, the principles by which they were 
organised and distributed around the polar basin closely mirrored the region’s 
distribution of NPP, a pattern that would become a sedimented aspect of the Arctic’s 
early modern international units and systems following the arrival of more 
technologically sophisticated European units from the late sixteenth century.  
Europeans’ arrival is the subject of the Chapter’s next section, which considers 
Coevolution’s role in the development of the fur trade – the primary process by which 
European units interacted with, and eventually came to dominate, the Arctic’s peoples 
and landscapes.  Finally, the Chapter considers some of the ecological consequences of 
these interactions, including the depletion of the region’s natural capital and the arrival 
of new species, closing the mutually constitutive coevolutionary loop.    
                                                
239 Spruyt in Thompson (2001): 114.  See also Stephen Jay Gould, The Panda’s Thumb (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1980): 13. 
240 Gould (2000): 32-35; Spruyt in Thompson (2001): 116. 
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The pre-contact and early-modern periods of Arctic history are important to our study 
insofar as they establish the tools with which we will trace the Coevolution of 
international and ecological systems through to the modern day.  They also hint at the 
importance of our other sources of explanation – Ecological Capacity (EC) and 
biogeographical structure – and uncover the roots of the region’s imperial international 
systems, exposing the systemic – as opposed to unit-level – origins of today’s littoral 
states. 
A Short Introduction to Arctic Ecology 
 
The Arctic is a region defined by its ecology. (See figure 4.1) The most visible 
ecological characteristic is the ecotone that marks the transition from treeless tundra to 
forested taiga – the treeline.241  This term is a bit misleading.  As an ecotone, the 
treeline is not a line at all.  Rather, it is a transitional zone between biomes.  Imprecise 
to the extent that it does not demarcate a neat division between the main terrestrial 
biomes of the arctic and subarctic, it captures a snapshot of several interacting climatic 
factors, particularly temperature, precipitation, and the availability of 
Photosynthetically Active Radiation (PAR).  Across the Canadian Arctic, the tundra-
taiga ecotone varies in width from 112km ± 41km between the Mackenzie River delta 
and Great Slave Lake to 179km ± 81km between Great Slave Lake and the coast of 
Hudson Bay.242  Above it stretch the high and low tundra, the defining biomes of the 
arctic landscape.  Below it stretches the northern boreal forest – the taiga – the 
dominant biome of the subarctic.   
 
Tundra and taiga alike are divisible into several biotic zones.  The polar desert is the 
most northerly of these and the most extreme form of tundra, possessing less than 25% 
percent vascular plant cover.  Even in its southern reaches, mean July temperatures 
rarely exceed 5°C and precipitation levels are often less than 8cm per year.  Today, the 
polar desert is confined to the Russian and Canadian arctic islands and the 
                                                
241 In Arctic ecology, a tree is taken to refer to “a perennial woody plant with a single central stem at least 2 m tall.” 
[Barry & Ives in Ives & Barry (1974): 5.]  This thesis will not be using the Arctic Circle as a guide to the region for 
the simple reason that it bears little relationship to either its ecological structure or its international systems.  [Carina 
Keskitalo, Negotiating the Arctic: the construction of an international region (London: Routledge, 2004): 30-32; 
Carina Keskitalo, ‘International Region-Building: Development of the Arctic as an International Region’, 
Cooperation & Conflict 42(2) 2007, pp. 192-193.] 
242  Timoney et al, (1992): 5-6. 
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northernmost regions of Greenland and the Taimyr Peninsula.243 South of the polar 
desert, one encounters the high tundra.  This is distinguished by an almost continuous 
cover of summer herbaceous plants on its well-drained (mesic) soils, interspersed with 
isolated prostrate woody plants.  Together, the polar desert and high tundra are referred 
to as barren ground, and constitute two of the least productive ecosystems on Earth. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Circumpolar terrestrial vegetation zones244 
 
Between these ecosystems and the treeline, one finds the low tundra.  This is home to a 
higher density of dwarf shrubs such as birch and willow on mesic sites, and features 
polygonal bogs in poorly drained areas. As described in Chapter Three, NPP is low 
across all of these biotic zones, from 100-250 g m-2yr-1 in the high tundra, to 250-500 g 
m-2 yr-1 in areas closest to the tundra-taiga ecotone.245 
 
                                                
243 Samuel Rieger, “Arctic Soils” in Ives & Barry (1974):759. 
244 United Nations Environmental Programme.  "Vegetation zones in the Arctic." UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and 
Graphics Library. 2005. UNEP/GRID-Arendal. [online]  5 Mar 2010 <http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/vegetation-
zones-in-the-arctic>. 
245 Patrick Webber, “Tundra Primary Production” in Ives & Barry (1974): 447-9, 455-6, 459. 
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Of the many subordinate zones within the belt of boreal taiga that circles the globe, 
only two need worry us for the purposes of this project: the treeline and the northern 
boreal woodlands.246  The treeline tends to follow a band traced by the 10°C isotherm 
– a climatic zone defined by the extent of mean July temperatures above 10°C. As one 
proceeds through this ecotone, PAR, precipitation, and temperatures increase.  
Nevertheless, total evapotranspiration rates remain relatively low, leaving significant 
amounts of standing water that can convert the boreal forest into lichen woodland: 
wetland forests interspersed with muskeg bogs and swamps whose total productivity is 
lower than that of their mesic neighbours.  Their soggy state is compounded by the 
presence of permafrost, permanently frozen ground that is continuous under much of 
the tundra and patchier beneath the taiga.  This plays a key role in constraining the 
productivity of both biomes – limiting root depth and sealing lower soil horizons 
against drainage.247  Thanks to the taiga’s broad geographical range, which includes 
the more southerly middle and closed boreal forests as well as the northern woodlands, 
its NPP varies across a wide range of values, from less than 400 to almost 800g C m-2 
yr-1.  In the subarctic and northern taiga, values fall at or below the mean for the 
biome, leaving us with a measurement ≤ 600g C m-2 yr-1.248  The Hudson Bay 
lowlands, with their immature drainage and resulting lichen woodland patchwork, 
boast a paltry 250 g m-2 yr-1.249 (see plots TUN, BW and BF figure 4.2) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 - Box plots comparing model estimates among biomes for mean NPP.250 
                                                
246 Barry & Ives in Ives & Barry (1974): 7. 
247 James Larsen, “Ecology of the Northern Forest Border” in Ives & Barry (1974): 349-351. 
248 Krebs (1994): 609. 
249 Toby Morantz, “Economic and Social Adaptations of the James Bay Lowlanders” in Shepard Krech III, The 
Subarctic Fur Trade: native social and economic adaptations (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1984): 58. 
250 W. Cramer et al., ‘Figure 7, Report #5: Net Primary Productivity Model Intercomparison Activity’, IGBP/GAIM 
Report Series. 1994/1995. [online] May 5 2011, <http://gaim.unh.edu/Products/Reports/Report_5/> .  Biomes 
included are: arid shrublands/deserts (DES), tundra (TUN), subarctic boreal woodlands (BW), temperate savannas 
(TMS), northern boreal forests (BF), grasslands (GRS), xeromorphic woodlands (XFW), temperate coniferous 
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Perhaps the most important constraint on human activity in both biomes is their soil 
structure.  Tundra and taiga alike lock the majority of their organic matter in their plant 
cover, leaving few nutrients in the ground as a base for agricultural production.  As a 
result, their main ‘agricultural’ product is their herbivorous fauna, particularly 
caribou/reindeer and musk ox in the tundra, and woods buffalo, woodland 
caribou/reindeer, and moose in the treeline and northern taiga.251  These animals 
convert herbaceous and woody plant matter into forms of energy that can be 
metabolized by humans, making them essential to the region’s indigenous hunter-
gatherer bands (HGBs).  Other sources of human food include the snowshoe hare, 
rodents, and martens, along with abundant but highly seasonal supplies of fish and 
fowl.  By locating themselves near the ecotone, many pre-contact indigenous bands 
have been able to harvest a number of niche resources on a rotating basis, taking 
advantage of numerous prey species to produce a countercyclical subsistence regime 
that can substitute out one or more food sources during their periodic population 
crashes.252 
 
At the centre of the Arctic’s concentric belts of tundra and taiga is the Arctic Ocean, 
whose waters are a valuable source of food and resources for the inhabitants of the 
coastline’s relatively unproductive terrestrial biomes.  This is particularly true around 
the three main channels that drain the Arctic Basin: the Bering Strait, the Davis Strait, 
and the Greenland/Norwegian Seas.  In marine environments, nutrient availability is a 
much more important factor in determining NPP than temperature, making many 
Arctic waters highly productive thanks to vertical mixing that cycles nutrient-rich 
waters at the base of the water column into the photoactive layer near the top.  This 
supports large populations of primary producers (algae and plankton) and consumers 
                                                                                                                                        
forests (TMC), tropical savannas (TRS), temperate deciduous forests (TMD), temperate mixed forests (TMM), 
tropical deciduous forests (TRD), temperate broad-leaved evergreen forests (TMB), and tropical evergreen forests 
(TRE). Bars within the boxes represent median values. The bottom and top of the box represents the 25th and 75th 
percentile, respectively. The bars outside the box represent the 10th and 90th percentiles. Open circles represent 
statistical outliers. 
251 Rieger in Ives & Barry (1974): 761; Arthur Ray, “Periodic Shortages, Native Welfare, and the Hudson’s Bay 
Company, 1670-1930” in Krech (1984): 2-3. 
252 Populations of arctic fauna are susceptible to dramatic peaks and troughs.  The snowshoe hare has a population 
cycle of only ten years, with three-year maxima and minima.  Populations rise and fall rapidly, leaving HGBs that 
rely on them vulnerable to periodic starvation.  Increasing reliance on snowshoe hares among the Dene following 
their northward and westward migration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to regular famines among 
Mackenzie valley populations, increasing their reliance on the fur trade for access to food.  This socio-ecological 
process will be discussed further in Chapter 6.  [See Ray in Krech (1984): 18 n.; T. Griffith Taylor, Canada: a study 
of cool continental environments and their effect on British and French settlement (London: Methuen & Co., 1957) 
third edition: 356-357.] 
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(fish, birds, marine mammals), making the region’s oceans significantly more 
productive than their neighbouring terrestrial biomes.253  
Coevolution: pre-contact indigenous units 
 
Understanding the history of Arctic international systems requires that we begin by 
looking at the indigenous units and systems that constituted the region’s first actors 
and networks.  The circumpolar North is inhabited by a wide array of indigenous 
peoples. (see Figure 4.3)  In the pre-contact era, most of these were organized into 
fluid social groups, ranging in size from nuclear families, though multi-family local 
bands, to semi-permanent regional bands of fifty to five hundred individuals.254  Where 
they lacked access to a stable and sufficient food source – as was the case throughout 
most of the Arctic Basin – these peoples spent the majority of their time in small 
groupings, spreading the ecological risks associated with life in relatively unproductive 
biomes.255  Thanks to the Basin’s mosaic distribution of sites and niches, its 
indigenous units’ social and physical technologies varied greatly, from nomadic HGBs 
of the taiga such as the Even- and Evenk-Tungus of Central Siberia to the semi-
permanent whale-hunting villages of the North Slope Inupiat of Alaska. Their forms of 
internal organisation also varied from site to site.  Most often, pre-contact Arctic units 
were differentiated along segmentary lines, with each individual or sub-group being 
equal – and functionally similar – to all others. A few Arctic units, such as the 
Yakut/Sakha of the Lena River valley and the Inupiat of Alaska exhibited stratificatory 
forms of social organisation, in which the formal equality of segmentary societies 
gives way to structural social hierarchies.256  Prior to European contact, indigenous 
arctic and subarctic units did not adopt functional modes of differentiation, with their 
specialised divisions of labour across societal, political, and economic sectors.257  As a 
result, they never became complex units as understood by Joseph Tainter – defined by 
‘the size of a society, the number and distinctiveness of its parts, the variety of 
                                                
253 Molles (1999): 348-349; Miller (1991): 71-75, Chapter 5 passim. 
254 David Riches, Northern Nomadic Hunter-Gatherers: a humanistic approach (London: Academic Press, 1982): 
78. 
255 David Damas, ‘The Diversity of Eskimo Society’, in  Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore, Man the Hunter: the 
first intensive survey of a single, crucial stage of human development – man’s once universal hunting way of life 
(New Jersey: Aldine Transaction, 2009) second printing: 111. 
256 Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan, ‘Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory’, 
European Journal of International Relations (16:3) 2010:, pp. 318-319; Niklas Luhmann, ‘The Paradox of System 
Differentiation and the Evolution of Society’, in Jeffery C. Alexander and Paul Colomy, Differentiation Theory and 
Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990): 423-425. 
257 Buzan & Little (2000): 116-119. 
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specialized roles it incorporates, the number of distinct social personalities present, and 
the variety of mechanisms for organizing these into a coherent, functioning whole.’258  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic Basin259 
 
The organisation and distribution the Arctic’s pre-contact indigenous units were 
decisively influenced by Socio-Ecological Coevolution.  Though not determined by 
their ecological contexts, their social and material evolution was certainly constrained 
by their need to wring energy from the natural systems in which they were embedded – 
affecting their EC and creating covariance between the social and biogeographical 
structures of their environment.  As discussed in Chapter Three, a unit’s EC is 
mediated by three factors.  These are: 
 
i) whether local levels of ecological productivity, measured in terms of NPP, 
make the sustainability of specific international units and systems easy or 
difficult; 
ii) what physical technologies are available for the extraction and utilization of 
a habitat’s energy reserves; and 
iii) what social technologies are available for the extraction and utilization of a 
habitat’s energy reserves. 
 
                                                
258 Tainter (1988): 23.    
259 W.K. Dallman, "Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic Countries", Arctic Council Map Archive [online], 2002, 
Norwegian Polar Institute. 2 May 2009 <http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/AHDRmap_lan-3..jpg>. Notes: 
Overlapping populations are not shown.  In the Russian Federation, indigenous peoples have a special status as 
‘Samll Peoples of the Arctic’ only when they number less than 50,000.  Names of larger indigenous peoples are 
written in green. 
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The Arctic’s pre-contact indigenous peoples possessed highly specialised social 
adaptations to minimize ecological risks, including inter-band food sharing and the 
tendency to spread resource-gathering across a number of different ecological niches.  
Nevertheless, they lacked the social and physical technologies needed to actually 
increase their energy allowances, as is possible through large-scale trade with more 
productive ecosystems.  This left their EC highly constrained by the NPP of their 
surroundings, affecting their ability to support the hierarchies, divisions of labour, and 
large populations that define social complexity.260   
 
Recalling our discussion of New Ecology in Chapter Three, the Arctic is not 
homogenously unproductive.  Conditions vary from site to site, producing corridors 
and islands of ecological productivity where relatively complex stratificatory units can 
sustain themselves in the midst of less differentiated social groups.  Given our previous 
discussion of Arctic Ecology and the correlation between EC and units’ levels of 
hierarchical and functional differentiation, three socio-ecological axes can be deduced. 
First, NPP – and with it levels of social complexity – will tend to increase as one 
moves from North to South thanks to rising temperatures and levels of PAR.  Units 
closer to the pole are, in general, able to sustain smaller populations and lower levels 
of differentiation than their southern neighbours.  This neat North-South distribution is 
interrupted by a second socio-ecological axis stretching from continental to maritime 
climates, where increased precipitation and moderated temperatures boost the energy 
available to embedded human populations.  Finally, NPP increases along an axis 
running from tributary uplands to mature river valleys and coastlines.  This is 
particularly important in the Arctic, whose rivers run from South to North (see figure 
4.4), bringing organic matter and nutrients to the relatively sluggish ecosystems of the 
northern taiga and tundra and thereby boosting soil fertility, improving drainage, and 
bringing an influx of organic matter, fish, and flora.261 Coastlines, meanwhile, give 
access to the region’s relatively productive marine ecosystems. 
 
The distribution and organisation of indigenous units around the Arctic basin mirrors 
these socio-ecological axes, providing inductive support for our hypothesized 
                                                
260 David Damas, ‘The Arctic from Norse Contact to Modern Times’, in  Bruce Trigger et al., The Cambridge 
History of the Native Peoples of the Americas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 359-360; Simmons 
(1997): 17, 29-30; Tainter (2011), pp. 89-90; Tainter (2006), p. 92; Tainter (1988): 37-38. 
261 Miller (1991): 69-71. 
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correlations between NPP, EC, and the organisation of pre-contact units.  According to 
the archaeological and anthropological records, indigenous groups exhibiting low 
levels of hierarchical and functional differentiation have historically been found along 
northern and upland portions of the continental taiga and tundra, in areas lacking 
access to either marine or riverine resources.  For example, the inland Yukagir of 
northeastern Siberia and the Even/Evenk Tungus of the Central Siberian Plateau lived 
in small HGBs scattered over vast stretches of continental upland, lacking permanent 
leadership hierarchies and using small-scale pastoralism – a form of on the hoof food 
storage imported from the southern steppes – to steady the seasonal vagaries of their 
hunting and gathering lifestyles.262  Downstream from these upland groups lived 
stratificatory groups such as the Yakut/Sakha of the middle Lena River – a society of 
cow and horse pastoralists with traditions of private property and social hierarchy that 
reached back to their initial northward migration around AD1000.263   
     
 
Figure 4.4 – Map indicating the major rivers draining into the Arctic Ocean.264 
 
The evolution of the principles that define Yakut society provides an opportunity to 
observe how changing ecological contexts affect units’ organisation.  As the Yakut 
migrated north from the middle to the lower Lena – and then to the even more extreme 
                                                
262 James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia’s North Asian Colony 1581-1990 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992): 49-51, 74-75. 
263 Aleksei P. Okladnikov, Yakutia Before its Incorporation into the Russian State, Trans. Henry Michael 
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1970): 395-399, 381. 
264 Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, ‘Major River Systems in the Arctic’, Global Environmental Outlook 3 
[online] 2012, United Nations Environmental Programme. Accessed 26 February 2012 < http://www.grida.no/ 
graphicslib/OpenFile.aspx?id =3e032e9a-b0ea-4adc-a17d-d1774857bb0c>. Numbers indicate their annual 
discharge of fresh water in cubic kilometers. 
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continental climates of the Anabar, Yana, Indigirka and Kolyma basins – their 
stratificatory social hierarchies converged with the segmentary social arrangements of 
their Tungus and Yukagir neighbours.  In doing so, these Yakut groups evolved along 
paths that diverged from the stratificatory organisation of their southerly Yakut 
brethren, even abandoning carnivorous pastoralism in favour of a segmentary hunting-
herding lifestyle.265  The tendency of carnivorous pastoralists to accumulate individual 
wealth and create hierarchies of leadership – a trait much less common in mixed 
herding and hunter-gatherer bands – meant that the northern Yakut experienced a sharp 
reduction in hierarchical differentiation as they adopted social technologies more 
adapted to their new ecological contexts.  These northern Yakut also converged with 
their Yukagir and Tungus neighbours at a material level, with Yakut lodges being 
replaced by Tungus tents while their clothing became a mixture of traditional Yakut 
and Yukagir designs.266  Thus, under pressure from their low-energy ecological 
surroundings, the Yakut evolved towards simpler forms of social organisation – a 
pattern that would be repeated by successive waves of European migrants over the 
next four hundred years, and which illustrates the powerful impact of NPP on the 
spatial distribution of units, systems, and complexity around the Arctic Basin. 
 
This interplay between social organisation, material technology, and ecological 
productivity combined to produce several dynamics of Socio-Ecological Coevolution 
that remain important in the modern era.  First, where initially dissimilar units find 
themselves embedded in similar ecosystems, Socio-Ecological Coevolution will push 
them onto convergent evolutionary pathways, leading to the development of similar 
forms of segmentary, stratificatory, or functionally differentiated social organisation.  
Likewise, where initially similar societies become embedded in fundamentally 
different ecosystems, they will tend to diverge, reflecting the pressures brought to bear 
by their dissimilar ecological contexts.  In both cases, social differentiation covaries 
alongside a site’s NPP, marking a direct correlation between EC and the social 
principles adopted by a biome’s embedded units and systems.  The divergence of the 
                                                
265 Carnivorous pastoralism refers to the mode of production in which a society primarily relies on its herds for 
meat, rather than earlier forms of pastoralism in which domesticated animals supplemented hunting by providing 
milk and transport.  Only in times of famine would these groups kill and eat their herds. [Knut Odner, The Varanger 
Saami: habitation and economy AD 1200-1900 (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992): 32-33.] 
266 Robert Paine, ‘Animals as Capital: Comparisons among Northern Nomadic Herders and Hunters’, 
Anthropological Quarterly, 44(3) 1971, pp. 168-169; Okladnikov, Chapter III.1.6 ‘Northern Elements in the Culture 
of the Yakuts’ (1970): 291-303. 
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Copper and Iglulik Inuit cultures in the central Canadian Arctic during the centuries 
before European contact is a case in point. (see figure 4.5) 
 
 
Figure 4.5 – Inuit societies in the Arctic267 
 
Like other Inuit societies, the Copper and Iglulik Inuit trace their descent to the Thule 
Eskimos, a relatively complex culture of Arctic whale hunters whose social units 
resembled those of the North Alaskan Inupiat.  By storing significant quantities of 
whale meat over the winter months, the Thule were able to maintain permanent 
communities of up to 500 individuals with leadership hierarchies and a limited division 
of labour between men and women, hunters and shamans.268  The Thule people 
originally migrated across the Canadian Arctic to Greenland during the Medieval 
Warm Period (MWP).269  When the MWP gave way to cooling conditions during the 
Little Ice Age (LIA), Inuit groups across Arctic North America and Greenland found 
themselves exposed to different local ecological regimes, producing divergent social 
adaptations among their once-similar units.270   
 
The Copper Inuit, inhabiting lands around Coronation and Queen Maud gulfs, found 
themselves in sites where land-fast ice blocked access to marine resources through 
most of the year, limiting their ecological energy base to the summer caribou hunt and 
                                                
267 Damas in Lee & DeVore (2009): 112. 
268 Robert McGhee, Ancient Peoples of the Arctic (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996): 20-23, 
184-185. 
269 Robert McGhee, ‘The Timing of Thule Migration’, Polarforschung 54(1) 1984, pp. 2-3.   
270 David Riches, ‘The Netsilik Eskimo: A Special Case of Selective Female Infanticide’, Ethnology, 13(4) 1974, p. 
359. 
  P a g e  | 119 
 
wintertime ring seal breathing-hole hunting.271  In the face of chronic energy shortfalls 
and regular periods of famine, they were unable to maintain the large bands and 
hierarchies that had been typical of Thule culture, adapting instead highly fluid social 
arrangements in which much smaller multi-family groups were ‘experimentally 
constructed’ from a wide pool of nuclear families for one or two seasons, with less 
concern for kinship than for hunting success.272  The Copper Inuit went so far as to 
abandon named leadership positions among their multi-family units, with authority 
becoming increasingly ephemeral as their bands’ constitutions became increasingly 
unstable.273  Constrained by the NPP of their surroundings, they went on to adopt a 
segmentary form of social organisation, in which each individual and sub-group was 
socially equal, and functionally similar, to all of the others.274  Meanwhile, the Iglulik 
Inuit, whose territories on the Melville Peninsula and western Baffin Island border the 
more productive maritime ecosystems of Baffin Bay and Foxe Basin, faced a more 
moderate environmental regime during the LIA, allowing them to retain a greater 
degree of Thule-era social complexity. Using sea kayaks and group hunting, physical 
and social technologies abandoned by the Copper Inuit, the Iglulik were able to access 
large bearded seals and walruses to supplement the caribou and breathing-hole hunting 
techniques they shared with their southwestern  neighbours.275 These additional energy 
sources allowed them to maintain larger populations and many of the hierarchical 
institutions that had characterized Thule culture.276   Iglulik multi-family and regional 
bands not only displayed a higher level of social cohesion than those of the Copper, 
but also featured a hierarchical system of food redistribution through the person of the 
isumataaq, “intelligent one”, indicating a greater level of stratificatory differentiation 
than was to be found among their ecologically disadvantaged Copper brethren.277   
 
*** 
 
                                                
271 David Damas, ‘Central Eskimo Systems of Food Sharing’, Ethnology 11(3) 1972, pp. 220-221. 
272 Riches (1982): 83. 
273 Damas (2009): 114. 
274 Albert & Buzan (2010), p. 318. Though we tend to think of hierarchically and functionally differentiated units as 
somehow superior to those exhibiting this sort of segmentary organisation, this is not the case in regions where 
maintaining hierarchies (much less strict divisions of labour) leaves a group dependent on too few hands to feed too 
many mouths with too undependable a food supply.  As the Yakut found during their northward migration along the 
Lena, ‘simpler’ units and practices are sometimes better than more complex alternatives. 
275 Damas (1972), p. 221. 
276 Riches (1974), p.  359. 
277 Riches (1982): 68-69; Damas (2008): 115; Luhmann (1990): 424; Albert & Buzan (2010), pp. 318-319. 
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Socio-Ecological Coevolution had a decisive impact on the organization and 
distribution of pre-contact indigenous units around the Arctic Basin. In pre-contact 
Siberia and arctic North America, social differentiation covaried with regional NPP 
along several axes of ecological productivity, the number and variety of which made 
the polar basin’s distribution of segmentary and stratificatory groups complex and 
intermingled.  Along one axis, social differentiation increased from North to South 
thanks to increasing levels of PAR and temperature.  Along a second, differentiation 
increased from continental to maritime climates thanks to moderated temperatures and 
increased precipitation. Along a third, differentiation increased from tributary uplands 
and areas of immature drainage to mature river valleys and coastlines.278  By means of 
these ecological axes, Coevolution had a perceptible impact on geographical patterns 
of convergent and divergent evolution among the Arctic’s pre-contact indigenous 
units.  Where initially similar units found themselves embedded in different ecological 
contexts, their social technologies tended to diverge, leading to the evolution of 
different principles of social organization.  Conversely, where initially dissimilar units 
found themselves embedded in analogous ecological contexts, their social technologies 
tended to converge around parallel sets of social principles.  This coevolutionary 
dynamic meant that units could become either more or less differentiated over time, 
indicating that unit evolution does not necessarily move in the direction of increasing 
complexity and technological sophistication.  Though constrained by path dependence 
– as discussed in Chapter Three – societies’ endogenous sources of stability can be 
overcome by ecological pressures, encouraging the adoption of less differentiated 
social technologies in order to cope with acute resource shortfalls.  In some cases, such 
as the northern Yakut and Copper Inuit, these evolutionary pressures require units to 
move toward lower levels of differentiation in order to reduce their energy 
requirements, replacing what we in the progress-obsessed modern world think of as 
‘superior’ social technologies with simpler forms of organisation more carefully 
adapted to new ecological contexts. 
Coevolution: early-modern units & systems 
 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution affects the development of both units and the social 
systems constituted by their interactions.  One source of explanation for its 
                                                
278 Miller (1991): 69-71; J.C. Yerbury, The Subarctic Indians and the Fur Trade, 1680-1860 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1986): ix. 
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effectiveness is tied to the impact of EC – the ability of an actor to mobilize energy 
resources in a given physical context.  Coevolution is also active at the systems level, 
leading to covariance between a region’s biogeographical structures – defined by its 
biological, chemical and physical systems – and the principles of membership and 
behaviour that define its social structures.  One international process has been 
particularly important to the evolution of Arctic international systems – trade.  In 
Siberia and Arctic North America, European traders were drawn into arctic and 
subarctic biomes by the presence of fur – a product of the taiga’s and tundra’s specific 
environmental history. The Coevolution of international and ecological systems in the 
circumpolar North resulted in a distribution of units and processes closely related to 
the three axes of ecological productivity described in the last section.  As traders and 
settlers soon learned, Socio-Ecological Coevolution means that where you interact has 
a clear and present effect on how you interact. 
Pre-international Systems of Exchange 
Long before the arrival of Europeans East of the Urals and West of the Denmark Strait, 
the Arctic was home to a variety of pre-international systems comprising elements of 
socio-cultural, economic, and even politico-military interaction.  The most expansive 
of these were primarily societal – occupying the least intensive sector in terms of its 
interaction and ecological capacity requirements – though all were typified by a 
mixture of socio-cultural, economic, and even politico-military relationships.279  These 
systems exchanged goods, ideas, and people over large areas, almost certainly by 
means of linear relay systems that linked unit to unit in a series of short hops between 
immediate neighbours.  This permitted remarkably extensive networks to develop 
despite the restrictions placed on interaction capacity and EC by groups’ limited social 
and physical technologies and challenging ecological contexts.280   
 
For example, well before the arrival of Europeans along the northern coast of Arctic 
America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, soapstone lamps made by the 
Copper Inuit from the region around Coronation Gulf in the central Canadian Arctic 
were a standard feature in Inuit and Eskimo households as far away as Cape Prince of 
Wales and Kotzebue Sound on the Bering Strait.281 (See Figure 4.6)   
 
                                                
279 Ibid: 81. 
280 Ibid: 96-97. 
281 Morrison (1991), pp. 239-246. 
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Figure 4.6 – Pre-international linear relay trade routes in the western  
and central North American arctic282 
 
Pre-international systems such as those which moved lamps over 2500km from the 
central Canadian Arctic to the Bering Strait display aspects of economic interaction – 
namely, the exchange of goods.  However, they were never purely economic.  They 
were pre-international to the extent that their interactions lacked firm distinctions 
between sectors and tended to penetrate deeply into the ‘domestic’ structure of 
participating units.283  As discussed in the last section, the indigenous units whose 
interactions constituted these interactive systems were most often differentiated along 
segmentary lines. A few exhibited stratificatory forms of social organisation, though 
none demonstrated the full functional differentiation characteristic of units and systems 
with specialized divisions of labour among the societal, political, and economic 
sectors.  The absence of these functional divisions makes it impossible to differentiate 
between discrete sectoral processes, problematising the issue of structure in pre-
international systems.284 Exchange processes such as that which transported soapstone 
lamps across Arctic North America included elements of economic, societal, and 
political interaction, allowing units to penetrate deeply into one another’s internal 
processes and problematising the inside-outside distinction at the heart of IR’s 
definition of ‘the international’.  Exchanges of this kind were as important for their 
                                                
282 David Morrison, ‘The Copper Inuit Soapstone Trade’, Arctic 44(3) 1991, p. 240.  The ‘major trading centres’ 
represented in the map indicate the presence of a seasonal hunting and trading camp among the relatively complex 
Inuit/Eskimo cultures of the Beaufort coast.  Note the absence of such sites among the segmentary bands of the 
Copper Inuit. 
283 Buzan & Little (2000): 123-130. 
284 Albert & Buzan (2010), pp. 130-133, 318-319; Luhmann (1990): 423-425. 
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role in reinforcing kinship and reciprocity relationships as they were for moving 
goods, bolstering vital social technologies that ensured the survival of ecologically-
constrained HGBs in the event of local resource shortfalls even as they provided an 
important physical technology to the peoples of the Bering Strait.285    
Environmental History & the Fur Trade 
The arrival of European units and processes in Siberia after 1581 and Rupert’s Land 
after 1670 – lured by the wealth of furs to be had in the taiga, treeline, and tundra – did 
not undo the coevolutionary relationships responsible for the spatial organisation of 
indigenous peoples’ pre-international units and systems.  Ecosystems’ coevolutionary 
impact on incoming European units – and the systems constituted by their interactions 
– was similar to their impact on the region’s pre-international indigenous units and 
systems.  Socio-Ecological Coevolution encouraged their systems to adapt to 
ecological challenges and opportunities with social technologies that varied along the 
three axes of socio-ecological coevolution described earlier in this Chapter, 
substituting indigenous proxies for complex European units where ecology made the 
latter unsustainable.  This laid the groundwork for the state-centred imperial 
international systems that will be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
 
Russia’s infiltration of Siberia began in earnest during the early 1580s, when Ermak 
Timofeevich – a Cossack mercenary in the private employ of the commercially 
powerful Stroganov family – crossed the Urals from Verkhoturye near the headwaters 
of the Tura River with a force of just over 800 men.286  From the establishment of 
Tyumen in 1586, it took only sixty-three years for a line of Russian forts, ostrogs, and 
small winter blockhouses, zimoves, to reach across 6,500 kilometers of boreal taiga to 
the Sea of Okhotsk and to the Anadyr River on the Chukotka Peninsula. (see figure 
4.7)  One should not mistake this scattering of isolated posts in the wilderness for a 
state in the Westphalian sense of a collective actor possessing sovereign power over 
domestic affairs and international interactions within a well-demarcated territory.  
Rather, each ostrog and zimove was an island of Russian activity in a sea of trees and 
                                                
285 Morrison (1991), p. 244. 
286 Yuri Semyonov, Siberia: its conquest and development, Trans. J. R. Foster (London: Hollis and Carter, 1963): 
46. For translation of related texts, see George Lantzeff and Richard Pierce, Eastward to Empire: exploration and 
conquest on the Russian open frontier to 1750 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1973): 89. 
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tundra and a main point of contact with the 200,000 or so indigenous people of 
Siberia.287 
 
 
Figure 4.7 – Map of Russian Expansion across Siberia from 1586-1860, showing the riverine Southern and 
Northern trans-Siberian transportation routes via Yeniseysk and Turukhansk.288 
 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution played a key role in shaping the processes by which this 
expansion took place.  It is a remarkable story by any standard, motivated by the quest 
for fur.289  By the end of the sixteenth century, a single sable pelt was worth more than 
the annual income of a peasant family in European Russia, pushing independent fur 
trappers and state agents further and further East.290  Where demand pushed, supply 
pulled private and state hunters across the continent.  After securing positions along 
the Ob River and either trapping available fauna  or enforcing fur-tribute – yasak – on 
its indigenous peoples, Russian trappers and state agents reached the lower Yenisei 
River via Mangazeia on the River Taz in 1607.  Eight hundred kilometers further 
south, units from Tobolsk reached the upper Yenisei via a portage from the Ob in 
1608.291  The depletion of fur bearing animals along the main courses of the Taz and 
lower Yenisei in the 1620s pushed yasak men and traders eastward from Mangazeia 
into the taiga-tundra ecotone at the base of the Taimyr Peninsula and up the Lower 
Tunguska River.  From there, privately-funded fur parties portaged to the middle Lena 
                                                
287 Lincoln (1993): 45. 
288 Adapted from Victor Mote, Siberia: Worlds Apart (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998): 42.  
289 This is one of the very few points on which historians of Siberia – Russian and western, communist and 
capitalist – generally agree.   
290 Lincoln (1993): 43, 50-51. 
291 Lanteff & Pierce (1973): 127-129, 137. 
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River, where they began to hunt the valley’s substantial sable and fox populations and 
extract yasak from the Yakut and Tungus peoples of the region.292  In 1628, the first 
state expedition set out from Yeniseysk to secure the Lena fur lands opened by these 
private traders, erecting an ostrog at the site of present-day Yakutsk in 1632.293  
Yakutsk became the eastern terminus of the northern and southern trans-Siberian 
routes and the administrative centre of Eastern Siberia – a huge area defined as all of 
the lands east of the Yenisei and north of the Amur River basin.  This was the richest 
storehouse of furs yet discovered, the presence of which would subsidize Yakutsk’s 
severe ecological deficits for decades to come.  Yakutsk was also the jumping-off 
point for expeditions into the Yana, Indigirka, and Kolyma basins in the harsh 
northeastern corner of Asia.  These basins held fewer saleable furs thanks to the 
depressed productivity of their northern, continental, and upland climates, removing 
the primary motivation behind the Russian advance.294  Still searching for alternative 
fur sources, the ostrog of Okhotsk was founded on the Pacific coast in 1641, and a 
party led by Semyon Dezhnev rounded the northeastern cape of Asia in small open 
boats from the Kolyma in 1648, founding an ostrog, Anadyrsk, on the middle Anadyr 
River in 1649.295 Neither Anadyrsk nor Okhotsk proved profitable and for the rest of 
the century they remained geographically and ecologically isolated outposts of Russian 
power.  By 1731, Okhotsk had shrunk to a garrison of 30 Cossacks, who subsisted – 
like their indigenous Lamut neighbours – on local fish and roots.296  Anadyrsk fared no 
better, and the ostrog founded by Dezhnev on the Anadyr was abandoned and 
destroyed in 1764.  Chukotka was not truly brought under direct Russian control until 
after years after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.297   
 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution played a key role in shaping the distribution of the fur 
trade in Siberia, with consequences for the subsequent course of Russian rule across 
northern Asia.  The fur resources that drew Russian units across the Urals to the Bering 
Strait are a product of the Arctic Basin’s specific environmental history.  The taiga’s 
                                                
292 Raymond Fisher, The Russian Fur Trade, 1550-1700 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1943): 97-98, 
106. 
293 Forsyth (1992): 62. 
294 Ibid: 76. 
295 Terrance Armstrong, Russian Settlement in the North (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965): 23-25. 
Anadyrsk should not be confused with the modern settlement of Anadyr at the mouth of the eponymous river.  It is 
interesting to note that official records of Dezhnev’s 1648 expedition remained buried in government offices until 
discovered by G.F. Muller, the father of Siberian history, in 1736. [Forsyth (1992): 55.] 
296 Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Siberia and the small peoples of the North (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
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fur-bearing fauna, which have some of the densest and warmest coats in the animal 
kingdom, have evolved in direct response to the climatic systems of the boreal forest 
and treeline.  These experience the most dramatic seasonality of any ecosystems on 
Earth, selecting individuals and species best able to survive in extreme cold through 
the basic mechanisms of Darwinian evolution.298  At their most extreme, temperatures 
in the subarctic taiga vary from as low as -70°C in the winter to over 30°C in summer, 
an annual swing of 100°C.299 Over evolutionary timescales, this extreme seasonality 
forced the winter coats of the region’s fur-bearing fauna to become incredibly thick, 
making their pelts highly desirable among the wealthy classes of Europe and China – 
the two most important markets for Russian furs.  This is especially true of the sable 
(martes zibellina), a subarctic variety of Asian marten whose luxuriant brown fleece 
became the standard against which all other Siberian furs came to be judged.  At a 
fundamental level, the fur trade could not have begun without the specific 
environmental history that made these adaptations possible.300  Though other 
commodities – say, gold or salt – may have eventually lured the Tsarist state across the 
Urals, only furs were geographically dispersed throughout the subarctic boreal taiga 
and treeline in such a way as to draw its agents from the Urals to the Pacific in a matter 
of decades.  It is no coincidence that the ecotones dividing the boreal forest from its 
neighbouring biomes were largely coterminous with the borders of Russian control for 
two hundred years after Siberia’s ‘conquest’.301  This biome-wide distribution meant 
that hunters and state fur collectors could use the same technological toolkits from the 
Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean.  The ecological conditions of the taiga thereby 
constituted the socio-ecological borders of Russian rule in Siberia – feeding into the 
setup costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations described 
with reference to path dependence in Chapter Two.302   
 
A similar story can be told in subarctic and arctic North America, where the North 
American beaver (castor canadensis) was the fur trade’s preferred prey species.  
Though widely distributed across most of present-day Canada and the United States, 
                                                
298 Darwin (1988): 62-105. 
299 Molles (1999): 37, 40.  Compare these measurements from Verkhoyansk on the Yana with the 35-45°C swings 
more common in the tundra to the North, where more maritime conditions mean that summer temperatures do not 
climb as high and winter temperatures do not fall as low.  This is mainly due to the taiga’s continental climate and 
much lower albedo, the rate at which light is diffusely reflected from the ground, which allows the forest to warm 
up relatively quickly in the long days of the Arctic summer. 
300 Robert S. Hoffmann, ‘Terrestrial Vertebrates’, Ives & Barry (1974): 485. 
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the best furs came from the most cold-affected systems, where coats were 
evolutionarily selected to become thicker and warmer.303  Although beaver numbers 
were lower in the cooler boreal forest than in more productive southern woodlands, the 
biome’s extreme climatic variability made it home to the most valuable pelts, 
encouraging the fur trade’s expansion into this challenging ecosystem. At the same 
time, however, the boreal forest provided very few local energy resources on which to 
base even a modest trading post.  Even the indigenous Cree considered the northern 
boreal lowlands around the Bay to be ‘sterile’, making them loath to overwinter there 
for fear of starvation.304  By 1800, the European footprint in present-day Western and 
Northern Canada was constituted by fur trading posts strung along the southern 
borders of the boreal forest – located in such a way as to take advantage of easy access 
to the relatively productive parklands and prairies – and along with the river valleys 
that cross and connect them, representing sites and corridors of heightened ecological 
productivity in the midst of otherwise depressed boreal ecosystems.305   
Environmental History & International Systems in 
Russian Siberia 
The impact of the planet’s biological, chemical, and physical systems on the dominant 
states of the circumpolar basin will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.  For 
now, suffice it to say that the ability of European units to exercise power over the 
peoples and territories of the tundra and taiga has never been absolute, but has 
increased alongside the three axes of ecological productivity that run from North to 
South, from continental to maritime climates, and from tributary uplands to mature 
river valleys and coastlines.  Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, this relationship had a perceptible impact on the organisation of the politico-
economic processes that laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of 
imperial international systems around the region.   
 
In Siberia, ecological productivity covaried alongside a transition from areas of 
indirect resource exploitation and rule by indigenous proxies to regions in which neo-
European conditions permitted direct Russian colonization and exploitation.  In the 
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latter, the means by which resources were mobilised converged with the dominant 
economic principles of metropolitan Russia, leading to the establishment of an 
economic system based on sedentary peasant agriculture and an increasingly 
centralized and homogenized political apparatus to organize and tax the resulting 
production and trade.306  Fur resources in these regions were quickly ‘hunted out’, and 
local indigenous people were displaced from particularly productive ecological niches.  
In terms of the principles by which their units and systems were organised, the Russian 
population of these neo-European ecological sites came to live in colonial extensions 
of Russia’s metropolitan core – huddled around corridors and islands of relative 
productivity in which the agricultural toolkits of European Russia could be deployed 
with little modification.307   
 
Outside of these neo-European ecosystems, Russian settlements could only grow up 
around important trade hubs.  These subsidized their local ecological shortfalls by 
exchanging fur for food – ‘trading away’ from NPP constraints by accessing ghost 
acreage (large additional acreages in more productive ecosystems) in European Russia 
and its neo-European colonial extensions.308  A town such as Mangazeia – located in 
the northern treeline on the Taz River (see figure 4.7) – could only be sustained as long 
as the trade on which its energy subsidies depended continued.  When this trade 
declined due to a failure of supply, it sank into obscurity and disappeared.309  
Following Martin Wight’s oft-quoted argument concerning the importance of common 
culture to the establishment of viable international societies (read international systems 
for the purposes of this analysis), it should come as no surprise that the ‘thickness’ of 
the principles of membership and behaviour that came to define the boundaries of 
                                                
306 Lieven (2002): 222-224, 251-253. At the same time, European Russia itself ‘appeared to be converging more and 
more with European political, social, and cultural norms’, dragging settled regions of Siberia along with it. [Ibid: 
248.] 
307 Crosby (1986): 36-39.  Crosby denies Siberia the status of a neo-Europe due primarily to its failure to produce 
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Lake Baikal.  Crosby’s comments reflect an unfortunate tendency to view Siberia as a single ecological unit rather 
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Russia’s international imperial system in the Arctic was deeply influenced by the 
regional distribution of Russian colonization.310   
 
Where sites’ biogeographical structure constrained settlers’ ability to either directly 
access and mobilize ecological resources or ‘trade away’ from local energy deficits, 
indigenous peoples were left in situ and integrated into Russia’s expanding imperial 
international system as semi-autonomous actors whose positions within that system 
were ‘centred on, but certainly not reducible to’ the dictates of the metropolitan 
state.311  This indirect integration was accomplished first through the imposition of 
yasak: a sectorally undifferentiated form of resource mobilisation that forced Siberia’s 
indigenous units to swear allegiance to the Tsar and annually deliver a set number of 
furs to state agents, making them indirect – and involuntary – agents of Russian 
political and economic power.  By the end of the seventeenth century, yasak 
constituted up to 80% of the state’s fur revenue and tied together the vast hinterlands 
of northern, continental, and upland Siberia.312  As a matter of course, yasak agents 
held members of bands or family groups as ‘collateral’ against non-payment, often 
using these hostages as leverage to extract additional furs for their own private sale.313  
As the yasak system became institutionalized, indigenous groups in marginal 
ecosystems were able to parlay their politico-economic positions into limited forms of 
autonomy within this emerging imperial international system, reinforcing their semi-
independent status within it.  They gained increasing de jure rights over local order and 
justice – foreshadowing the formal system of indirect rule in Siberia that will be 
discussed further in Chapter Five. This ‘outsourcing’ of political and economic power 
in northern, continental, and upland sites of low NPP remained largely unchanged until 
the second quarter of the twentieth century.314  Perched at the unproductive ends of the 
ecological axes that describe productivity in the Arctic Basin, indigenous groups 
remained locked into a largely undifferentiated system of resource mobilisation until 
its abolition by the Bolshevik government after 1917.  Only then, thanks to a 
combination of modern transportation and communications technology and the Soviet 
state’s application of subsidized central planning, was the Russian state able to boost 
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its Ecological Capacity enough to ‘effectively occupy’ larger segments of the Arctic 
through direct colonization – a key aspect of the Soviet Union’s and Russian 
Federation’s de jure claims to territorial sovereignty.315   
 
The imposition of yasak also began the transition of indigenous units from pre-
international to international status.  Indigenous groups’ responsibilities vis-à-vis the 
imperial centre brought with it pressure to fulfil yasak obligations in increasingly 
depleted ecosystems.  This decreased the time available for traditional subsistence 
hunting, undercutting their ability to insulate themselves against the periodic collapse 
of various prey populations through the seasonal harvest of different ecological niches.  
Yasak thereby increased indigenous dependence on Russian trade goods, realigning 
exchange processes through Russian hubs and undercutting the linear relay systems of 
reciprocity that linked indigenous populations together around the Arctic Basin.316  
Finally, the incorporation of indigenous actors into Russia’s imperial international 
system increasingly defined them as discrete units with ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’. Yasak 
collectors had to know how many hunters were in a band in order to assess their annual 
tribute, leading the state to formalize the previously fluid constitution of many 
segmentary units and spell the beginning of the end of their undifferentiated, pre-
international status. 
Environmental History & International Systems in 
Rupert’s Land 
The Environmental History of units and processes in Siberia has it corollary in arctic 
North America, where early modern socio-economic international systems were 
fundamentally shaped by the ecological contexts in which they evolved.  The 
similarities that bind Siberia and arctic America are often masked by the different 
forms of resource mobilisation used to access their ecological capital.  These different 
systems were – in part – products of the different European states that operated on the 
two continents.  Russia represents (even defines) Charles Tilly’s coercive model of 
state development.  England, meanwhile, employed more capital-intensive means of 
resource mobilisation in its arctic territories, with moves towards a mixed capital-
coercive form of mobilisation constrained by its units’ low EC in non-European 
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biomes.317  These divergent means of resource mobilisation mask an underlying 
similarity in the organisation of the imperial international systems they began to 
constitute.  These became organized through increasingly indirect means as interactive 
processes moved into less productive regions, where European units’ EC was 
constrained by low NPP and unfamiliar biogeographical conditions. 
 
There is no denying that the capital-intensive methods used by England’s commercial 
agents to mobilize resources in the Hudson Bay and Mackenzie River drainage basins 
was markedly different from the coercive processes of Russian Siberia.  Whereas the 
latter relied first on the state’s ability to coerce indigenous groups, the English state 
employed corporate proxies to draw indigenous peoples into the fur trade through 
commercial carrots rather than coercive sticks.  The key unit in what became arctic and 
subarctic Canada was the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), a joint-stock enterprise 
chartered by King Charles II on May 2nd, 1670.318  In its royal charter, the HBC was 
granted permanent title to 3.9 million square kilometers of land that drained into 
Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait, a vast region named Rupert’s Land in honour of the 
Company’s first Governor, Prince Rupert of the Rhine.319 (see figure 4.8)  Within this 
territory – larger than all but seven countries in the world today – the Company was 
granted de jure rights to make diplomatic treaties with indigenous groups, establish 
order and justice, defend against encroachment by other European actors, and 
monopolize trade.320  These rights exceeded even those of the East India Company 
insofar as the HBC was given rights of dominion and propriety over its chartered 
territory and the peoples thereof, making it both a de facto sovereign and an imperial 
proxy of the English state.321 
 
Following the advice of two French fur traders – Pierre-Esprit Radisson and Médard 
des Groseilliers – the founding partners of the HBC opened their first post at Rupert 
River on James Bay in 1669.  Their subsequent foundations along Hudson and James 
                                                
317 Tilly (1992): 94, 137-143, 151-156. 
318 The HBC was founded 89 years after Yermak crossed the Urals, 22 years after Dezhnev rounded Siberia’s 
eastern tip, and 307 years to the day before the author was born. 
319 Barry M. Gough, ‘The Adventurers of England Trading into Hudson's Bay: a study of the founding members of 
the hudson's bay company, 1665-1670’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 2(1) 1970, p. 
38. 
320Rich (1958): 53-56; Hudson’s Bay Company Committee, Hudson’s Bay Company, Incorporated 2nd May 1670: 
a brief history (London: Hudson’s Bay Company, 1934): 1-8. 
321 Rich (1958): 266; See also John S. Galbraith, The Hudson’s Bay Company as an Imperial Factor: 1821-1869 
(Berkley: University of California Press) 1957. 
  P a g e  | 132 
 
bays were located at the nexus of indigenous relay trade routes and Europe’s North 
Atlantic shipping lanes.  The former connected the tributary uplands of the 
Saskatchewan, Churchill, Albany and Rupert rivers to the lowlands around the Bay, 
and had long been responsible for the pre-international exchange of silica from Ungava 
in northern Quebec, copper from the Coppermine River in the Central Canadian 
Arctic, obsidian from the Pacific Northwest, and shells from the eastern and western 
seaboards.322  The HBC’s posts were sited in such a way as to tie oceanic shipping 
lanes into these continental linear relay systems, taking advantage of English maritime 
technologies to minimize the costs of bulk transportation back to markets in Europe.323   
 
 
Figure 4.8 - Hudson's Bay Company territory, 1670 to 1763.324 
 
This greatly increased the Company’s EC at the Bayside, allowing it to mediate the 
depressed NPP of the lowland forests in which its posts were sited.325  By ‘trading 
away’ from its ecological constraints, the HBC followed in the footsteps of Siberia’s 
fur trading hubs – overcoming local NPP shortfalls by importing energy from more 
productive ecosystems.  Unlike Siberia, however, access to this ghost acreage did not 
initially extend inland, where very different transport technologies were required to 
move goods and people.  The most important of these were birch and cedar bark 
canoes, craft that could be paddled up- and downriver, carry a significant cargo, yet 
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were light enough to be portaged for many kilometers around the region’s rapids and 
across its heights of land.  This socio-ecological dynamic was reinforced by the floral 
communities of ecosystems around Company posts.  Situated in the immature muskeg 
of the Hudson Bay lowland boreal forest, these lacked adequate access to the birch and 
cedar trees required for canoe construction.  This ecological shortage was particularly 
pronounced around York Factory and Fort Prince of Wales, the two most strategically 
situated points of entry into the continental hinterland.  As one of the HBC’s pioneers, 
Samuel Hearne, told Company Directors in 1774, “The greatest obstacle that is likely 
to prevent the Company from getting goods inland is the want of proper canoes, to 
procure which I am at a loss what measures to take.”326  A single, very specific 
ecological deficit – measured in terms of two floral species – thereby constrained the 
HBC’s ability to trade upriver, limiting the sustainability of any posts it attempted to 
situate in the interior.327   
 
While the technologies available to the HBC encouraged it to take advantage of the 
oceanic trade routes running to their posts on the Bay, traders out of Montreal followed 
their own path dependent histories into the interior via the Great Lakes watershed.  
Following in the wake of earlier voyageurs, Pierre Gaultier de Varennes and Sieur de 
la Vérendrye crossed the height of land separating the Lake Superior basin from that of 
Lake Winnipeg in 1731, establishing a direct if lengthy route to the Saskatchewan 
basin from Montreal. (see figure 4.8)  Using their long acquaintance with canoes and 
indigenous languages – key physical and social technologies – French and Canadian 
traders established a string of small posts along inland waterways from the Forks of the 
Saskatchewan River to the headwaters of the Albany River, siphoning off the best furs 
from indigenous groups before they reached the HBC’s posts farther downstream.328  
Montreal traders thereby came to control the hinterlands immediately behind 
establishments such as York Fort, forcing the latter’s fur returns down from 52,000MB  
in 1731 to 32,000MB in 1732.329  The HBC, still tied to the Bay by its limited EC and 
path dependent preference for oceanic transportation, could do little to intervene.330  
                                                
326 J.B. Tyrell, ed. Samuel Hearne and Philip Turnor, Journals (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1934): 118.  
327 Rich (1959): 42. 
328 Ray (1974): 14-16, 51-53; See also The National Atlas of Canada, "Post of the Canadian Fur Trade", Natural 
Resources Canada Map Archives, 1974 [online] accessed 15 January 2010.  
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329 MB refers to made beaver, the unit of barter established by the Company to facilitate record keeping.  1 MB was 
equivalent to one prime winter beaver skin, with a value that rose and fell depending on the time and place at which 
trade was conducted.  [Ray (1974): 61-62.] 
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As a result, its fur receipts remained severely depressed until it penetrated the interior 
later in 1774/5 after Samuel Hearne finally purchased canoes from local indigenous 
Cree and received permission from the Company Directors to establish Cumberland 
House on the Saskatchewan River in order to bypass the Montrealers’ stranglehold on 
the inland trade.331   
 
As in Siberia, the biogeographical structure of Rupert’s Land affected the organisation 
of its early international systems.  Despite the HBC’s chartered right to administrative 
sovereignty over Rupert’s Land, the constraints imposed by its limited EC meant that 
its trade was organised around an indirect system of indigenous trappers and 
middlemen through whom it accessed the hinterland’s ecological capital.  Indeed, the 
rapid expansion of the fur trade was largely thanks to entrepreneurial spirit of 
indigenous middlemen, some of who would travel over two thousand kilometers in a 
six-month round trip to collect and deliver pelts from isolated upland trapping bands to 
HBC posts.332  Thus, Rupert’s Land saw its fur resources mobilised through indirect 
relay trade in all but the immediate environs of its posts.   
 
The organisation of the fur trade in arctic and subarctic North America therefore 
reflected the axes of socio-ecological productivity first described in Chapter Three, 
with indigenous economic proxies becoming increasingly important in northern, 
continental, and upland ecosystems.  Conditioned by the English preference for 
capital-intensive means of resource mobilisation, this led to a predominantly socio-
economic (capitalistic), as opposed to politico-military (coercive), system based on 
indigenous commodification.333   Commodification is an ideational process whereby 
exchange and use values are assigned to natural objects, an ontological development 
closely linked to Europe’s dualist conception of the relationship between man and 
nature.  It abstracts an article from its ecological context, justifying its exploitation by 
human actors without regard for the impact of that exploitation on natural systems.334  
                                                
331 Hudson’s Bay Company Committee (1934): 14-15; Rich (1959) 60-65. 
332 Arthur Ray, ‘Some Thoughts About the Reasons For Spatial Dynamism in the Early Fur Trade, 1580-1800’, in 
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333 Tilly (1992): 16-20. 
334 Stephen A. Mrozowski, ‘Colonization and the Commodification of Nature’, The International Journal of 
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Commodification is therefore both an international process in its own right and a 
social technology affecting units’ EC.335 Though infused with economic consequences, 
commodification is not a clearly defined sectoral process.   
 
The commodification of indigenous units in Rupert’s Land began closest to the 
Bayside posts, leading to the development of concentric rings of functionally 
differentiated indigenous units with varying degrees of access to the ecological 
surpluses of non- and neo-European ecosystems.  Trade goods – particularly store food 
– provided indigenous units with access to Europe’s ghost acreage, allowing them to 
subsidize local ecological deficits with energy from more productive ecosystems. 
Typically, indigenous units of the fur trade are placed in a typology of expanding rings 
around each post.  Closest were the Home Guards, living at or near posts and 
provisioning them from local hunting and gathering in return for primary access to 
trade goods and emergency foodstuffs. Middlemen ran farther afield, carrying the trade 
into the non-European hinterland in return for the right to extract profits from the 
peoples of the interior.  Most distant of all were Trappers, who caught and processed 
furs at their source and could only access European trade goods via Middlemen.336  
The result was a radially-organised linear relay system, resembling the hexagonal 
lattice model with which Buzan and Little describe the simplest pre-international 
networks of exchange; the main difference being the specialised functions played by 
each indigenous unit in the emerging international economic system of seventeenth 
and eighteenth century subarctic and arctic North America.337  This distinction is 
significant insofar as it shows how pre-international systems were beginning to replace 
their purely segmentary organisations with higher-energy alternatives.  While their 
incorporation into the trade helped Middlemen and Home Guards to improve their 
access to European ghost acreage, the increasing complexity of their social 
arrangements made indigenous units more vulnerable to disruptions in the case of 
resource shortfalls.  In essence, commodification had the same effect on indigenous 
unit’s Ecological Capacity as the coercive yasak system in Siberia, undermining the 
pre-international systems that had heretofore protected bands against short- and long-
term productivity deficits while increasing their access – and their dependence – on 
energy resources imported from European and neo-European biomes.  
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  P a g e  | 136 
 
 
*** 
 
The Environmental History of the Arctic Basin had a clear impact on the organisation 
of the main process by which European international systems spread around the region 
between 1581 and the nineteenth century – trade.   In both Siberia and Rupert’s Land, 
the region’s specific environmental history was a necessary cause in the evolution of 
the fur-bearing animals most sought after by European markets.  The distribution of 
Ecological Capacity – influenced by the interaction capacities of Russian, English, 
French, and indigenous units – produced patterns of increasingly indirect resource 
mobilisation along the three axes of socio-ecological productivity.  Where European 
units were able to settle, they either used their preferred means of resource 
mobilisation – coercive in the Russian case, capitalistic in the British and French – to 
extract furs directly from local producers or simply hunted for them themselves.  
Where EC constrained their ability to sustain complex units and systems in northern, 
continental, and upland sites, they outsourced the trade to indigenous proxies.  These 
became organised into linear relay trading systems that radiated out from neo-
European ecological sites, bounding indigenous groups as discreet units and 
undermining the pre-international relationships of reciprocity that had heretofore 
mediated their exposure to local resource shortfalls.  In the process, indigenous units 
came to rely on European ghost acreage to supply their ecological deficits, laying the 
groundwork for the core-periphery relationships that would dominate Arctic state-
building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Closing the Coevolutionary Loop: the early 
modern Arctic 
 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution describes a mutually constitutive relationship between 
human units and systems and the ecological contexts in which they are embedded.  
The previous sections have focused on the impact of Ecology on the spread and 
organisation of pre-international and international units and systems in the Arctic 
Basin.  Understanding Coevolution’s impact on Arctic history requires that we close 
the mutually constitutive loop that binds the two sides of the socio-ecological equation 
by looking at how the region’s human units and systems have affected the 
development of their ecological contexts. As indicated by the fourth principle of 
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Coevolution, the ecological consequences of human adaptation are felt first among an 
ecosystem’s biological constituents, only later moving down Ecology’s levels of 
analysis to affect the chemical and physical systems that support them.  Our analysis 
therefore begins by looking at (i) the depletion of the faunal populations on which the 
fur trade depended, and (ii) the spread of pathogen populations among the systems’ 
constituent actors.   
Socio-Ecological Coevolution & Faunal Depletion  
The spatial organisation of faunal depletion in Siberia and Rupert’s Land during the 
early fur trade reflects the organisation of the international systems on which that trade 
relied.  Where EC permitted European units’ direct involvement in the trade, 
competition led to precipitous – and, in the case of neo-European pockets of 
agricultural settlement, permanent – faunal depletion.  Much of this can be laid at the 
feet of Europeans’ commodified approach to resource management, which saw 
trappers compete furiously for whatever they could catch – be it from their own traps 
or via the indigenous proxies on whom the trade relied in less productive ecosystems.  
In an unregulated environment, competition among European actors led to an 
archetypal ‘tragedy of the commons’, in which the absence of a management regime 
permitted  actors to deplete a common property resource in order to maximize their 
own personal returns.338  Competition for fur-bearing animals in the marginally 
productive biomes of the taiga and tundra proved to be a disaster for local faunal 
populations, with the long-term effect of encouraging the formation of monopolies – 
economic units which proved more effective than competitive markets at maintaining 
sustainable yields.339  In ecosystems where NPP and European units’ low EC 
discouraged their direct participation in the harvest of fur resources, depletion tended 
to be more gradual.  In these cases,  indigenous units’ possession of fairly well defined 
hunting territories from which they were encouraged to exclude other hunters meant 
that fauna located at these sites constituted an early form of excludable resource, in 
which common property was jointly managed and regulated by the community by 
whom it was held.340  This early form of international management regime – defined as 
‘an institution or, more precisely, a set of norms, principles, rules and decision-making 
                                                
338 Vogler (2000): 2, 10-12. See also Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science 162(3859) 1968, pp. 
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339 Carlos & Lewis (1993), pp. 483-4, 490-491; Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, ‘Property Rights, Competition, 
and Depletion in the Eighteenth Century Canadian Fur Trade: the role of European markets’, The Canadian Journal 
of Economics 32(3) 1999, pp. 707-709, 725. 
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procedures that govern a particular issue area, such as trade, money or more relevantly 
the use of the global commons’ – protected the long-term viability of the resources on 
which their ecologically adapted social and physical technologies relied by 
discouraging wasteful competition.341 
 
Faunal depletion was most dramatic in Siberia, which experienced far more direct 
European settlement than did Rupert’s Land.  In Siberia’s corridors and islands of 
ecological productivity, depletion of sable and black fox – the two most valuable furs – 
followed close on the heels of Europeans’ arrival.  Depletion’s spatial distribution 
traced Siberia’s riverine paths of conquest, impacting forested lands along main river 
channels long before the tributary uplands that drained into them.  Once sable and 
black fox populations in these narrow corridors declined below easily-harvested levels 
– normally within the first ten years of their opening – Russians would shift their 
trapping activity to other parts of the main river or onto its largest tributaries.  
Promyshlenniks (trappers) rarely lingered to harvest the smaller streams that ran into 
these basins from their tributary uplands, preferring the easy returns and higher 
interaction and ecological capacities afforded by the largest valleys.  On each of 
Siberia’s rivers, this coevolutionary process of faunal depletion was repeated – with 
relatively productive main valleys being wrung dry quickly, followed by a leap to the 
next river.342  Depletion therefore followed the same axes of ecological productivity 
that influenced the organisation of the units and processes associated with the trade 
itself – beginning first in southern, maritime, and riverine or coastal ecosystems before 
moving on to northern, continental, and upland sites. 
 
This socio-ecological pattern of depletion was exacerbated by agricultural settlement.  
This resulted not so much from intense trapping – though this played a role – as it did 
from ecological processes associated with agricultural development.  By converting 
forest to field, settlers destroyed the habitats on which fur-bearing populations 
depended, undermining their ability to recover in many of Siberia’s most ecologically 
productive sites.  Thus, agriculture undercut the initial source of ecological wealth that 
had drawn Russia across the continent, leaving hunting and pastoral peoples unable to 
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access the capital – furs – required to pay their annual tribute and maintain themselves 
in Siberia’s most productive niches.343 
 
The North American trade, though different in its primary means of resource 
mobilisation, experienced a convergent pattern of faunal depletion in ecosystems in 
which HBC and Montreal-based traders were in direct competition.344  In these areas – 
whose location tends to mirror the three axes of socio-ecological productivity 
described earlier – the Company encouraged indigenous trappers to ‘hunt out’ local 
forests by raising the prices paid per pelt.345  For Middlemen and Trappers, this led to 
increasing harvests and rising consumption of trade goods, particularly store food.  
This would not have been possible without the commodification of these indigenous 
units, a process whose distribution radiated out from the posts of the HBC and its 
competitors along the axes that described Rupert’s Land’s corridors and islands of 
ecological productivity.  For many decades, this commodified dynamic went 
unappreciated by historians of the trade, who assumed that indigenous hunters would 
react to higher prices by decreasing their harvests to the minimum level required to 
purchase necessities, thereby increasing the amount of time they could spend in leisure 
or subsistence activities.   However, as Carlos and Lewis show in regard to the 
productive hinterlands of forts Albany and York, where competition with Montreal 
traders was rife, and the severely constrained ecosystems around Prince of Wales fort, 
where the HBC held a near-monopoly, the spatial distribution of commodification – 
itself a product of socio-ecological coevolution – had significant feedback effects on 
the behaviour of the trade’s indigenous commercial proxies, leading to the most severe 
depletion events in the most ecologically productive regions of Rupert’s Land.346 As in 
Siberia, the ecological ‘pull’ factors that affected Europeans’ initial trading forays into 
Rupert’s Land led to a spatial distribution of depletion events that mirrored the socio-
ecological axes discussed in previous sections, affecting subarctic and arctic America’s 
corridors and islands of ecological productivity before its energy-constrained northern 
and continental uplands. 
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Socio-Ecological Coevolution & the Impact of 
Pathogen Populations 
The effects of coevolutionary developments on the Arctic’s early modern international 
systems can also be observed with reference to the effect of European pathogens on the 
peoples of the region.  Following the discovery and exploration of the Americas in the 
late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a biotic wave of flora and fauna flowed out of 
Europe, displacing indigenous American species.347  This portmanteau biota included 
several pathogens such as smallpox, measles, and tuberculosis – products of the 
Neolithic Revolution during which most of Eurasia’s cereals crops and animals had 
been domesticated.  Domesticated plants and animals played a vital role as physical 
technologies in the history of early agriculture and pastoralism, boosting the EC of pre-
international units in the Nile, Mesopotamian, Indus, and Yangtze river valleys.348  
Beyond being a necessary cause in the development of urban populations and early 
international units, the Neolithic Revolution exposed the peoples of southern Eurasia 
to new sets of pathogens, most of which were mutated strains of diseases that 
originated in domesticated livestock.  Though virulent in the settled societies in which 
they evolved, millennia of contact led to human-pathogen coevolution (in the 
ecological sense of the term), providing a level of immunity in settled Eurasian 
populations that eventually moderated the severity of epidemics.349   
 
Lacking this immunity, the indigenous peoples of the circumpolar world were left 
exposed to the full virulence of outbreaks.  The death rates in the virgin land epidemics 
that followed were catastrophically high.  The semi-sedentary Yukagir of the Yana, 
Indigirka, and Kolyma basins in northwestern Siberia are a case in point.  Without the 
Neolithic toolkits that gave Russians some level of resistance, the Yukagir went into 
headlong decline between 1700 and 1850.350  Already in 1694, the zimove on the 
Omolon River – a tributary of the Kolyma – was shut because the yasak-paying 
Yukagir of the area ‘all died in the smallpox pestilence.  And from now on there are no 
great sovereign’s [Tsar’s] Omolon Yukagir from whom to take yasak.’351  In the two 
years following an outbreak of smallpox in 1633, up to two-thirds of the Enets 
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Samoyeds living on the Khantaika River, a tributary of the lower Yenisei near present-
day Norilsk, are thought to have perished.352  These fatality rates are in line with 
estimates of mortality in the Americas following European contact, where smallpox 
acted as an imperial vanguard, wiping out population centres and fatally weakening 
indigenous units’ ability to organize effective defences.353  The disruption of 
indigenous units and systems was a social consequence of the introduction of new 
species into Arctic biomes and played a leading role in the conquest of areas such as 
Kamchatka.  There, attempts by Itlemen to organize and resist Russian advances were 
undermined by their exposure to an array of diseases imported by their invaders, which 
accounted for most of the forty-five percent decrease in their numbers between 1697 
and 1738, reducing their ability to resist yasak and incorporation into Russia’s imperial 
international system.354   
 
The North American boreal forest and tundra escaped the brunt of the early virgin land 
epidemics that spread smallpox from Hispaniola to the Great Lakes in the sixteenth 
century.  However, as arctic and subarctic units were incorporated into the linear relay 
systems that spread out ahead of Europe’s expanding socio-economic international 
systems, they could not escape infection.  The first major smallpox epidemic to flare 
across northern Cree and Na Dene bands ignited in 1781, wiping out up to 95% of the 
Home Guard population around the inland HBC post at Cumberland House on the 
middle Saskatchewan.355  The full extent of this and subsequent epidemics may never 
be known, records being so scant as to be almost non-existent.  In one of the few first-
hand accounts of the epidemic, Samuel Hearne records up to 90% mortality among 
several groups of “Northern Indians”, which included the Na Dene nation and some 
northern Cree.356 Though likely inflated by 10-20%, these figures are roughly in line 
with estimates from similar virgin land epidemics, and were probably boosted by a 
number of interrelated social and ecological factors.  These include malnutrition 
caused by the disruption of traditional subsistence patterns and the organisation of the 
trade itself, which saw sedentary populations of Home Guard hunters settle around 
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trading posts, creating large pools of potential infection.  These were visited by 
Middlemen, who transported pathogens between infection hotspots and the homes of 
upland Trappers who might otherwise have been insulated by their isolation.357  The 
disruptions caused to indigenous units’ subsistence activities were intensified by the 
introduction of parallel diseases into various animal populations, including the 
beaver.358 The combined effect of these human and animal epidemics left commodified 
groups of Trappers, Middlemen, and Home Guards increasingly reliant on the 
resources of the trading post – deepening indigenous dependence on Europe’s ghost 
acreage while simultaneously undercutting their ability to access the capital required to 
pay for it.359 
 
*** 
 
The immediate ecological consequences of Coevolution in the arctic and subarctic 
biomes of Siberia and Rupert’s Land followed the same corridors of ecological 
productivity as the fur trade and its associated politico-economic and socio-economic 
processes.  In both regions, productive sites witnessed the earliest faunal depletions, 
leaving indigenous groups – who had previously enjoyed relative affluence360 – with 
neither the ecological capital needed to access European trade goods nor the traditional 
systems of reciprocity and risk-sharing that had heretofore mediated their exposure to 
local resource deficits.  This socio-ecological crisis was compounded by the arrival of 
European pathogen populations – diseases to which subarctic peoples’ environmental 
history had given them no immunity.  The result was a series of virgin land epidemics 
that often killed between fifty and seventy-five percent of the indigenous people 
infected, clearing ground for Europeans to impose their own coercive (Russia) or 
capitalist (English) modes of resource production on the units that remained.  The 
combined effects of these ecological events deepened indigenous units’ dependence on 
European trade goods, including store food, even as they undermined the ecological 
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resource base on which those units depended for access to the ecological surpluses of 
European and neo-European ecosystems. 
Conclusion 
 
The impact of Coevolution on the units and systems of the circumpolar world before 
and during the fur trade era illustrate several socio-ecological dynamics that remain 
central to the story of international relations in the circumpolar world.  First, there 
appears to be a direct if complex correlation between ecosystems’ productivity and the 
distribution of social differentiation among both units and the systems constituted by 
their interactions.  Both tend to become more differentiated as one moves into 
increasingly productive ecosystems, which follow at least three axes running from 
northern, continental, and upland ecosystems to southern, maritime, and riverine or 
coastal sites.  Second, ecological context has a clear impact on unit- and system-level 
patterns of convergent and divergent evolution.  Simply put, initially similar units and 
systems placed in different ecological contexts will tend to diverge, while initially 
dissimilar units and systems in similar ecological contexts will tend to converge.  
Third, following in the footsteps of Alfred Crosby, the organisation of units and 
processes that resulted from overlay of European international systems during the fur 
trade indicates that European systems were successfully recreated in neo-European 
biomes, where their existing physical and social technologies were already adapted to 
meet ecological challenges and opportunities.  Their EC deficits in non-European 
biomes could be mitigated by trade, which provided them with access to ghost acreage 
from which to make up their energy shortfalls.  However, as we will discuss in the next 
Chapter, this strategy carried with it the risk of collapse should the trade on which they 
relied fail through resource depletion or a dramatic environmental change.  Finally, 
social adaptations affected the evolution of the ecosystems in which indigenous and 
European units and systems were embedded, creating a complex dynamic of socio-
ecological feedback that disrupted indigenous units’ existing adaptation strategies, 
making them increasingly dependent on European trade and closing the mutually 
constitutive loop that defines Socio-Ecological Coevolution in the historical record. 
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Chapter Five 
Ecological Capacity and the Evolution of Bifurcated States in the Arctic to 1945 
 
The State is a tree with its roots in the land.361 
 
The unit-level impact of Socio-Ecological Coevolution on Arctic states has led to their 
convergent evolution around a set of characteristics that differentiate them from the 
dominant sovereign and territorial polities of the global international system.  This 
Chapter explores ways in which Ecological Capacity (EC), one of the three sources of 
explanation introduced into our ecologically-contextualized analytical matrix, has 
contributed to this development.  Arctic states have all been impacted by this 
coevolutionary mechanism, which describes units’ and systems’ abilities to sustain 
social complexity in given ecological contexts.  EC is closely tied to three axes of 
increasing Net Primary Productivity (NPP), which run from North to South, from 
continental to maritime climates, and from tributary uplands to major river valleys and 
coastlines.  Its influence has resulted in the construction of a series of imperial 
international systems around the Arctic Basin centred on their respective metropolitan 
capitals, characterized by principles of membership and behaviour that distinguish the 
Arctic as a region within the global international system.   Though NPP plays a central 
role in the evolution of social complexity, its influence has been mediated to varying 
degrees by the social and physical technologies that Arctic units and systems deploy to 
access and subsidize their local energy allowances.  This has been particularly 
important for the empires of the circumpolar world, whose principles of sovereignty 
and territoriality vary across the neo- and non-European biomes that they straddle. 
 
None of the states of interest to this study – Russia, the United States, Canada, and 
Kalaallit Nunaat-Denmark – are exclusively arctic (or even subarctic) in their 
ecological constitution.  Each straddles multiple biomes, ranging from the temperate 
forest-steppe ecotone to the polar desert.  This divided ecological structure has affected 
the principles by which they are organized, contributing to their convergent evolution 
as bifurcated imperial units whose internal organisations vary across the productivity 
gaps that divide their neo-European and non-European ecological contexts.  Where 
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they have been able to deploy sufficient EC – namely, in neo-European ecosystems – 
these organizing principles have converged with those developing in the global (née 
European) international system.  This is particularly true in terms of characteristics 
associated with hard territoriality and sovereignty.362  In non-European ecosystems, the 
region’s imperial states have adopted one of two approaches to deal with their 
ecological constraints.  Where ready supplies of saleable resources permit, they have 
mediated low NPP through trade, using this social technology to import energy 
surpluses – in the form of food, fuel, and other goods – from ghost acreage in more 
productive ecosystems.  At such sites, trade-dependent colonies have risen out of the 
tundra and taiga – converging with the principles by which states are organized in their 
metropolitan cores.  Where the resources required for trade are lacking, the principles 
by which the Arctic’s imperial states organise themselves have diverged from the 
global norm, leading them to adopt alternative principles of organisation in order to 
mediate their depressed EC and maintain their de jure rights to Arctic lands and 
people.  Until the early to mid-twentieth century, this was accomplished mainly by 
incorporating indigenous units into state-centred imperial systems in which 
metropolitan powers sacrificed a degree of domestic sovereignty over semi-
autonomous peripheral units in order to maintain their Vattelian-Westphalian and 
international legal claims.363   
 
Over more than four centuries of Coevolution, the socio-ecological bifurcation that 
separates the Arctic Basin’s neo-European and non-European biomes has become a 
sedimented characteristic of its regional international system, with divergent principles 
of membership and behaviour that trace its main ecological divisions.  Though the 
arrival of modern social and physical technologies in the region in the early to mid-
twentieth century has mediated Ecology’s influence on the principles that define these 
state-centred systems, the Arctic’s dominant units – and the secondary states system 
constituted by their interactions – continue to display a remarkable core-periphery 
dynamic in relations between their neo-European cores, their trade-dependent colonial 
extensions, and their non-European imperial hinterlands. 
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Characteristics of Bifurcated Arctic States: 
Sovereignty & Borders 
 
States – which can be thought of as socially constituted sets of ‘administrative, 
policing, and military organisations headed, and more or less well-coordinated, by an 
executive authority’ – mobilize human and financial capital to administer and defend 
their domestic jurisdictions.364 Two key characteristics define the state as an ideal 
sovereign unit in the global international system: domestic hegemony and international 
autonomy.  These describe (i) a state’s ability to exercise effective sovereignty over its 
populations, and (ii) its ability to exclude other actors from intervening in its domestic 
affairs and foreign policy decisions.  They also help to define the ‘inside-outside’ 
distinction discussed in Chapter One.  Sovereign states did not emerge, fully-grown 
and indivisible, at a specific moment in international history. The Peace of Westphalia, 
though an important step along the route to creating autonomous and mutually 
recognized sovereign units, was not a moment of genesis.365  Rather, they have 
evolved out of many different international units, converging around a shared set of 
principles that define their membership and behaviour in the international system – 
first in Europe and later in neo-European colonies and non-European imperial 
possessions.  Over several centuries, these units have converged around principles of 
centralised sovereign control, mobilising a mixture of coercive and capital resources to 
strengthen their rule at home and their autonomy abroad.366  This evolution has 
depended on the development of complex social organizations – large populations, 
socio-economic hierarchies, and functionally differentiated executives, bureaucracies, 
judiciaries, and military arms – and has never been completely successful insofar as all 
states’ sovereignty remains constrained and incomplete.367  The purpose of this section 
is to investigate some of the ways in which Coevolution – explained in terms of EC – 
has contributed to this development.   
 
As Alfred Crosby notes in Ecological Imperialism, the most attractive ecological 
contexts during the age of European imperial expansion were those suited to Europe’s 
existing technological adaptations, particularly those related to agricultural production.  
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Neo-European biomes allowed units and systems to follow their path dependent 
instincts and avoid costly innovations, building sustainable population and resource 
bases to meet their capital and coercive needs.368  The next best thing to neo-European 
biomes were sites featuring a saleable commodity with which a state could ‘trade 
away’ from local energy deficits, allowing for the establishment of trade-dependent 
colonies amidst otherwise inhospitable landscapes.  As noted in the last Chapter, these 
islands of colonial settlement spelled trouble for local indigenous peoples, who were 
often displaced from their vicinity or found their livelihoods disrupted – and in some 
cases destroyed – by their new neighbours.  Where saleable resources were 
unavailable, states looked to alternative principles of organisation to maintain their 
sovereign claims to non-European ecosystems.  The most common of these was 
indirect rule, which devolves domestic authority onto local proxies in return for 
ensuring the state’s access to their ecological surpluses and their recognition of the 
metropole’s superior position within the imperial hierarchy.  By recognizing these 
peripheral units as collective actors in direct relationship with the metropole, indirect 
rule constituted early modern Arctic states as imperial international systems, 
unmasking the historical contingency of statehood as ideally defined in IR.   Though 
mediated by increasingly sophisticated social and physical technologies, the tripartite 
division of imperially-integrated neo-European cores, trade-dependent resource 
colonies, and non-European hinterlands still describes the Arctic’s dominant units over 
four hundred years after Russia’s initial foray across the Urals and three hundred years 
after the HBC’s first establishment on James Bay. 
Indirect Rule & Sovereignty in Siberia 
The evolution of the Russian state in northern Asia has been deeply influenced by its 
ability to access ecological energy across Siberia’s disparate biomes.  This socio-
ecological dynamic has historical roots as deep as Russia’s leap across the continent in 
search of ecological capital: ‘pulled’ by Siberia’s apparently endless and uncontested 
supply of furs and ‘pushed’ by booming demand for sable and marten and fox in the 
markets of Europe and China.369  Thanks to their climates and soil profiles, neither 
tundra nor taiga is well-suited to European agriculture – the main technology with 
which European units and systems have historically accessed the energy potential of 
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their surroundings.370  In such regions, trade has provided a means by which to convert 
ecological products, most notably fur, into other forms of matter and energy.  This 
gave Russian units access to vital ghost acreage: the ecological surplus of more 
productive biomes with which they subsidized localized EC shortfalls.371  Trade has 
subsequently become a sedimented aspect of circumpolar governance, a key process 
via which the Russian state has mediated its limited EC to support complex units and 
politico-military processes in sites that otherwise lack sufficient NPP.  Where trade 
was limited by local resources, the Russian state devolved domestic authority onto 
local proxies, constructing an imperial international system with itself at the hub of a 
set of core-periphery relationships that extended like spokes into the non-European 
biomes of northern, continental, and upland Siberia.372 
 
The effects of Ecological Capacity on the international units and systems of Russian 
Siberia – and the Arctic Basin in general – are best understood by unpacking the 
concept of sovereignty.  Sovereignty is a key principle in the contemporary 
international system, most simply defined as a state’s possession of domestic 
hegemony and international autonomy. Most often associated with developments 
around the time of the Peace of Augsburg and the Peace of Westphalia in 1555 and 
1648, its possession defines the contours of the modern state for the purposes of 
analysis and shapes the ways in which it interacts with other international units.373  
Sovereignty is therefore both a principle of behaviour and a principle of membership 
within the socially-constituted international system.374  According to Stephen Krasner, 
sovereignty can be disaggregated into at least four different components: domestic 
sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, Vattelian-Westphalian sovereignty, and 
interdependence sovereignty.  Domestic sovereignty refers to the state’s ability to 
control and deploy political authority within its borders.  International legal 
sovereignty refers to states’ mutual recognition of one another as legal actors in the 
international system.  Vattelian-Westphalian sovereignty refers to a state’s right to 
exclude external actors from its territory. Finally, interdependence sovereignty refers 
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to a state’s ability to practically control its borders and to regulate interactions with 
other jurisdictions.375  As Krasner notes, states generally possess all of these types in 
some degree.  However, they are not all-or-nothing propositions.  Sovereignty is 
something that states gain and lose over time, depending on when and where one 
looks.376  This typology provides a useful starting point from which to analyse the 
different forms of indirect rule that typify the imperial structures of the Arctic’s 
bifurcated international systems. 
 
Where EC has permitted, states have tended to converge around principles of 
membership and behaviour that have been successful in the core of the global (née 
European) international system.  Russia’s southward expansion across Siberia’s forest-
steppe ecotone in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries opened up new neo-
European lands to peasant settlement; a vital step in Russia’s consolidation of its 
contiguous land empire.377  These settlements were organized around principles similar 
to those that defined state activity in metropolitan Russia, using their agricultural 
production to boost EC and establish some degree of control over all four categories of 
sovereignty. Away from the neo-European corridor along the forest-steppe ecotone, 
the state was forced to adopt alternative strategies to maintain its exclusive rights to its 
arctic and subarctic hinterlands.  Where it could not ‘trade away’ from NPP deficits, it 
devolved administrative responsibility onto designated local proxies. In a classic 
‘sovereignty bargain’, control over order and justice in these non-European biomes fell 
to indigenous proxies who wielded domestic sovereignty on the state’s behalf in return 
for the payment of yasak and taxes to the metropolitan capital and recognition of its 
Vattelian-Westphalian sovereignty and banal authority: its final right to override their 
domestic authority when they were deemed to be in breach of their obligations.378  The 
resulting division between directly and indirectly ruled territories established the 
bifurcated framework by which Siberia would be incorporated into a Russia-dominated 
imperial international system until well after the Bolshevik Revolution. 
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The ecological gap between Siberia’s neo-European extensions – where practices and 
principles converged with those of Russia’s metropolitan core – and its non-European 
imperial hinterlands roughly followed the band of agricultural productivity that 
continues to run from the around 60°N at the Ural Mountains to 50°N near Lake 
Baikal, with riverine extensions stretching down the subcontinent’s major river 
valleys.  This socio-ecological structure remains a visible feature of Siberia today, 
marking the limits of settlement by ethnic Russians and an ecotone north of which the 
state’s EC declines sharply.  (See Figure 5.1) 
 
 
Fig. 5.1 – The Peoples of Siberia, c. 1980379 
 
The consequences of this socio-ecological bifurcation were evident from the early days 
of Russian expansion, when the state’s political and military apparatus began to 
nucleate around Siberia’s neo-European ecological sites. In the seventeenth century, 
politico-military power coalesced around four seats of regional administration, the 
razriads.  Each razriad was deliberately centred on an administrative hub – Tobolsk, 
Tomsk, Yeniseysk, or Yakutsk – that could boast an energy surplus in the form of food 
or furs.380  As the seventeenth century progressed, their military governors (voevodas) 
became Moscow’s primary state agents in Siberia, exercising domestic sovereignty 
through the delivery of taxes and the maintenance of order in the subordinate regions, 
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uzeds, of their razriads.381  Natural limitations on their EC meant that effective taxation 
and justice often required the voevoda to devolve administrative responsibilities onto 
still smaller political units – volosts.  Where these represented indigenous groups, 
volosts came to be organized under lushchie liudi, ‘best men’.  In 1677 and 1678, these 
replaced the authority of the uzed in matters of indigenous justice, order, and 
administration.  Initially chosen by the voevoda, a best man would often find himself 
suddenly elevated above his peers to a position of hierarchically superior authority.382 
This system of imperial integration was highly successful among the Yakut chiefdoms, 
whose stratificatory social institutions were already hierarchically differentiated.  It 
was less so among indigenous HGBs with segmentary social structures, such as the 
Tungus and Yukagir.  Among these groups – the least complex of the five basic 
international units identified by Buzan and Little – best men rarely possessed de facto 
authority beyond their immediate families.383  In extreme cases, responsibility for 
segmentary units had to be transferred to stratificatory indigenous units, as when 
responsibility for the nomadic Samoyed-Nenets of the lower Ob was handed to more 
southerly and differentiated Khanty princelings in the late eighteenth century.384   
 
Although the use of semi-autonomous proxies to maintain territorial cohesion was not 
novel in Russian history, the system’s fundamental importance in Siberia’s non-
European biomes up to 1917 marks a dramatic break with contemporaneous trends in 
European Russia, its neo-European colonial extensions along the steppe-forest frontier, 
and in the trade-dependent colonies scattered across the taiga and tundra.  In the late 
European Middle Ages, devolved and overlapping authorities were commonplace in 
the heartland of European Russia, with vassalage creating complex patterns of 
domestic and Vattelian-Westphalian sovereignty.  The evolutionary predecessor of 
Siberian indirect rule is found in Russia’s colourfully named medieval tradition of 
kormlenie, ‘feeding’, whereby an official received domestic lordship over the 
population and surpluses of a specific geographical area.  These officials were 
responsible for the delivery of taxes, the maintenance of order, and enforcement of the 
same banal rights as were later recognized by Siberia’s indigenous proxies.385  This 
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feudal system helped to ‘gather in’ Muscovy’s rapidly expanding territories in the late 
sixteenth century, a period in which the government lacked the administrative capacity 
to establish direct rule over its sprawling lands.386  Though effective as a short-term 
solution to Muscovy’s administrative deficits, kormlenie eventually undermined the 
principality’s territorial integrity, fragmenting authority by dividing sovereign power 
among semi-autonomous fiefdoms.  Attempts to rein in the system began by granting 
charters to subject populations in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, outlining 
subjects’ rights vis-à-vis their feudal overlords.  It also led to the limitation of 
administrative terms to a single year, blocking the possibility of kormlenie grants 
becoming hereditary possessions.  By the end of the sixteenth century, kormlenie was 
in terminal decline as a means of state control in the core of European Russia.387  
When Russia entered Siberia, it attempted to avoid a resurgence of the kormlenie 
system, which was now viewed as a threat to the integrity of the state.  Military 
governors’ terms were limited and Moscow kept as close an eye on its officials’ 
activities as possible (not an easy task where a return trip from European Russia to 
Yakutsk could take up to four years).388  However, as fur income in Western, Central 
and Eastern Siberia waned, kormlenie provided a useful blueprint on which to base the 
nascent imperial system of northern, continental, and upland Siberia – placing order 
and justice in the hands of dedicated proxies in return for the regular delivery of yasak 
and taxes and recognition of Moscow’s Vattelian-Westphalian rights.389  Meanwhile, 
in Siberia’s neo-European southern, maritime, and riverine ecological niches, domestic 
sovereignty became concentrated the hands of the state’s official representatives, 
converging with the increasingly Westphalian principles by which the state was 
becoming organised in European Russia.390   
 
As northern fur trade receipts declined in the second half of the seventeenth century 
following the depletion of sable and black fox populations, Russian administration in 
northern Siberia increasingly diverged from the principles of territoriality and 
sovereignty that were then taking root in its European core and neo-European 
extensions.  Thanks to the high costs of their upkeep, state offices above Siberia’s band 
of neo-European settlement (see figure 5.1) became chronically understaffed.  This 
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undermined the state’s administrative capacity and threatened its territorial integrity in 
marginal ecological regions, encouraging governors to make further sovereignty 
bargains with local groups – surrendering components of the state’s domestic 
sovereignty in order to strengthen its Vattelian-Westphalian rights and international 
legal claims against other international actors such as China and England.391  As 
opposed to contemporaneous developments in European Russia and its neo-European 
colonial extensions, northern, continental and upland Siberia witnessed the 
construction of an imperial international system with the Russian state at its heart and a 
variety of semi-autonomous indigenous collective actors playing the role of 
subordinate units. 
 
The incidence of indirect rule in Siberia increased as Russia expanded into more 
northerly, continental, and upland ecosystems, reflecting the continuing influence of 
Chapter Four’s axes of ecological productivity.  Under the terms of Mikhail 
Speranskii’s 1822 reforms, the bifurcation that split Siberia’s neo-European and Arctic 
territories was formalized within the region’s administrative apparatus.  These reforms 
were meant to address what Speranskii saw as Siberia’s three main challenges: the 
breadth of its geography, the range of its climates and resources, and the diversity of 
its peoples.  In large and sparsely settled areas, particularly the taiga and tundra, 
simplified provincial administrations linked local authorities directly to the imperial 
centre without the intermediary levels of provincial and regional governance that were 
put in place along Siberia’s settled, neo-European southern fringe.392  Direct contact 
with the imperial centre was meant to insulate non-European biomes’ mainly 
indigenous populations from undue interference by provincial administrators.  Their 
internal affairs remained largely autonomous under the authority of the clan 
administration, rodovaia rasprava, who advised the regional ‘land captain’ on matters 
of judicial and administrative concern.393  The result was a formalized system of 
indirect rule, in which increased autonomy was granted to indigenous units as a reward 
for loyalty to the metropole – loyalty signified by the continued payment of tribute and 
peripheral units’ acceptance of the Tsar’s superior position in the imperial hierarchy.  
Under Speranskii’s regulations, legally separate systems of native justice were 
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reinforced or, where absent, introduced. The payment of yasak was made a clan 
responsibility – payable in cash, kind or service – and the clan leadership among 
nomadic and semi-sedentary HGBs became increasingly formalized as its chiefs 
transformed into a hereditary elite based on their access to salaries, subsidies, 
pensions, and the ecological surpluses of ghost acreage within the Empire.  Because 
Siberia lacked either a landed gentry or widespread serfdom (neither of these complex 
institutions successfully crossed the Urals) local indigenous grandees filled an 
important role by administering justice and ensuring their units’ service to the Tsar.394  
 
Beyond its formalization of the relationships that defined the boundaries of the 
imperial international system by which the Russian state exercised sovereignty over 
non-European biomes and populations, Speranskii’s reforms defined Siberian 
indigenous groups as bounded units.  Recalling our discussion in Chapter Four, the 
Arctic Basin’s pre-international systems allowed units to penetrate deeply into one 
another’s internal processes, problematising the inside-outside distinction that remains 
at the heart of IR’s definition of ‘the international’.  Indirect rule reordered this aspect 
of pre-international indigenous relations, defining HGBs and chiefdoms as bounded 
collective actors in direct relationship to the Russian metropole. This completed the 
overlay of international characteristics onto the pre-international units and systems that 
had previously defined relations in the region, replacing linear relay networks of 
mutual aid and reciprocity with direct, imperial ties to the metropolitan ‘hub’ in 
Moscow or St. Petersburg.  As Motyl explains, in imperial systems, ‘[t]he nonnative 
state’s elite located in the core coordinates, supervises, and protects the peripheral 
native societies, which… interact with one another only via the core. Empires, then, 
are structurally centralized political systems within which core states and elites 
dominate peripheral societies, [and] serve as intermediaries for their significant 
interaction’.395 The peoples and territories of non-European Siberia were thereby 
incorporated into the emerging global international system not as part of a state in the 
Westphalian sense, but as part of an imperial system whose dominant unit – Tsarist 
Russia – was also a member of what Wight calls a ‘secondary international system’ 
composed of the other states and imperial systems of Europe.396  Among the other 
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imperial international systems with which the Russian metropole interacted were the 
other empires of the Arctic Basin, particularly that of England (after 1707, Great 
Britain). 
 
Russia’s ability to exercise sovereignty in arctic and subarctic Siberia varied as its EC 
rose and fell across time and space.  During resource booms, the state had no problem 
subsidizing direct involvement in Arctic affairs through trade-dependent colonial 
settlements, allowing it to claim high degrees of control across all four of Krasner’s 
categories of sovereignty.  When the collapse of either supply or demand undercut the 
state’s ability to trade away from local NPP shortfalls, it became unable to maintain its 
high-energy, functionally differentiated units and processes.  Focused as Russia was on 
coercive forms of resource mobilization – discussed in Chapter Four – its ability to 
operate in the politico-military sector is a good indicator of its EC across the region.  
During the sixteenth century ‘fur rush’, the state was able to bring considerable force 
to bear on indigenous HGBs like the hunting-herding Nenets-Samoyeds of the tundra 
between the Urals and the Taimyr Peninsula. (see Figure 5.1)  Traditional Nenets-
Samoyed hunting and herding ranges cover valuable fur lands around the mouths of 
the Ob, Yenisei, and Taz rivers. From the time of its first incursions in the sixteenth 
century, the state was wary of these Neolithic HGBs, who resented the extraction of 
yasak and whose nomadic existence made it difficult for Russian authorities to enforce 
regular payments.397  Nenets rebellions were quickly quashed in the early days of 
Russian rule.  In 1601, Nenets parties attacked and killed thirty Cossacks who were 
attempting to erect the first ostrog at Mangazeia.  Subsequent rebellions in 1604 and 
1606 were crushed and the Nenets-Samoyeds were coerced into quiescence.398  For the 
next forty years, Mangazeia was the premier fur market of Siberia, seeing more private 
trade pass through its customs house every year in the 1630’s than the state managed 
to extract as annual yasak from the rest of Siberia.399  This steady source of tax income 
sustained Moscow’s direct rule in the region, more than covering the costs of 
bureaucratic and military control.  Following the depletion of Mangazeia’s immediate 
hinterland and a territorial reorganization that cut it off from rich fur-bearing lands of 
the Vilyui and lower Lena rivers, however, fur receipts in 1646 fell to barely a third of 
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what they had been a decade earlier.400  The depletion of fur-bearing populations along 
the most productive parts of their traditional subsistence territories also made the 
Nenets’ yasak burden increasingly difficult to bear, leading to renewed attacks on 
Mangazeia in the 1640s. As receipts dropped perilously low in the 1660s, the 
government transferred troops and personnel out of the area.  A series of Samoyed 
rebellions in 1662/3, 1666, 1667, 1668 and 1669 made the financial costs associated 
with defending this Russian position untenable, leading to the wholesale transfer of 
Mangazeia’s garrison to Turukhansk in 1672.401  This marks the end of this trade-
dependent colony, which disappeared back into the tundra-taiga ecotone once its 
access to marketable ecological commodities collapsed.  For the next seventy-five 
years, the Nenets-Samoyed lived outside of Russian control and continued to press on 
Western Siberia’s northern settlements, successfully attacking towns and hamlets 
along the lower Ob until well into the first half of the eighteenth century.402 
 
It is worth asking how a collection of Neolithic hunter-gatherers was able to compete 
militarily with the Russian state in 1700 when they had been unable to do so a hundred 
years earlier.  It would be difficult to argue that the Russian state was less materially 
capable of defeating the Samoyeds in 1700 than it had been in 1600, a time when 
Russia’s European heartland was being ravaged by the ‘Time of Troubles’ that ended 
with the elevation of the Romanov dynasty in 1613.  Rather, as would happen in the 
northeastern corner of the continent in the next century, the depletion of the region’s 
ecological resources – which had drawn the state into the area to begin with – 
diminished its ability to subsidize the costs of domestic sovereignty.403 The state 
simply found itself unable any longer to ‘trade away’ from its EC shortfalls and it 
became unwilling unable to cover the costs of direct sovereign control. 
 
Mangazeia was typical of one strategy associated with Socio-Ecological Coevolution 
in the Arctic, being was one of the many trade-dependent islands of colonial rule 
carved out of the tundra and taiga by successive resource discoveries.  These colonial 
constructs are born out of the metropolitan society’s demand for a specific product, 
maintained by a combination of ecological supply and social demand, and doomed by 
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the failure of either to maintain its side of the bargain.404  While they persist, the 
principles by which boom towns are administered converge with the Westphalian 
model of direct domestic control over a consolidated territory.405  When their trade 
declines, boom towns sink back into a shadowy existence and de facto state power 
either withers or passes to a local proxy.406 Over the past four centuries, boom towns 
have sprung up around the circumpolar basin to access the region’s bonanza deposits 
of natural resources, becoming centres of trade-dependent colonial government in 
otherwise marginal ecological systems.407  They are characterized by a shared life 
cycle: a short period of intense growth, followed by a window of sustained activity 
based on a single commodified good and, finally, a rapid decline following the 
resource’s depletion or a collapse of demand.408  During their lifetimes, they are 
islands of neo-European colonial rule, relying on their integration into metropolitan 
and international markets for access to ghost acreage with which to maintain their 
complex divisions of labour between bureaucrats, soldiers, policemen, and leaders.  
They rise quickly from the imperial hinterland, extract its resources, and erode back 
into the tundra and taiga.  Being complex units with relatively large populations and 
sophisticated hierarchies and divisions of labour, they are vulnerable to the two 
varieties of social collapse described by Joseph Tainter: when the resource base upon 
which they depend deteriorates due to human mismanagement – as with the depletion 
of fur resources, or when its technological adaptations are disrupted by an 
environmental shift – be it social or ecological.409 
 
Following its retreat from the fur lands of northern Siberia in the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, Russia left indigenous proxies to administer domestic sovereignty 
in return for their recognition of Moscow’s Vattelian-Westphalian rights and banal 
lordship.  By allowing indigenous volosts to rule themselves as semi-independent units 
with their own ‘customary law’, the state relocated itself at the hub of an imperial 
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international system.410  Given the importance of EC to this process, it should come as 
no surprise that the northern limit of agricultural productivity in Siberia covaried with 
the northern limit of the state’s direct exercise of domestic sovereignty and therefore 
represents a socio-ecological ecotone between the state and imperial systems of 
northern Asia. As early as the seventeenth century, each of Siberia’s regional capitals, 
with the exception of Yakutsk, was sited in one of its neo-European agricultural 
niches.  Yakutsk – itself a classic colonial boom town – was only able maintain its 
status by virtue of its position at the centre of the eastern Siberian fur trade. Even so, 
the depletion of fur-bearing fauna in its vast hinterland led to the town’s administrative 
eclipse by the agriculturally productive settlement of Irkutsk next to Lake Baikal in 
1736, completing the southward shift of domestic sovereignty that defined the split 
character of Russian rule in arctic and subarctic Siberia.411  
 
The extension of Russia’s medieval system of kormlenie into northern Siberia via the 
introduction of indirect rule stands in stark contrast to events in European Russia, 
where the practice was in decline by the time of Yermak Timofeevich’s conquest of 
the Khanate of Sibir’s capital at Isker in 1582.412  It would be going too far to say that 
kormlenie had ceased to exist in European Russia by 1581.  However, the trend there 
was definitely away from decentralized control via imperial proxies.  Throughout its 
neo-European territories, the Russian state was on an evolutionary path towards 
increasing centralization and homogenization – a trajectory from which it was 
deflected in northern Asia by its constrained EC in non-European arctic and subarctic 
ecosystems.413  We must look to Socio-Ecological Coevolution and EC to explain 
these trends in divergent and convergent evolution, which resulted in a growing gap in 
the exercise of sovereignty between Siberia’s directly-ruled, neo-European colonial 
south and its indirectly-ruled, non-European and imperial north.  As predicted by the 
evolutionary patterns observed among indigenous units and systems in Chapter Four, 
Russian units embedded in different ecologies evolved in different directions – some 
towards the increasingly centralized forms of governance common in the core of the 
European international political system, and others towards an imperial international 
system in which local administration fell to subordinate, semi-autonomous collective 
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actors.  The result was the division of Siberia along socio-ecological lines, with non-
European hinterlands integrated into an imperial international system via a hub-and-
spoke arrangement that marked Russia out as both a state and an international system 
in its own right. 
Indirect Rule & Sovereignty in Arctic North America 
European states claiming sovereign jurisdiction over subarctic and arctic North 
America also utilized indirect rule and imperial relationships to mediate their low 
Ecological Capacity in non-European biomes.  As Europe’s expanding international 
economic system began to interact with the continent’s pre-international units, proxies 
such as the Hudson Bay Company (HBC), Russian American Company (RAC), and 
Royal Greenlandic Company (KGH) took over responsibility for the administration of 
domestic sovereignty in their respective geographical spheres: Rupert’s Land and the 
Canadian Northwest, Russian America, and Western Greenland.414  They did so behalf 
of metropolitan states, becoming de facto – in the HBC’s case, even de jure – units in 
direct relationships with imperial metropoles in Great Britain, Russia, and Denmark.  
Though this use of corporate proxies was not novel in and of itself – chartered 
companies such as the East India Company (EIC) having been responsible for the 
governance of large sections of European states’ growing empires since the 
seventeenth century – states’ ongoing need to mediate their depressed EC in arctic and 
subarctic ecosystems allowed these units to outlast their counterparts in other 
biomes.415  Whereas the mighty EIC was largely subordinated to the British 
government by the 1784 India Act, the HBC remained the de facto and de jure 
sovereign of Rupert’s Land and the Northwest Territories until the transfer of these 
territories to the young Dominion of Canada in 1871.416  Even then, unlike the EIC in 
India, the HBC maintained an important role in the maintenance of Canada’s imperial 
relationships across the region.  Using the EC it had developed over two hundred 
years, the Company continued to act as an avenue by which Ottawa provided its 
subordinate native units – the ‘effective occupiers’ of the land with whom the 
Canadian government had signed a series of land-claim treaties – with goods and 
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capital in return for their recognition of Canada’s banal lordship and Vattelian-
Westphalian rights.  Like other corporate proxies in arctic North America, the HBC 
represented a social technology by which the ‘hub’ of an imperial system 
communicated with its ‘spokes’ until technological advances allowed for more direct 
state administration after the Second World War.417   
 
The HBC’s position in Britain’s (after 1870, Canada’s) imperial system linked 
indigenous units in Rupert’s Land and the Northwest – the ‘effective occupiers’ of the 
non-European boreal and tundra biomes – to the metropolitan hub. Effective 
occupation is an important concept in international law, and deserves some 
explanation.  Sometimes known as uit possidetis or the ‘Principle of Effectivity’, it 
was formalized at the Berlin Conference of 1884/5, where Europe’s imperial powers 
settled most of their competing territorial claims in Africa.  As a legal principle, 
effective occupation judges claims on the basis of states’ abilities to administer and 
control lands and people.   Effective occupation was the principal route by which states 
substantiated claims originally based on other international principles, such as the right 
of discovery.418  Without it, territory might be declared inchoate and returned to the 
status of terra nullius, opening it to competing claims from other international 
actors.419  Lacking widespread agricultural settlements on which to base their claims 
thanks to the ecological systems in which their rule was embedded, states such as 
Great Britain and Canada designated subarctic and arctic indigenous peoples as 
‘effective occupiers’ in direct subjection to the imperial metropole.  This was an 
interesting development insofar as their claims prior to European contact had been 
dismissed or marginalized, allowing Europeans’ claims of discovery to be made on 
lands already inhabited by indigenous groups.  Recognition of indigenous claims 
required a sovereignty bargain between the imperial system’s metropole and its 
subordinate indigenous units – trading away some of the former’s domestic 
sovereignty in return for the latter’s recognition of its Vattelian-Westphalian rights, 
which thereby buttressed the metropole’s sovereignty claims in Europe’s secondary 
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international system, which constituted what Paul Keal refers to as a ‘society of 
empires’.420   
 
Europeans’ recognition of indigenous units as effective occupiers tended to be 
withheld as long as no competing claims to international legal sovereignty were put 
forward by other international actors.421  Russia, for example, faced competition from 
maritime powers such as Britain and the Netherlands early in the fur trade era, 
particularly around the mouth of the Ob River, contributing to its decisions to close the 
northern trans-Siberian route to all foreign traffic in 1704 and devolve power onto its 
indigenous peripheries.  Canada adopted a parallel policy of indirect rule with 
reference to its arctic possessions in the early twentieth century to protect against 
perceived threats to its claims from American, Danish and Norwegian explorers, who 
had established several bases in the eastern Arctic Archipelago.422   
 
Though less developed than Siberia’s imperial international system, the structures that 
supported states’ sovereign claims in arctic America shared several of the former’s 
fundamental principles.  First, the states of arctic North America permitted indigenous 
units the widest possible degree of judicial and administrative autonomy so long as 
they acknowledged the imperial hub’s rights and claims vis-à-vis other European 
actors.  Until the early twentieth century, the government of Canada refused to 
formalize its responsibilities towards indigenous peoples, seeing little purpose in 
systematic attempts to restructure indigenous socio-economic and political 
relationships.  Even when resource discoveries after 1900 made trade-dependent 
European settlements north of the agriculturally productive prairies possible, the state 
sought out the least intrusive options for extinguishing indigenous land.423 Treaty 
Eleven, signed in 1911 and covering 620,000 km2 and an estimated 3,400 individuals, 
was at the time the only land agreement to deal specifically with Canada’s arctic 
peoples. (see figure 5.2)  
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Figure 5.2 – Native treaties in Canada, 1871-1921424 
 
This formal agreement between indigenous groups and the Crown made provisions for 
the extinguishing of native claims along the Mackenzie Valley and Great Slave and 
Bear lakes (sites of newfound mining potential) in return for annual government 
payments to native hunters and the provision of hunting and fishing equipment, with 
payments depending on an individual’s hierarchical position in the clan, as defined by 
the metropole.  Thus, a clan chief received $25 per year, the headman of a family 
group $15, and other individuals $5.425  The government thereby continued the process 
of social differentiation that had begun with the HBC’s selection of trade captains and 
the development of a trade hierarchy incorporating home guards, middlemen, and 
trappers.  More importantly, the treaty system formalized the relationship between 
indigenous ‘spokes’ and the imperial ‘hub’, according to which indigenous peoples 
swore themselves to respect the Crown’s rights to Vattelian-Westphalian sovereignty 
and banal lordship in return for guarantees of protection against encroachment on their 
traditional practices.426  Thus, the imperial international system of Canada converged 
with the practices of indirect rule that typified those in Russian Siberia, with the state 
intervening as little as possible in the domestic sovereignty of native units so long as 
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its final right to exclude other actors from the region was recognized by local actors.427  
In IR terms, each represented the formal overlay of an imperial international system on 
top of the pre-international indigenous socio-economic systems of the region. 
 
The effects of EC can be felt across all of the sectors described in Buzan and Little’s 
analytical matrix.  For commercial proxies in subarctic and arctic North America – 
including the HBC, KGH, RAC, and the Alaska Commercial Company (ACC) – the 
devolution of commercial power onto trade captains and indigenous Middlemen was a 
variation on the theme of indirect rule.  The HBC’s uneven distribution of EC in 
different regions of Rupert’s Land and the Northwest had observable effects on the 
organization of the economic units and systems by which it incorporated these 
challenging biomes into Britain’s – and later Canada’s – arctic empire.  Thus, the 
organization of its inland trading posts diverged from the principles common at the 
Bayside, where the Company used its positions at the nexus of indigenous and 
European trade routes to subsidize NPP shortfalls with food and materials traded from 
more productive biomes. This ghost acreage gave Bayside posts access to energy 
surpluses, allowing them to maintain relatively complex systems of functional 
differentiation.428 In the boreal and tundra hinterlands of the Saskatchewan and 
Mackenzie basins, the potential benefits of differentiation – maintained by trade-based 
energy subsidization – were weighed against the costs of sustaining high-energy units 
in regions of low Ecological Capacity. Without efficient physical technologies with 
which to import energy from more productive biomes, posts’ organisations became 
less differentiated as they moved inland, slipping from a largely functional division of 
labour towards a stratificatory social model in which hierarchically differentiated units 
carried out a similar range of tasks regardless of rank.  Functional divisions of labour 
therefore became less complex as posts moved farther away from the communications 
hubs that allowed Bayside posts to mediate their ecological deficits.429  With little to 
mediate their relationship to local NPP, inland posts evolved towards simpler social 
principles and became organized along increasingly stratificatory lines, reinforcing the 
link between EC and social differentiation described by the three axes of ecological 
productivity in Chapter Four.  This was most evident in arctic America’s least 
productive biomes, particularly those lying northwest of Fort Prince of Wales and in 
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the tundra of the central Canadian Arctic – the ‘blank’ area lying northeast of Treaties 
11, 8, 10, and 5 in figure 5.2.  This tundra ecosystem remained outside the direct reach 
of fur traders until 1911, and was incorporated into Canada’s imperial system only via 
the continuing linear relay trade that marked the outer limits of the HBC’s – and 
Canadian – Ecological Capacity.430   
 
As in Siberia, the ecological systems of North America had a perceptible impact on the 
metropole’s ability to sustain units and systems in the politico-military sector.  Even 
with its access to ghost acreage at the Bayside, the HBC was never unable to maintain 
a full division of labour in its politico-military interactions, relying instead on trading 
personnel to fill soldiers’ boots.  The results of this stratificatory approach to warfare 
were woeful.  In 1686, the Chevalier de Troyes, with only thirty French veterans, 
emerged from the woods above the HBC post at Moose factory and captured it easily.  
Within weeks, posts on the Rupert and Albany rivers followed Moose Factory into 
French hands, leaving the HBC with only York Fort from which to carry on its 
trade.431  These military failures were a consequence of coevolutionary influences 
resonating between the posts’ social and ecological contexts, which limited the number 
of mouths that could be fed on local provisions and imported foodstuffs and thereby 
constrained units’ ability to maintain specialised military personnel.  In every 
subsequent Bayside military action, attacking forces had no difficulty dispatching 
amateurish defenders – be they British or French.  Without adequate local NPP to 
support a dedicated militia, neither side was able to escape the politico-military 
consequences of their depressed EC.432  In 1782, the last military engagement between 
European states in Hudson Bay followed the same pattern as Comte de Lap rouse 
sailed up to Prince of Wales Fort, by then an impressive and modern fortification 
reinforced by stone bastions and heavy cannon.  Severely undermanned with only 
thirty-nine men on hand, and completely lacking in dedicated artillerymen to work the 
cannon, it was surrendered without resistance.433  The same problems associated with 
EC contributed to Russia’s decision to sell Alaska to the United States in 1867, 
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bringing a new state actor into the region.434  Such is the cost of low EC leading to 
stratificatory differentiation in a warzone where, as a result, defence has historically 
been severely disadvantaged by the costs of sustaining functionally differentiated 
politico-military units in ecologically challenging biomes.   
 
The HBC’s unwillingness to allow Canadian agricultural settlement in its lands along 
the 49th parallel – which it rightly saw as a threat to the sustainability of the fur trade – 
finally contributed to pressure that forced the Company Directors in London to sell 
Rupert’s Land and the Northwest Territory in 1870, transferring over 10 million km2 to 
the three year-old Dominion of Canada.435  With the sale, the HBC surrendered its de 
jure political rights in return for freedom to continue its trade in the region, freedom 
from special taxation, and a 1/20 share of subsequent land sales.  Though the Company 
lost its de jure responsibility for the administration of justice and relations with the 
region’s indigenous people, it did not surrender its position in the imperial 
international systems linking peripheral units of the boreal forest and tundra to the 
metropolitan state.436 HBC posts remained the de facto point of contact between its 
new de jure political leaders in Ottawa – who continued to employ the HBC as its main 
conduit for northern supplies and services well into the 20th century – and the 
indigenous units that formed the ‘spokes’ of Canada’s imperial international system.437  
This role actually expanded as the Company pioneered the fur trade in the Arctic 
Archipelago and the central Canadian Arctic in the early twentieth century.  Between 
1911 and 1926, it opened posts in Chesterfield Inlet, Repulse Bay, Baker Lake and 
Eskimo Point on the northwest coast of Hudson Bay, at Aklavik in the McKenzie 
River Delta, and at Lake Harbour, Pond Inlet and Arctic Bay on the coasts of Baffin 
Island.  These laid the territorial groundwork for the reestablishment of a de facto fur 
monopoly in the Eastern and Western Arctic and became important centres for the 
areas’ indigenous peoples, who acted as trappers, guides, hunters, and clients to the 
Company’s traders.  Throughout the Canadian interior, the HBC’s posts remained the 
principal sources of food and supply – bases from which commodification and 
differentiation continued to spread through their associated indigenous units.438 
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The HBC’s arctic posts supported and sustained the Canadian government’s claims in 
the Canadian Arctic and the Arctic Archipelago by connecting the imperial core to its 
non-European peripheries.  When the Northwest Mounted Police (NWMP) established 
their first stations at Ft. McPherson on the Mackenzie River and Fullerton Harbour on 
Hudson Bay in 1903, both were sited beside HBC posts on which they also relied for 
supplies and support.  Only the NWMP post at Herschel Island in the Beaufort Sea 
west of the Mackenzie Delta in 1904 did not align with existing HBC establishments, 
being set up specifically to supervise the whaling camp established there by American 
sailors in the 1890s.439  The RCMP’s post at Pond Inlet (1922) was sited alongside the 
HBC post of the same name, whose existence had led to the nucleation of a small 
settlement by the time of the force’s arrival.  Craig Harbour (1922), at the extreme 
south-east corner of Ellesmere Island, was far removed from any human settlement 
and only remained in operation for a few years to ‘fly the flag’ before being shut.  
Subsequent RCMP posts at Pangnirtung (NE Baffin Island), Dundas Harbour (SE 
Devon Island), Bache Peninsula (E Ellesmere Island), and Lake Harbour (SE Baffin 
Island) followed similar courses.  Those associated with HBC posts outlived their 
original garrisons, helping to form the bases for many of today’s nucleated Arctic 
communities. Those sited away from HBC posts soon disappeared back into the 
tundra, their garrisons being transferred to locations better integrated with Canada’s 
evolving imperial state.440  As in Rupert’s Land two centuries earlier, the HBC’s 
twentieth-century commercial expansion in the Canadian Arctic presaged subsequent 
political inroads by its associated imperial power.  State power followed in the wake of 
the commodification of local Inuit, whose HGBs nucleated around these sources of 
supply.  The costs of this development only became clear with the decline of the fur 
trade during the 1930s and after the Second World War.  Its collapse effectively denied 
indigenous units access to capital, cutting them off from the trading system on which 
they had come to rely for access to ghost acreage, ushering in an era of crisis for the 
indigenous ‘spokes’ on Canada’s imperial wheel.  Even then, government relief in 
these remote districts – a clear signal of Ottawa’s jurisdiction in the Arctic 
Archipelago – was put in the hands of the HBC, which also ran a parallel program of 
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relief throughout the 1930s.441  Thus, the state’s gradual penetration of the Arctic 
followed paths laid down by their economic vanguard.  Indeed, the Canadian 
government was only able to replace the HBC as the main provider of goods and 
services in the North after the introduction of modern communications and transport 
technology in the second half of the twentieth century, a date that marks the beginning 
of an identifiable political sector in the region.442   
 
As in Siberia, the international units and systems of arctic North America experienced 
divergent patterns Socio-Ecological Coevolution driven by the different EC they 
enjoyed in the region’s neo-European and non-European biomes.  Where neo-
European conditions boosted their EC, the principles by which territories and 
populations were integrated into the international system converged with those of the 
system’s European core.  Where non-European ecosystems limited such settlement, 
states constructed imperial international systems to integrate their ecologically distinct 
peripheries.  These systems – less developed than their older cousin in Siberia – often 
relied on economic proxies to connect their ‘hubs’ and ‘spokes’, lacking as they did 
sufficient EC to permit the formation of functionally differentiated units and processes 
in the political sector.    
Ecological Capacity & Territoriality in the Arctic 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the organization of the 
Arctic’s states and their associated imperial systems continued to be heavily influenced 
by their limited Ecological Capacity.  This constrained metropoles’ abilities to exercise 
domestic and interdependence sovereignty over their ecologically constrained 
peripheries, opening space in which non-state actors could contest territoriality.  
Structures of indirect rule predominated over the sovereign state model that was fast 
becoming the norm among dominant units of the European and global international 
system, with arctic states split between their neo-European cores – characterized by 
hard boundaries within which states sought to exercise full sovereign control – and 
their non-European peripheries – where sovereignty bargains led to vaguely 
demarcated frontiers that resembled medieval Europe’s imperial marches more than 
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the carefully drawn lines that separate territorial jurisdictions in a Westphalian 
international system.443 
 
At a time when territoriality in Europe and its neo-European colonial extensions was 
becoming increasingly formalized, frontiers above the socio-ecological ecotone that 
bifurcates the circumpolar world remained highly permeable to competition and 
penetration by external actors.  As indicated by the discussion of functionally 
differentiated politico-military units in the last section, the Arctic’s imperial states had 
only a limited ability to stem foreign encroachment into their territory.444  Non-state 
actors, such as whalers, found that the hubs of these imperial systems were often 
unable to enforce their claims to interdependence sovereignty.  As rivers had earlier 
been for Russian promyshlenniks and the HBC, Arctic seas became points of 
penetration for non-state actors: ecologically productive pathways to peripheries’ 
peoples and resources.  Nowhere was this truer than in the rich whaling grounds 
around the Bering Strait.  Though Russia claimed the major landmasses on either side 
of the North Pacific until 1867, as many as 400 American and British whalers were 
operating at any one time in the confined waters of the Bering Strait and the Sea of 
Okhotsk by mid-century.  These often landed to trade with locals, ignoring Russia’s de 
jure sovereign rights and harvesting significant resources from Chukotka and 
Kamchatka.445  Their infiltration was facilitated by the imperial system by which Russia 
exercised its authority in its non-European biomes.   Having recognized the Chukchi 
and Eskimos as ‘peoples not completely subdued’ and barred the establishment of 
Russian posts or settlements among them in its 1857 Legal Code, the Russian 
metropole accepted regional autonomy in Chukotka in return for the nominal 
allegiance of its native units.446  By 1900, the thickening economic ties that bound 
Chukotka’s people and territory to the maritime trade of the North Pacific sparked 
renewed Russian concern over its sovereign authority in the region, a situation made 
all the more worrying by the emergence of English as the peninsula’s lingua franca.  
Nevertheless, the imperial government found that little could be done to stem the flow.  
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In the end, Russian claims were preserved by the absence of a rival state rather than by 
any actual show of sovereign control.  Even after the establishment of Soviet power, it 
proved difficult to unseat these non-state actors from northeastern Asia, and the HBC 
and various American companies continued to act as sources of goods and services to 
local units into the 1920s.447 
 
As sovereignty became fragmented at the ecological limits of states’ power, so too did 
the frontiers that defined their territoriality. As indicated by Chukotka and Kamchatka, 
Arctic boundaries at the beginning of the twentieth century diverged from the model of 
hard territoriality developing in Europe since the end of the medieval period, 
resembling the imperial marches of medieval empires: frontiers between centres of 
imperial power characterised by a degree of geographical imprecision and a gradual 
shading of authority between one centre of power and another.448  Given the tenuous 
control they exercised over distant and ecologically hostile regions, imperial cores 
treated their arctic frontiers with a flexibility that was completely absent in the tightly 
defined states systems of Europe and its neo-European colonial extensions.  So long as 
their right to Vattelian-Westphalian sovereignty was nominally recognized by local 
actors and their rights to international legal sovereignty was recognized on the 
international stage, imperial states were willing to subcontract territorial administration 
– and with it domestic sovereignty – to any variety of proxies, including those of 
another state’s imperial system.  Such was the case in the Alaska panhandle.  There, 
the Russian American Company (RAC) leased its rights in the area to the HBC from 
1837 until the RAC‘s dissolution in 1867.  Constrained by its limited EC in the region, 
the RAC – with the approval of the metropole in St. Petersburg – sacrificed its 
domestic authority over the panhandle in order to maintain its international-legal and 
Vattelian-Westphalian rights in Russian America.449  Embedded in non-European 
biomes, Russian America’s reliance on a single commodity – fur – made it a typical 
example of a trade-dependent colony.  As a result, it was highly vulnerable to human-
induced depletion events and dramatic environmental transformations that could 
disturb either the supply of, or demand for, the colony’s furs.450  When smallpox 
ravaged native hunters, killing a third of the Aleut hunters on whom the pelagic sea 
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otter trade depended, the trade was thrown into crisis.  The situation was made worse 
when four in ten Tlingit died in the neighbourhood of Novo-Arkhangelsk, the 
company’s colonial capital at present-day Sitka.  This posed a double socio-ecological 
challenge, as the Tlingit were major providers of fresh meat and fish to RAC posts 
during the winter – essential supplements to the supplies sent from Russia and bought 
from American and HBC ships.451  With declining trade volumes and rising costs, the 
RAC bargained away its domestic authority over the Alaskan panhandle to the HBC, 
which provided Novo-Arkhangelsk with a reliable source of non-trade income and 
steady source of supplies in return for its trading and governance rights on the 
mainland south of Mt. Elias.452  Though costly in terms of domestic sovereignty, the 
lease brought British recognition of Russia’s Westphalian-Vattelian and international-
legal rights in the region, stabilizing Russia’s effective occupation of the panhandle 
until the sale of Russian America to the United States in 1867. 
 
This curious arrangement was indicative of the Russian state’s inability to overcome 
the challenges posed by the ecological systems of the North Pacific and the Beaufort 
Sea; a problem it shared with the other imperial systems in the circumpolar region: 
British, Danish, and – after 1867 and 1870 – American and Canadian.  It also 
illustrates the constitutive role played by ecological context in framing regional 
international relations.  Having failed to overcome its depressed EC by means of social 
or physical technologies, Russia was forced to accept its inability to adequately 
occupy, administer, and protect its American possessions.453  Whereas Chukotka’s 
contiguous position at the North-eastern corner of Siberia protected the legality of 
Russia’s claims, Alaska’s position on the other side of the North Pacific posed a 
double socio-ecological challenge.  Socially, it required the Russians to develop a 
substantial navy and merchant marine to mediate the impact of the region’s depressed 
ecological capacity.  This did not come easily to Russia, whose path dependent 
evolution had adapted it to terrestrial, not maritime, processes. It therefore lacked the 
infrastructure to maintain a navy or merchant marine along its Pacific Coast – a 
problem that would become all too clear in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.454  
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Ecologically, a major problem was posed by the productivity of the North Pacific, 
whose wealth of marine mammals pulled non-Russian economic units into a sensitive 
strategic crossroads.  Once there, non-state actors deployed technological adaptations 
to limit Russian access to the marine ecosystems that linked its Siberian and Alaskan 
possessions.  Meanwhile, the relatively unproductive terrestrial ecosystems of Russian 
America constrained attempts at permanent settlement, creating chronic problems of 
supply and manpower that increased Russian dependence on European rivals for 
communication and transport, and on indigenous peoples for furs, provisions, labour, 
and sex.455  These ecological and social factors contextualize Russia’s decision to sell 
its American colonies to the United States for US$7.2 million in 1867.  Though 
undoubtedly influenced by political considerations emanating from Europe’s 
secondary international system – including ongoing tensions with Britain following the 
Crimean War and the ‘great game’ in Central Asia – Russia’s decision would have 
been highly unlikely had its socio-ecological adaptations in the North Pacific been 
more successful.456  Any assessment of the sale of Alaska with reference to political 
factors alone would therefore be as flawed as a deterministic explanation based solely 
on the region’s ecological conditions.  In the final analysis, a middle road between 
social and ecological causation must be found.  This path is provided by Socio-
Ecological Coevolution, whose influence in the North Pacific contributed directly to 
the formal entry of the United States into the Arctic Basin’s developing international 
systems. 
 
While the march-like frontiers of the Arctic’s non-European international units and 
systems remained contested areas of overlapping authority, those bounding neo-
European biomes and their embedded colonies were being formalized through treaties 
that defined states’ respective jurisdictions as disjoint, mutually exclusive, and fixed 
territories.457  Along the southern frontier of Rupert’s Land, where agricultural 
settlement was thought inevitable following American expansion beyond the 
Mississippi, the border was formalized in 1818 when the British and American 
governments agreed to a line following the 49th parallel of latitude from Lake of the 
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Woods in modern Ontario to the Rocky Mountains.458  Following the occupation of the 
Willamette Valley in modern Oregon by American settlers, the twenty eight year-long 
Anglo-American condominium in the Oregon Territory was terminated by the Treaty 
of 1846, which extended 49th parallel to the Pacific Coast.459 The careful demarcation of 
state borders in the neo-European farmlands of the Great Plains and coastal mountains 
stands in stark contrast to the overlapping jurisdictions that continued to characterize 
Arctic frontiers.  Whereas the division of Oregon led to the HBC’s complete 
withdrawal from those portions of the Columbia River basin below the 49th parallel, 
the company felt no such obligation towards the northern hinterlands divided by the 
Treaty of St. Petersburg (1825), which defined the boundaries of Russian America and 
the HBC’s lands between 54˚40’N and the Arctic Ocean.  Indeed, the HBC maintained 
Fort Yukon at the confluence of the Yukon and Porcupine rivers for twenty-two years 
from 1847, at a point well beyond of the 141st line of longitude that marked the 
western boundary of British territorial claims (see Figure 5.3).460 
 
 
Figure 5.3 - Hudson’s Bay Company Territory, 1821-1870461 
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*** 
 
Neither imperial Russia nor the international systems of arctic and subarctic North 
America were able to escape the constraints imposed by the limited ecological 
capacities they enjoyed in non-European arctic and subarctic biomes.  Their plight 
illustrates three ways in which the imperial states of the circumpolar world have been 
affected by the axes of socio-ecological productivity discussed in Chapter Four.  First, 
it provides inductive support for Crosby’s contention that European political power has 
been drawn towards relatively productive southern, maritime, and riverine sites.  
Second, it illustrates how indirect rule evolved to become a primary social technology 
by which metropolitan states maintained their claims over ecologically marginal 
regions, constructing hub-and-spoke imperial international systems that linked 
European and neo-European cores to their non-European peripheries.  Third, it shows 
how trade-dependent colonial settlements were only sustainable so long as their access 
to ghost acreage in other biomes could be maintained.  Each of these points has 
blocked the development of functionally differentiated units and processes in the 
circumpolar basin, producing a characteristic division of sovereign authority between 
states’ southern and neo-European cores – where they exercise domestic and Vattelian-
Westphalian sovereignty; their non-European northern, continental, and upland 
peripheries – where sovereignty bargains are struck that devolve domestic sovereignty 
onto local proxies and semi-autonomous imperial units; and their trade-dependent 
islands of colonial rule – boomtowns that temporarily converge with the principles of 
the metropolitan core before the collapse of trade causes them to evolve back towards 
the non-European hinterlands out of which they originally rose. 
 
The frontiers that bound the resulting imperial state systems have historically been 
characterized by a split personality.  Principles of membership and behaviour in 
Europe’s evolving international states system were largely unable to bridge the gap 
between neo-European and non-European biomes, causing them to evolve along 
divergent pathways on either side of this socio-ecological divide.  Borders and 
territoriality in arctic and subarctic ecosystems came to be characterised by a large 
degree of geographical imprecision and a gradual shading of authority between one 
centre of power and another, resembling the frontiers of the medieval European 
international system more than the mutually exclusive borders of its nineteenth and 
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twentieth century successor.462  Only with the widespread introduction of modern 
physical and social technologies in the early to mid-twentieth century were the 
resulting imperial international systems dragged, at least partially, into line with the 
practices and principles that defined the dominant units of Europe and its neo-
European colonial extensions.  Even then, the region’s deeply rooted socio-ecological 
bifurcation would defy attempts at complete erasure. 
Mediating Ecological Capacity: physical and 
social technologies 
 
The twentieth century has seen metropolitan states’ increasing Ecological Capacities 
allow them to take on additional sovereign responsibilities vis-à-vis their respective 
imperial peripheries.  Much of this increase in EC has followed the application of 
modern physical technologies to the problem of state power in non-European biomes.  
Innovations such as the airplane, icebreaker, and snowmobile have increased units’ 
and systems’ interaction capacity across Arctic landscapes.  By determining how many 
– at what speed – ideas, goods, and people can be moved across space, interaction 
capacity affects units’ and systems’ ability to subsidize local energy deficits.463  Trade, 
and with it interaction capacity, are therefore sedimented aspects of Ecological 
Capacity: social technologies that mediate a site’s Net Primary Production.  A unit 
embedded in a region of low NPP can have its EC boosted well above the levels one 
would expect by means of trade, explaining the increasing presence of trade-dependent 
neo-European islands in otherwise non-European landscapes.  This is particularly 
significant for Arctic states insofar as it permits them to expand the geographical 
extent of their hard borders, closing the frontiers of the imperial international systems 
they dominate. It is also important for peripheral units in non-European imperial 
hinterlands, where physical technologies can boost the EC of indigenous groups living 
in increasingly large and differentiated settlements.  
 
Units’ EC has also been boosted by specific social technologies, including the use of 
involuntary labour to carve colonial archipelagos out of the taiga and tundra.  The best-
known example of this prior to the Second World War was the Soviet Union’s use of 
the GULAG as a colonial vanguard, permitting the Stalinist state the state to carve out 
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large colonial settlements at relative low financial, but extraordinary high human cost.  
This section will discuss the importance of physical and social technologies as 
mediating influences on units’ and systems’ Ecological Capacity and, hence, their 
ability to sustain complex units and systems in the circumpolar North. 
Physical Technologies & EC: mediating NPP 
The slow growth of interaction capacity in the Arctic from the sixteenth to the 
twentieth centuries had a relatively small effect on the Ecological Capacity of its 
imperial units and systems.  Drawn to familiar sites by path dependent decision-
making and lacking physical technologies to permit easy communication through the 
Arctic’s non-European ecosystems, early modern European units were ‘pulled’ down 
paths of least resistance – waterways on which they could use existing knowledge and 
adapt local transportation technologies, or along the steppe-forest ecotone where the 
best mix of agricultural conditions was found for neo-European settlement.464  The 
discovery and application of steam power, internal combustion, and electricity in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries revolutionized humanity’s ability to move 
ideas, goods, and people across inhospitable terrain, increasing sites’ potential access 
to ghost acreage and permitting the development of increasingly complex units in the 
demanding ecological systems of the circumpolar world. 
 
From Yermak Timofeevich’s first entry into Siberia via the Tura River in 1581/2, 
Siberia’s waterways – and Russians’ path dependent decision making – helped to 
determine the routes by which actors explored, conquered, and occupied the land.  The 
narrative of Russia’s lunge across Siberia is awash with rivers.  Both the northern and 
southern trans-Siberian routes (see fig. 4.7) depended on the intersecting tributaries of 
the Ob, Yenisei, and Lena to facilitate the West-East movement of ideas, goods, and 
people. It is no coincidence that all four of  seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Siberia’s razriads were based in settlements that controlled access to major river 
valleys: Yakutsk ruling the Lena; Yeniseysk, the Yenisei; Tomsk, the Ob; and 
Tobolsk, the Irtysh.  With their long experience of travel on rivers west of the Urals, 
Russian units possessed the social and physical technologies to use Siberia’s 
waterways to their best advantage, adopting a variety of craft to explore and exploit the 
continental interior.  Though better suited to Russian technologies than either overland 
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travel through the tundra and taiga or oceanic travel via the ice-choked coastal waters 
of the Arctic Ocean, travel on Siberia’s river network was notoriously slow. A trip 
from Tobolsk to Yeniseysk via the southern route took three or four months, and up to 
seven months via the northern.  A round trip from European Russia to Yakutsk and 
back often took between three and four years to complete.465 However, in the absence 
of viable alternatives before the construction of the overland post road from Tyumen to 
Irkutsk along the taiga-steppe ecotone in the mid-eighteenth century, Russian units 
remained tied to the subcontinent’s river valleys. As a result, their spatial distribution 
was closely entwined with these waterways: the main thoroughfares of Russia’s arctic 
and subarctic empire.466 
 
A socio-ecological explanation of this historical evolution combines consequences 
arising from units’ and systems’ ecological context, interaction capacity, and path 
dependence.  It is worthwhile to note the dynamics by which these interrelated 
concepts operate.  Consider their combined impact on the technological evolution of a 
group of fishermen living around a lake.  It would be natural to assume that, because 
they are accustomed to a life near the water, the group would likely develop or adopt 
boating technology sooner than would a group of herders living on the steppes.  If our 
boat-building fishermen then had a choice to migrate down a stream that flows out of 
their lake or across a mountain range that rises beside it, the path dependence 
generated by the interaction of their social and physical technologies with their 
ecological context will probably send them downstream, through familiar ecologies 
where their existing adaptations could be used to best effect.  Similar socio-ecological 
effects can felt at the level of social systems. When, like the hypothetical fishermen-
boat builders mentioned earlier, an international unit is presented with a set of 
ecologies into and across which it can transport its ideas, goods, and people, it is most 
likely to select ecological highways that best fit its existing technological toolkit.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, this path dependent behaviour results from society’s 
tendency to maintain institutions in which its members have invested time and 
energy.467 That is not to say that a society must select ecologies similar to the ones in 
which their institutions were developed.  As shown by the Yakut settlers of the lower 
Lena, units and social systems can adapt or adopt alternative social and material 
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technologies to deal with novel ecological challenges.  However, the constraints of 
path dependence help to explain why units and systems in Siberia evolved as they did: 
with Russian populations and practices coalescing along narrow riverine corridors at 
Siberia’s southern fringe in regions around Tobolsk, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Irkutsk, 
whose neo-European ecosystems closely resemble those left behind in European 
Russia.468  Motivated by path dependence, Russian units and systems were predisposed 
to transport ideas, goods, and people to and through ecosystems in which their existing 
technologies provided the greatest possible returns, pushing them away from the 
hostile and unfamiliar worlds of the northern taiga and tundra and contributing to the 
socio-ecological bifurcation of northern Asia’s state and imperial international 
systems.  This combination of social and ecological factors helps to explain Alfred 
Crosby’s thesis of ecological imperialism, which identifies neo-European ecologies as 
a determining pull factor in the expansion of Europe’s imperial states.469 
 
Since the early to mid-twentieth century, the Arctic has witnessed a gradual pattern of 
imperial integration stemming from the application of new material technologies to the 
problems posed by ecological constraints.   The use of these technologies varied from 
state to state, helping to determine the Ecological Capacity available to each of their 
associated imperial international systems.  Russia and the Soviet Union ran far ahead 
the United States, Canada, and Denmark in this regard.  By 1922, Canada relied on the 
CGS Arctic, an unmodified trawler purchased from Germany in 1904, to transport its 
RCMP detachments to Pond Inlet and Craig Harbour.  It had no appreciable 
icebreaking capacity, leaving detachments isolated throughout the winter except by 
dogsled.470  The Russians, meanwhile, had commissioned their first metal hulled, 
steam-powered icebreaker, the Yermak, from Newcastle shipyards in 1898.471  By 
1917, its navy had four icebreaking and five ice-forcing ships, ranging from 2,600t. to 
8,750t. and from 2,000 to 10,000 horsepower.  These remained the backbone of the 
Soviet Arctic fleet until 1939.472  With an icebreaking fleet already at hand by 1917, 
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the USSR made significant headway in developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) that 
connects European Russia to the Bering Strait and the Pacific.  Central to the state’s 
plans for arctic transportation after the civil war of 1917-1919, the NSR was to be a 
northern parallel to the trans-Siberian railway that linked European Russia to 
Vladivostok along Siberia’s southern margin.  The first transit of the NSR was 
completed by Adolph Nordenskjöld in the Vega over two seasons, from 1878-1879, 
followed in 1914-1915 by Boris Vil’kitskii, captaining the Russian ships Taimir and 
Vaigach.   Through much of the 1920s, the NSR’s development was hindered by 
competition between the many agencies and commissariats assigned to the task.  
Competition for resources, manpower, and authority in northern Siberia led to an 
unsustainable drain on the region’s ecological systems, resulting in the amalgamation 
of the state’s many northern agencies under the Main Administration of the Northern 
Sea Route (GUSMP) in 1932.  Though the 1920s witnessed some notable successes in 
terms of the NSR’s physical infrastructure, including the construction of port of Igarka 
on the lower Yenisei – later a centre of Soviet forestry – these paled in comparison 
with the achievements of the GUSMP.473  The period to 1936, covering the second 
Five-Year Plan, saw tonnage on the NSR rise from 136,100 to 271,100, with river 
traffic on the Ob, Yenisei, Lena, and Kolyma climbing from 57,300 to 160,000 tons.474  
When compared with the stagnation that typified marine transport in arctic North 
America, the NSR’s subsequent history, even the low point of having half of its 
shipping fleet and all but one icebreaker locked in the ice during the winter of 1937, is 
one of remarkable achievement.  This ultimately led to the USSR’s effective 
application of interdependence sovereignty over its Arctic coastlines, transforming its 
frontiers into true Westphalian border and allowing it to exclude non-state actors such 
as the Hudson’s Bay Company, which had remained an important provider of goods 
and services in Chukotka throughout the 1920s.475 
 
In addition to its focus on arctic shipping, the USSR put great emphasis on the 
development of its arctic airlift capacity, which had also been pioneered during the 
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Tsarist era.476  In 1932, the GUSMP operated six aircraft north of the Arctic Circle, 
clocking up 512 flying hours. By 1936, it had 125 aircraft recording 10,900 hours.  
This led to increases in both passenger numbers, up from 123 in 1932 to 5,423 in 1936, 
and freight haulage, which rose from 1,512 lbs. in 1932 to 90,723 lbs. in 1936.477 As 
with the icebreaking fleet, these developments present a stark contrast with the 
relatively slow development of air transport in arctic America.  Apart from the contract 
given to Ben Eielson in 1924 to deliver priority mail in Alaska, the United States’ 
arctic colony saw little investment in its transportation infrastructure until Japanese 
threats in the Second World War made such improvements necessary for the 
movement of men and weaponry to the Aleutian front.478  In Canada, the HBC and the 
handful of mining companies operating in the Mackenzie Valley pioneered subarctic 
air transport, though to nowhere near the same degree as the Soviet government across 
the water.  As opposed to Soviet planners, who sought to create permanent bases and 
settlements in the North, the Canadian government and its commercial proxies saw 
aircraft as a means to locate, construct, man, and supply transient northern mines and 
lumbering camps from bases in the neo-European south, reinforcing arctic America’s 
continuing socio-ecological dynamics by making it easier for neo-European actors to 
access non-European ecosystems without the need to establish and maintain costly 
permanent settlements.479 
 
These advances in arctic interaction capacity led to an extension of hard territoriality in 
the Arctic Basin.  Whereas imperial frontiers north of 60° remained highly permeable 
to international actors prior to the Second World War, states’ investments in ice-
capable ships and air infrastructure led to increasingly defined lines of demarcation as 
the century progressed, shifting the frontier of actively-patrolled sovereign borders 
north of 60°.  The Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands during the Second World 
War was particularly important in this regard, leading to the construction of the first 
all-weather highway from the lower 48 states to Alaska and encouraging the 
construction of significant military infrastructure in this long-neglected American 
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territory.480  It is not coincidental that further increases in the USA’s interaction 
capacity in Alaska coincided with the need to boost American interdependence 
sovereignty vis-à-vis the Soviet Union across the Bering Strait after 1947.  Even then, 
however, the difficulty of ensuring full sovereign control over this massive and distant 
landmass led to considerable opposition to its full incorporation into the union in 1958, 
with even President Eisenhower opposing its claims to statehood.481    
Social Technologies & EC: socialist identity & the 
GULAG  
In Siberia, indigenous peoples played a key role as proxies in Russia’s imperial 
international system by virtue of their effective occupation of the land.  Following 
1917, however, the new Soviet government of the USSR began to interfere with 
groups’ internal affairs, pushing the region’s imperial structures onto evolutionary 
pathways towards Westphalian statehood. While Canada, the United States, and 
Denmark focused on maintaining indirect control over their imperial peripheries, the 
USSR adopted novel social technologies to bridge the ecological gap that separated its 
neo-European and non-European territories, seeking to construct a ‘socialist identity’ 
among indigenous units to mirror that which it sought to create among its European 
populations.  In the 1920s, these efforts centred around northern Siberia’s fourteen 
kul’tbazii (cultural bases) and numerous ‘red tents’ (mobile cultural bases) supported 
by the Committee of the North – the state body charged with the welfare of Siberia’s 
twenty-six ‘Small Peoples of the North’, a designation that included all indigenous 
groups of less than 50,000 individuals.  These centres were generally unsuccessful 
insofar as they failed to convince native groups that what they offered was an 
improvement over traditional lifestyles, whose ‘simpler’ social and physical 
technologies continued to prove themselves resilient to ecological and social crises.482  
By the mid-1930s, when the Committee of the North was taken over by GUSMP, the 
goal of revolutionary cultural change was replaced by new imperatives: the destruction 
of opposition to Soviet authority and the harnessing of indigenous productive capacity 
to the state’s economic goals.  The state took aim at two groups: the indigenous elites 
that had developed out of the region’s three hundred year-old imperial international 
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systems, and the shamans who were at the centre of indigenous spiritual life.  In a 
northern extension of Stalinist dekulakization, both groups were branded class 
enemies.  In their efforts to mobilize native resistance to these anti-Soviet forces, 
native women and the poorest members of native society were encouraged to access 
Soviet courts, symbols, and powers in order to undermine traditional institutions.  By 
granting women and the poorest natives special access to Soviet power, the 
relationship between the imperial ‘hub’ and its indigenous ‘spokes’ shifted down the 
social hierarchy, weakening leaders’ positions vis-à-vis their fellow natives.483  In the 
end, however, this did not produce the revolutionary changes that Moscow had hoped 
for.  Rather, thanks to the influence of path dependence, the advantages that women 
and the dispossessed gained from their improved access to external sources of 
authority were turned to bolstering their positions within their clans rather than to the 
subversion of traditional lifestyles.484   
 
Moscow’s attempt to close the gap between the processes and structures that defined 
Siberia’s imperial international system and those that defined its European and neo-
European heartland proved unsustainable.  Unable to justify their expense, the 
GUSMP abandoned cultural projects aiming at the creation of a socialist identity, 
focusing instead on the economic goals set by the decade’s parade of Five-Year 
Plans.485  With this retreat, the systems of indirect, imperial governance that Soviet 
power had sought to replace bubbled back up to the surface, defying the Soviets’ 
costly, decade-long struggle against them. 
 
More lasting change was brought about by Stalin’s decision to employ the state’s 
growing prisoner population as a colonial vanguard to boost the state’s Ecological 
Capacity in arctic and subarctic biomes.  To an extent undreamed of in Tsarist Russia, 
prisoners became a disposable form of social technology, used to carry out the 
dangerous job of accessing isolated raw materials and laying the groundwork for 
subsequent Russian colonization.  In a process unique in the history of Arctic 
settlement, the prison camps of the Main Administration for Prisons (GULAG) became 
the main population centres of northern Siberian, involuntary colonial archipelagos 
carved out of the tundra and taiga.  Run on an ‘eat-as-you-work’ basis and concerned 
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mainly with the construction of infrastructure and mines, this brutal system expanded 
from 23,000 inmates in 1929 to half a million in 1934.  By the eve of the Second 
World War, its population had risen to two million prisoners for whose services the 
GULAG acted as a central clearing house, providing labour to a wide variety of 
government projects.486  Typical of these were those of the gold-rich Kolyma basin in 
northeastern Siberia.  
 
Operated by Dal’stroy, the Main Administration for Construction in the Far North, the 
Kolyma camps subsidized the high costs of construction, supply, and maintenance 
with disposable human capital.  In temperatures that regularly dropped to -45˚C in 
January, prisoners were clothed poorly, fed poorly, treated abominably and died in 
droves, making it necessary to constantly ‘top up’ the population.487  Of the 16,000 
prisoners who travelled to Kolyma in its first year, only half are thought to have 
survived.  On their way to Kolyma, all prisoners passed through Magadan on the 
northern coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, whose port, highway, and civic infrastructure 
they were forced to build.488   In 1936, Magadan boasted a free population of 15,000, 
rising to 70,000 by 1939, nearly all of whom were dedicated to the supply, security, 
and support of Dal’stroy.489  Both Dal’stroy and the GUSMP on which it depended for 
supply until the late 1930s were effectively ‘states within states’, operating as spokes 
on a new imperial wheel in a region whose ecological constraints had heretofore made 
neo-European settlement impossible.490  They were thus the successors of the HBC 
and Speranskii’s indigenous volosts, operating with almost total autonomy from the 
imperial metropole to which they owed final allegiance and for whom they were 
‘effective occupiers’ of the Arctic Basin. 
 
   
                                                
486 Hill & Gaddy (2003): 84-86; McCannon (2007), p. 407. 
487 This was an issue in GULAGs across Siberia, from the Urals to Kolyma. [James Harris, ‘The Growth of the 
Gulag: Forced Labor in the Urals Region, 1929-31’ Russian Review 56(2) 1997, pp. 269-270.] 
488 Anne Applebaum, Gulag: a history of the soviet camps (London: Penguin Books, 2003): 96-101.   
489 Robert Conquest, Kolyma: the arctic death camps (London: MacMillan Press, 1978): 108. 
490 McCannon (1998): 38-40.  
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Figure 5.4 - Distribution of forced labour during the GULAG era, with Dal’stroy’s region of 
 responsibility at the height of its influence, stretching east of 140°E491 
 
It is difficult to depersonalize the brutality of this system by treating it as just another 
form of social technology.  Though beyond the scope of this project, the stories that 
emerged from the GULAG are disturbing in the extreme.  In the cold light of history, 
‘social technology’ may be the best description for a system that treated men and 
women as disposable tools, nails to be hammered and discarded.  However, we would 
do well to take minute to consider the true costs of arctic development, which – as we 
will also see in Chapter Six – is often calculated in human lives and dignity as much as 
in rubles, dollars, and kroners.   
 
The long-term impact of the prison camp system on the socio-ecological evolution of 
northern Siberia led to the growth of sizeable urban centres which, if not subsidized by 
the Soviet state, would not have been possible.  This point is forcefully made by Hill 
and Gaddy and illustrated by a comparison of two maps from their work.  Figure 5.4 
illustrates the distribution of forced labour during the GULAG era.  Figure 5.5 
illustrates some of the associated urban centres remaining in modern Russia, indicating 
the lasting impact of Soviet penal servitude on the direction and development of 
permanent neo-European settlements in northeastern Siberia – already described in 
previous chapters as the most northerly and continental of Siberia’s regions.492 Like 
the HBC posts of Arctic Canada and the gold-producing towns of Alaska – including 
Juneau, Nome, and Fairbanks – the GULAG archipelagos described by Alexander 
                                                
491 Hill & Gaddy (2003): 85. Dal’stroy shading added by author. 
492 McCannon (1998): 177-178. 
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Solzhenitsyn were a colonial vanguard, carving out centres of neo-European settlement 
around which subsequent processes of nucleation took place.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 – Selected urban centres in modern Siberia493 
 
Though incredibly costly in terms of human and financial capital, the GULAG 
experiment remains one of the most influential attempts to bridge the ecological 
bifurcation between the state’s neo-European systems of southern Siberia and those of 
its non-European northern, continental uplands.  It also illustrates the unsustainability 
of such experiments, which require constant subsidization in order balance local 
energy deficits.  The GULAG’s use of slave labour to overcome the adaptation costs 
associated with settlement in arctic and subarctic ecosystems is indicative of a 
structural division that developed between the Soviet Union and the capitalist states of 
North America during the Cold War era.  While the Arctic’s banded ecosystems 
continued to act as a source of convergent evolution around the rim of the circumpolar 
basin, political and socio-economic processes originating in Europe and its neo-
European extensions after 1917 produced divergent trends on either side of the Bering 
Strait.  These divergent trends mirrored the growing gap in the global international 
system between the principles of membership and behaviour that defined its capitalist 
and communist subsystems.   
 
Once the divergent social pressures resulting from the Cold War were removed in 
1991, Siberia’s development was placed on a capital-intensive footing akin to that of 
North America.  As a result, the gap that had separated the Asiatic and American arctic 
                                                
493 Hill (2003): frontpiece. Dal’stroy shading added by author 
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began to close.  This spelled disaster for many of the arctic communities that had been 
supported by the USSR’s politico-military system of resource mobilization since the 
1930s.  Between 1989 and 2002, the population of northern and eastern Siberia fell by 
an average of 14%.  In the northeast – long recognized as the most non-European of 
the subcontinent’s ecosystems – the drop was even more precipitous.  Magadan, the 
gateway to the Kolyma, lost 53% of its population.  Chukotka, at the extreme 
northeastern tip of Siberia, lost two-thirds of its inhabitants as Russian settlers flocked 
back to their preferred neo-European biomes.494  The Soviets’ arctic experiments in 
social technology and direct state control were expensive and unsustainable.  Without 
a source of tradable energy with which to subsidize their high costs, large urban 
centres sank rapidly back into the tundra and taiga.  Like Mangazeia three hundred 
years earlier, these boomtowns could not outlast their subsidies, leaving the units and 
systems of the area – who had come to rely on the state as a major provider of goods 
and services – either to develop new sources of energy or to evolve towards simpler 
principles, including the systems of indirect, imperial rule that the Soviet experiment 
temporarily submerged.   
 
*** 
 
Arctic states have deployed a number of physical technologies to mediate their 
Ecological Capacity and bridge the gap between their neo-European cores and non-
European imperial peripheries.  The impact of physical technology on the internal 
organisation of the region’s dominant units has been mixed.  In terms of their 
Vattelian-Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty, it has extended sovereign 
boundaries, allowing metropolitan capitals to replace imperial frontiers with 
Westphalian borders.  In terms of domestic sovereignty, it has increased interaction 
between states’ neo-European cores and their northern peripheries, boosting the energy 
allowances of the North’s trade-dependent islands of colonial settlement.  Other 
technologies have been less successful.  Thankfully, the GULAG system at the heart of 
Stalinist development in northern Asia has become morally unjustifiable in the post-
Cold War period.  With the removal of the subsidies that supported its successor 
settlements, these have begun to sink back into the taiga and tundra from which they 
were carved by slaves of the state, a coevolutionary consequence of European units’ 
                                                
494 Ibid: 119. 
  P a g e  | 186 
 
and systems’ limited Ecological Capacity in the non-European biomes of the Arctic 
Basin. 
Conclusion 
 
The impact of Ecological Capacity on the evolution of the Arctic’s imperial 
international systems has created a socio-ecological bifurcation around the 
circumference of the polar basin. Throughout the region, states’ political and economic 
power clusters around European and neo-European biomes. The exercise of domestic 
sovereignty outside of these regions is left to subordinate indigenous and economic 
proxies – dependent on the metropolitan capital for economic sustenance or political 
legitimacy but possessing a degree of autonomy within the structure of their imperial 
systems.  Relations between the Arctic’s metropolitan capitals – Moscow, Washington, 
Ottawa, and Copenhagen – and the units in their northern, continental and upland 
hinterlands are therefore typified by a core-periphery dynamic in which units in 
biomes with relatively low NPP are subordinated to those enjoying higher levels of 
technologically mediated EC.  This development began with Europe’s initial entry into 
the region, when state actors were forced to exercise their authority through processes 
of indirect rule.  This gave local collective actors significant de facto administrative 
powers in return for recognition of the metropole’s sovereign rights, creating imperial 
international systems characterized by march-like frontiers and layered authority rather 
than the Westphalian model of hard territoriality and centralized sovereign control.  As 
metropolitan actors deployed more sophisticated social and physical technologies, 
states found themselves better able to access and subsidize local NPP, permitting the 
development of denser populations and the northward extension of Westphalian 
principles of territoriality.  These developments came at a significant cost, however, as 
witnessed by the precipitous decline of Siberia’s colonial archipelagos – carved out of 
non-European biomes by forced labour and supported by state subsidies – following 
the collapse of the Soviet system. 
 
This dynamic reflects the coevolutionary influence of Ecological Capacity on the 
international units and systems of the circumpolar basin, whose evolution since 
European contact reflects the ecological bifurcation of the circumpolar world.  
Resulting patterns of convergent evolution have led units and systems alike towards a 
shared set of international principles defining membership and behaviour in the 
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Arctic’s regional international system – which itself constitutes a secondary 
international system generated and maintained by the imperial subsystems which 
inhabit it.  This socio-ecological construct has proven remarkably durable, surviving 
even the divergent trends engendered by divisions within global international system 
during the Cold War.  By shifting the socio-ecological structures on which the region’s 
bifurcated processes and structures are based, GEC promises to be a more lasting force 
for change.  As the axes of ecological productivity described in the last two chapters 
shift, so too will the principles by which membership and behaviour in this region 
systems are defined.  The potential impact of these changes will be the main concern 
of our analysis in Chapter Six. 
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Chapter Six 
The Socio-ecological Structure of the Contemporary Arctic International System  
 
 
Chapters Four and Five have explored ways in which the Arctic’s imperial 
international systems – and the secondary international system constituted by their 
interactions – have been influenced by the ecological contexts in which they are 
embedded.495   Through a process of Socio-Ecological Coevolution, these 
interconnected international and ecological systems have generated sedimented social 
structures: system-wide principles of membership and behaviour that cause IR’s 
collective actors to behave in ways that may be at odds with their internal processes.   
These define the Arctic as an international region distinct from the global system of 
which it is a part.  This Chapter will explore these regional structures by reference to 
the ways in which its units are organized at the systems level: a very conventional 
definition of international structure from which some very unconventional conclusions 
can be drawn.496   It finds that the Arctic is not a region of international anarchy.  
Neither is it a region dominated solely by modern states.  Rather, it is a hybrid 
international system caught between competing sets of international principles.  One is 
rooted in the region’s specific international and environmental history and is best 
understood in terms of a set of several interacting imperial hierarchies, ‘centred on, 
but not reducible to, states possessing sovereignty in the Westphalian model.’497  The 
second is focused around a more conventional state-system constituted by the 
interactions of sovereign territorial units in a formally anarchic social environment.498  
The transition from one structural form to the other takes place across a socio-
ecological ecotone that bisects the Arctic Basin – the defining feature of its 
biogeographical and international structures. 
 
                                                
495 Crosby (1986): 5-7; Ernest Callenbach, Ecology: a pocket guide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008) 
second edition: 18. 
496 Waltz (1979): 80. 
497 Hobson & Sharman (2005), p. 71. 
498 Bull (1995): 8, 13.  This definition intentionally conflates Buzan and Little’s use of ‘international systems’ with 
Bull’s definition of ‘international societies’ because, as argued throughout this project, a network of human 
interaction cannot exist without some degree of society emerging between its members. [James (1993), pp. 269-
288.]  
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The Arctic international system has evolved structures that differentiate it from the 
wider global system of which it is a part.  This makes it a distinct region within the 
global ‘set of sets’, with principles of membership and behaviour generated by the 
interaction of imperial international systems with and within the Arctic’s bifurcated 
biogeographical structure.  These interactions have produced a secondary state system 
defined by a combination of directly and indirectly ruled neo-European and non-
European biomes, with isolated pockets of trade-dependent neo-European settlement 
scattered throughout the latter around valuable resource deposits.  The Arctic Basin’s 
biogeographical structure covaries with these hierarchic and anarchic social 
principles. The former – located in non-European biomes – diverge from global and 
European norms and are defined hub-and-spoke arrangements in which peripheral 
units’ interactions are centred on, but not reducible to, their metropolitan cores.  The 
latter – located in neo-European biomes and around trade-dependent colonial 
settlements – converge with the principles by which units and systems are organised in 
the global (née European) international system, particularly in terms of centralized 
sovereign control and hard territoriality. 
 
This Chapter will approach the question of structure in the modern Arctic international 
system in two steps.  First, it will describe the evolution of the modern circumpolar 
international system since the Second World War by reference to its organizing 
principles in the political and economic sectors.499  This provides a human systems 
baseline against which to judge the impact of ecological transformations associated 
with GEC. Second, it will consider the future shape of the Arctic international system 
in light of anticipated changes to one of the key biogeographical structures of the 
region – the polar ice cap that has heretofore provided a relatively stable physical 
context around which the region’s hybrid units, processes, and structures have evolved. 
Biogeographical Determinants of International 
Structure 
 
The balance between the Arctic’s anarchic states system and its formally hierarchic 
imperial international systems has its fulcrum on a socio-ecological ecotone – a 
transitional zone that divides the region’s agricultural and non-agricultural biomes and 
                                                
499 The timing of the modern era is asynchronous around the polar basin, starting earlier in Siberia (c.1930) than in 
the western Arctic (c.1945). 
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marks a shift from Westphalian to imperial forms of organisation.  The ecotone 
metaphor is apt insofar as there is no clear point or line at which one type of system or 
unit is completely abandoned in favour of the other.  The gradient between them varies 
depending on where and when one looks.  It is a dynamic transition, shifting over time 
alongside both the ecological structures that have influenced its evolution and the 
social and physical technologies that give human populations the ability to mitigate the 
influence of their ecological contexts. 
 
All four principles of Coevolution are in play in this socio-ecological process.  First, 
human societies react to their ecological contexts by adapting technologies to address 
specific environmental challenges and opportunities.  These technologies can be social 
or physical – GULAGs or airplanes.  Second, ecosystems are altered by the social and 
physical technologies adopted by their embedded human populations, defining 
Coevolution’s cyclical pattern of mutually effective social and ecological 
transformation.  Third, the relative impact of ecology and humanity tends towards 
increasing human influence as our societies become more technologically 
sophisticated.  Physical and social adaptations provide us with more powerful tools to 
mediate the impact of our ecological contexts, though often at the cost of higher 
energy requirements that must be met by subsidizing local energy deficits from the 
surpluses of other ecosystems. Finally, Ecology and IR react to one another’s 
influences at varying rates, with effects radiating down each discipline’s levels of 
analysis.  This means that the planet’s individual organisms and biological 
communities will react to human influences before the chemical and physical systems 
that support them.500  Likewise, individuals will react to ecological influences more 
rapidly than international units, which in turn react more rapidly than the broader 
systems constituted by their interactions.501  Thus, as individuals and units adapt their 
practices to meet ecological challenges and opportunities, the system-level social and 
ecological structures that constrain their behaviour remain relatively stable, 
contributing to the adaptive expectations discussed with reference to the constraints 
imposed on social evolution by path dependence.   
 
                                                
500 Molles (1999): 303-304; Miller (1991): 63-65. 
501 Recall that international systems are dynamic social networks inhabited by units and constituted by their 
interactions. [Mann (1986): 1-5.] 
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Coevolution – expressed in Chapter Five in terms of Ecological Capacity (EC) – 
implies that the Arctic’s hybrid international system has been constituted by the 
interactions of collective actors in the ecological context of the circumpolar basin.  The 
impact of EC on the organizing principles of the Arctic international system has been 
profound.  In ecological terms, the sovereign states at the heart of the Arctic’s imperial 
international systems each possess material capacities that far exceed those of any 
other collective actors in the region.  None of the littoral states under discussion in this 
project are exclusively or even predominantly Arctic in their constitution.  Each 
straddles several biomes, with political and economic authority concentrated in 
southern ecosystems, beyond the taiga and tundra.502   This gives them ready access to 
the ecological surpluses of neo-European biomes, allowing them to maintain complex 
organisations.  These include functionally differentiated ‘administrative, policing, and 
military organisations headed, and more or less well-coordinated, by an executive 
authority’, with which they mobilize human and financial capital to directly administer 
and defend their territorial jurisdictions, reproducing themselves over time by a 
combination of coercive and capitalistic means.503    
 
Historically grounded in late medieval and early modern Europe, these states’ imperial 
expansion was heavily influenced by their socio-ecological preferences, products of 
their often path dependent histories.  This has drawn them down particular 
evolutionary pathways suited to the ecological bases of their development: toward 
ecosystems in which agricultural producers can enjoy biogeographical conditions 
similar enough to those of Europe to allow for the successful cultivation of its familiar 
crops and livestock.  These Neo-Europes tend to be found at temperate latitudes and 
include areas around the Rio Del Plata in South America, the fertile fringes of 
southeastern and southwestern Australia, most of New Zealand, the Cape of Good 
Hope, Siberia’s southern belt of agricultural productivity, and a swathe of North 
America stretching from south of the boreal forest to the deserts of the American 
Southwest.504  Though every European state’s version of imperialism has been unique 
in its characteristics, the Russian and British examples that dominated the early 
modern Arctic were driven and sustained by agricultural settlement from the mother 
                                                
502 Yvon Csonka et al., ‘Societies and Cultures: change and persistence’, in Susan Joy Hassol, Arctic Human 
Development Report (Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute) 2004:45. 
503 Skocpol (1979): 29; Tilly (1985): 181-184; Tilly (1992): 14-15. 
504 Crosby (1986): 6-7.  They can also include sites of higher elevation in the tropics, such as the Kenyan and 
Peruvian highlands. 
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country.505  Ecosystems played at least two key roles in the expansion of their Arctic 
empires, as well as those of the successor states who took their places.  First, they 
permitted the reproduction of metropolitan principles in neo-European colonies. 
Second, they defined the frontiers of Westphalian and imperial international 
principles.506  
 
Unable to find neo-European ecosystems in which to base agricultural settlements, the 
states that expanded into the Arctic Basin were forced to abandon their preferred 
methods of colonization in favour of the two strategies described in Chapter Five: 
either carving resource-dependent colonial ‘islands’ out of non-European subarctic and 
arctic biomes, or making sovereignty bargains with semi-autonomous proxies who 
exercised domestic authority in return for maintaining the metropolitan state’s 
international legal and Vattelian-Westphalian claims to the region.  The first strategy 
has created non-contiguous extensions of metropolitan society, colonial archipelagos 
in a sea of trees and tundra.  These have used technological adaptations – particularly 
trade – to mediate local energy deficits, acting as nodes of contact between imperial 
systems’ European/neo-European cores and their non-European peripheries.  The 
second strategy has produced imperial international systems characterized by hub-and 
spoke relationships between metropolitan cores and semi-autonomous units in the 
periphery.507  The result has been a tripartite organisation of units, including: 
 
1. the metropolitan state – the dominant unit of each imperial international 
system, based in a European or neo-European biome and possessing a high 
degree of Vattelian-Westphalian, interdependence, international legal, and 
domestic sovereignty; 
2. the trade-dependent colony – a non-contiguous extension of the metropolitan 
state based in the non-European hinterland near a lucrative resource deposit 
which it exchanges for the ecological surplus of more productive biomes; and  
3. the imperial periphery – a series of semi-autonomous units capable of sustained 
and effective occupation of non-European ecosystems, integrated into each 
                                                
505 Tom Griffiths & Libby Robin, Ecology and Empire: environmental history of settler societies (Edinburgh: Keele 
University Press, 1997): 66; Vaughn (2007): 361; Lieven (2002): 208-210. 
506 Eric Smith & Joan McCarter, Contested Arctic: indigenous peoples, industrial states, and the circumpolar 
environment (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997): xii. 
507 Buzan & Little: 246-247, 251; Motyl (1999): 120-121. 
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imperial international system via direct and unmediated relations with the 
metropolitan core. 
 
Though relatively stable for the first three hundred and fifty years of European empire 
in the Arctic, constant changes to the social and ecological contexts in which this 
organisation is embedded has meant that the biogeographical structures on which the 
Arctic’s regional international system is based have been ever-shifting, never reaching 
a ‘steady state’ of socio-ecological equilibrium.  We would do well to remember the 
lessons of New Ecology discussed in Chapter Three.  These teach us that as a 
population adapts to meet environmental challenges, it will necessarily alter the very 
environment that is affecting it.  Remembering Heisenberg, it follows that neither 
human populations nor natural systems can achieve a final, optimal condition vis-à-vis 
their social or ecological contexts.  Rather, both contexts and units will be constantly 
evolving due to their mutually constitutive relationships with the ‘other side’ of the 
socio-ecological equation.508 
 
In the Arctic, this dynamic relationship has meant that the application of social and 
physical technologies to the requirements of the region’s biogeographical structure has 
altered units’ and systems’ EC and the ecological contexts in which they are 
embedded.  The Stalinist Soviet Union’s use of GULAG labour as a form of 
disposable human capital is one particularly nasty example of this coevolutionary 
process in action, diverting rivers and destroying the taiga and tundra around it.509  The 
application of physical technologies such as the icebreaker, the airplane, and the 
snowmobile has also boosted units’ capacities to sustain complex organisations in 
relatively unproductive arctic and subarctic hinterlands.  In coevolutionary terms, these 
physical technologies increase units’ interaction capacity – a socially-contextualized 
source of explanation that can itself become a sedimented aspect of a socio-ecological 
system and, therefore, an important determinant of a unit’s EC.510  In the modern 
Arctic, physical technologies have radically improved units’ and systems’ abilities to 
move ideas, goods, and people across space.  This has made the hinterland’s trade-
                                                
508 Zimmerer (1994), pp. 109-111; I. Scoones, ‘New Ecology and the Social Sciences: What Prospects for a Fruitful 
Engagement?’, Annual Review of Anthropology (28) 1999, pp. 481-483, 488-489. 
509 Paul Gregory & V. Lazarev, The Economics of Forced Labor: the Soviet Gulag (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press) 2003: especially chapters 6 & 7; Oleg Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the 
Great Terror, Trans. Vadim Staklo (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2004): 242-243, 335-337. 
510 Much as international processes can become sedimented aspects of interaction capacities, so too do interaction 
capacities becomes sedimented aspects of units’ EC.  [Buzan & Little (2000): 83.] 
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dependent colonial islands more sustainable by lowering the costs of interaction with 
the non-contiguous, productive biomes that provide the ghost acreage necessary for 
colonies’ convergence with metropolitan structures. 
The Arctic International Political System 
 
The application of modern physical and social technologies to the non-European 
biomes of the circumpolar world has altered the tripartite structure of state, colony, and 
imperial periphery that heretofore defined the Arctic’s regional international system.  
In the decades following the Second World War, states’ increasing EC encouraged 
them to reverse earlier trends toward indirect rule over imperial hinterlands via local – 
often indigenous – proxies.  Instead, the populations of the imperial hinterland were 
concentrated around outposts of state power such as collective farms and police 
stations.  In the Soviet Union, the means by which this concentration was pursued 
followed in the well-trod, coercive pathways traced by earlier policies. This process 
was already underway in the 1930s through Moscow’s intensive use of physical and 
social technologies to extend the state’s reach in northern Siberia – already discussed 
in Chapter Five.  The dekulakization of indigenous hunter-gatherer groups was the thin 
edge of the assimilationist wedge, which slowly drew more native units into state-
managed hunting and herding kolkhozes and sovkhozes.  Like other international 
processes before it, including the commodification of indigenous economies in 
subarctic North America during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
collectivization did not occur everywhere at once.  Rather, it spread down the axes of 
ecological productivity that ran from South the North, from maritime to continental 
climates, and from river valleys and coastlines to tributary uplands.  It was most 
successful among groups who lived in relatively productive niches that permitted 
sedentary and relatively differentiated organisations, such as those among the Yakut of 
the middle Lena.511  It was far less successful in Siberia’s marginal northern, 
continental, and upland biomes, where some HGBs, such as the Nenets-Samoyed and 
Even-Tungus, were able to maintain their nomadic lifestyles until the 1970s.512   
 
Thanks to the social constraints imposed by their path dependent histories, the 
processes by which the imperial states on the North American Arctic tried to 
                                                
511 The impact of Coevolution on the distribution of these groups is discussed at length in Chapter Four.   
512 Forsyth (1992): 292-296, 314; Olson (1994): 160, 200-201, 225. 
  P a g e  | 195 
 
incorporate indigenous proxies into metropolitan institutions were dominated by 
capital-intensive methods.  Commodified by the arrival of the fur trade in nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, the Inuit of the Canadian Arctic were actually 
discouraged from nucleating around trading posts and Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
stations before 1945.  The position of the Hudson’s Bay Company as Ottawa’s de facto 
corporate proxy in the region gave it the power to unilaterally transfer native 
populations from location to location – a policy for which it looked to its Headquarters 
in London for approval rather than to the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa.513   The 
HBC’s economic priorities meant that it encouraged the Inuit’s continued dispersal in 
small bands so as to increase the range of their trapping activities, maintaining 51 posts 
across the region by 1927.  In comparison, the government maintained only seven 
RCMP stations in the same area.514 This situation changed dramatically after 1945.  
The depletion of fragile arctic biomes by a wartime boom in fur production was 
disastrous for both Inuit trappers, who lacked other sources of trading capital with 
which to access the ghost acreage on which their commodified livelihoods increasingly 
relied, and for the HBC, which was financially incapable of providing welfare benefits 
to the entire native population of the North.515  The advent of the airplane, the 
icebreaker, and the snowmobile also increased the state’s capacity to directly rule its 
Arctic hinterlands – eventually overturning the HBC’s policy of population dispersal 
in favour of concentrated settlements at which Canada’s growing welfare state could 
provide centralized services to Inuit hunters.516  The commodification of Inuit 
economies makes it difficult to say whether this process was driven by indigenous or 
state priorities.517  Regardless, indigenous administration in Arctic Canada began to 
converge with the norms of the metropolitan state – a process permitted by the 
commodification of pre-international systems of exchange and by the state’s growing 
capacity to maintain complex organisations in ecologically marginal biomes.518  
 
Where Moscow, Washington, Ottawa, and Copenhagen had been content to use 
indigenous proxies as semi-autonomous ‘effective occupiers’ of the land in the early 
                                                
513 Damas (2002): 29-30. 
514 Ibid: 27. 
515 Ray (1990): 226-228. 
516 Damas (2002):107-110; Frances Abele, ‘Northern Development: Past, Present, and Future’, in Frances Abele et 
al., Northern Exposure: Peoples, Powers and Prospects in Canada's North (Toronto: McGill-Queens University 
Press, 2009): 25-26. 
517 Yvon Csonka, ‘Societies and Cultures: change and persistence’, Niels Einarsson et al., Arctic Human 
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modern era of Arctic IR, 1945 saw them begin to target groups’ cultural and socio-
economic distinctiveness, making them tools of state integration.519  The indigenous 
peoples of Siberia, Canada, Alaska, and Greenland were shifted into state-sponsored 
settlements by a combination of coercive and capitalistic means, where they were 
exposed to assimilationist policies.  Children, for example, were forced to attend 
residential schools where use of their language and culture was actively discouraged 
and the children themselves were exposed to shocking cruelty.520  The 1950s and ‘60s 
also witnessed increasing colonization from the South as significant deposits of metals 
and hydrocarbons were discovered, swamping or displacing local indigenous groups in 
the neighbourhood of the resulting archipelagos of trade-dependent colonial 
settlement.521 The same pattern of indigenous displacement occurred when and where 
the state saw its security – a primary politico-military resource during the Cold War – 
hampered by their presence.  Such considerations led to the removal of Siberian 
Eskimos from their coastal villages in Chukotka in the early 1950s and to the removal 
of the Inughuit from the vicinity of Thule United States Air Force Base at Cape York, 
Greenland, in 1963.522 
 
Even in the midst of this increasingly statist dynamic, the structural influence of 
indigenous groups’ special status as ‘effective occupiers’ of the land on behalf of their 
metropoles lived on as a sedimented aspect of the Arctic’s international system.  In the 
summer of 1953, the Canadian government attempted to extend its effective 
occupation of the heretofore uninhabited Queen Elizabeth Islands in the northern 
Arctic Archipelago by the forced relocation of several Inuit families.  As one 
government official said at the time, Canada was “anxious to have Canadians 
occupying as much of the north as possible and it appeared that in many cases the 
Eskimo were the only people capable of doing this.”523  Ten families were relocated 
from Pond Inlet (now Mittimatalik) on Baffin Island and Fort Harrison (now Inukjak) 
on the East coast of Hudson Bay to Resolute (now Qausuittuq) on Cornwallis Island 
and to Grise Fjord (now Ausuittuq) on the southern coast of Ellesmere.  Unlike the 
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communities from which they were removed, Resolute and Grise Fjord were located in 
the high arctic tundra – with desperately low NPP and up to three months of winter 
night.  This was completely unlike the relatively productive subarctic marine 
ecosystems to which the migrants were accustomed.  Moreover, many of those sent 
from Port Harrison were craftspeople rather than hunters, having recently established a 
successful carving industry on the shores of Hudson Bay.524  The settlements survived 
due to the generosity of local RCMP detachments, a few hunters who happened to be 
included in the Grise Fjord party, and the presence of a military airbase near the 
settlement at Resolute, where Canada’s ‘effective occupiers’ were forced to hunt for 
food and materials in the base’s rubbish tips.525  Ottawa’s efforts in 1953 are evidence 
not only of its disregard for its indigenous population and ignorance of its own 
territory, but also of its continuing inability to mobilize sufficient EC in its imperial 
hinterland to integrate these units into the state-centred global international system of 
the metropolitan South.   Only in a hinterland like the Arctic Archipelago could two 
tiny hamlets, composed of a few Inuit families, an HBC post, and an RCMP 
detachment demonstrate ‘effective occupation’ of over 400,000 km2 of territory in the 
Queen Elizabeth Islands.  When viewed from the perspective of the densely populated 
and intensively worked ecosystems of the neo-European south, these attempts at 
sovereign occupation are feeble.  In the harsh ecosystems of the polar north, however, 
they were effective – emulating earlier ‘sovereignty settlements’ founded by the 
Russians at Novaya Zemlya with Nentsy hunters in the 1870s, and by the Danes, using 
Inuit, at Ittoqqortoormiit, East Greenland in 1924.526  Each of these has since been 
accepted by the international community, with the Danish effort constituting a 
principal reason for its successful defence of its claim to the whole of Greenland at the 
International Court of Justice in 1933.527 This acceptance is indicative of the Arctic’s 
atypical status in international law and the failure of its littoral states to integrate the 
region completely into the structures of the global international system.528 
 
Even as states used their increasing EC in the North to alter the terms of their proxy 
relationships with the indigenous peoples of the region – making them adjuncts to the 
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region’s islands of colonial settlement and thereby undermining their semi-
autonomous status – they also sought to expand their colonial archipelagos.  The 
Soviet Union, whose centrally-planned economy allowed it to allocate financial and 
human capital wherever it chose, created and maintained the largest of these island 
chains by executive fiat; their settlement policy being driven mainly by the politico-
military sector.529  When the human tragedy of the GULAG proved to be no basis for 
sustained colonial occupation, the Soviet state turned to central planning and direct 
subsidization to meet its settlement goals.530  These sought to recreate Soviet industrial 
society in non-European ecological contexts, harkening back to the ‘Engels Dictum’ 
discussed in Chapter One.531  Throughout the Soviet era, scattered arctic and subarctic 
settlements were founded and expanded in order to fulfil this ideological ambition.  
Like the GULAGs on whose bones they were built, these new archipelagos were 
located near significant natural resources: gold in Kolyma, nickel and platinum in 
Noril’sk, diamonds at Mirny, and oil and gas at Urengoi.  These were far larger than 
similar resource colonies in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, with permanent family 
habitation being preferred to the transient mining camps that predominated in the 
West.532  With their populations sometimes reaching over 200,000 people, Siberia’s 
Arctic cities depended on massive quantities of imported food and manufactures to 
make up their local resource shortfalls – the same kind of ghost acreage that had been 
the basis of the HBC’s Bayside posts and imperial Russia’s fur-trading boom towns.533   
 
The consequences of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet economy 
make it clear that the Russian state has not escaped the biogeographical constraints 
imposed on it by Siberia’s ecological context.  Despite the fact that their development 
was driven by central planners rather than market forces, many of Siberia’s settlements 
fit snugly into the boom town-bonanza deposit model described in Chapter Five.  It is 
worth reminding ourselves of the conditions in which such complex units might be 
forced either to revert to simpler forms of social organisation – most often by shrinking 
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their population in order to reduce their energy deficits – or face the risk of complete 
collapse.  This can occur (i) when the resource base upon which they depend 
deteriorates due to human mismanagement, or (ii) when trade is disrupted by an 
environmental shift.534  Magadan, the gateway to the mineral-rich Kolyma basin, is 
one such settlement.  From its founding in 1929 as gateway to the Kolyma camps, its 
existence hinged on the ecological surpluses of other biomes to subsidize the enormous 
energy deficits generated by its population of over 150,000.  The collapse of the Soviet 
system in 1991 abruptly altered Magadan’s social environment – undermining the 
politico-economic structures that had delivered the bulk of its ghost acreage.  As 
expected of a boom town shorn of its resource base, the city and its surrounding region 
shrank rapidly, losing over half of its population between 1989 and 1999.  The rural 
population of the oblast around it shrank even more rapidly as outlying villages that 
relied on Magadan as a resource magnet were cut off and their populations shifted into 
town.  This simplified the regional resource picture by consolidating the oblast’s 
population around a developed trade hub, lowering the overall costs of supply.535  
Even so, the average food basket in Magadan cost 1,601 rubles in 2002, third in the 
Russian Federation only to Anadyr in Chukotka (r.2,823) and Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatski (r.1,762), and well above the national average of r.955. Supplying 
Siberia’s northern settlements remains problematic, with the costs of their upkeep 
totalling over half a billion dollars annually – four times the costs associated with 
transportation and supply in the European and neo-European core.536 
 
The same boom town dynamic affected the military settlements created by the United 
States during the Cold War – another variation on the theme of state-subsidized 
colonial archipelagos.  Bases such as Eielson AFB in Alaska and Thule AFB on 
Greenland were built as providers of a social commodity – security – and existed 
despite their ecological surroundings rather than because of them.537   Around 1960, 
with the Cold War at its height and bombers playing a central role in the American 
nuclear deterrent, these self-contained urban centres were home to over to 10,000 
military personnel each.538   In the wake of 1991, both bases’ went into decline. Thule, 
                                                
534 Tainter (1988): 44. 
535 Timothy Heleniak, ‘Demographic Change in the Russian Far East’, in M.J. Bradshaw (2002): 142-144 
536 Hill & Gaddy (2003): 124-126. 
537 Ibid: 89. 
538 Naske & Slotnick (1987): 131; Greenberg (2009), pp. 1368-1369; Dan Cragg, Guide to Military Installations, 6th 
Ed. (Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 2000): 8-9; Grant (2010): 315. 
  P a g e  | 200 
 
located in the high tundra of Cape York, was especially hard-hit, and is now reduced to 
around 600 inhabitants.539   
 
Only two types of Arctic settlement have escaped this precipitous post-1991 decline: 
(i) islands of colonial settlement located near bonanza deposits of valuable 
commodities, and (ii) those inhabited by the region’s indigenous groups.  The 
persistence of these familiar units is indicative of Ecology’s continuing influence on 
the organisation of units in the region.  In Western Siberia, enormous oil and gas 
reserves in fields such as Samotlor and Urengoi supported the growth of trade-
dependent boomtowns based on hydrocarbon extraction as early as the 1970s.  
Noyabyrsk and Novy Urengoi, both settlements situated in the Yamalo-Nenets 
autonomous region near the mouth of the Ob River, date from the discovery of the 
Urengoi gas field in the mid-1970s and have maintained relatively stable populations 
of around 100,000 each.  Noril’sk, a former GULAG settlement dating from 1935, has 
also survived thanks to its position near another bonanza deposit – in this case one of 
the world’s largest nickel-copper deposits.  After losing a quarter of its Soviet-era 
population between 1989 and 2002, it has now stabilized at around 135,000 people.540  
Though still overpopulated by between 14% and 30% when compared to Alaska, the 
Canadian Arctic, and Kalaallit Nunaat, the population dynamics of Siberia’s colonial 
archipelagos are gradually converging with those of the Western Arctic: turning to 
market-led growth around trade-dependent boom towns in lieu of experiments in direct 
state subsidization.541  This ongoing reorganization of population in the arctic and 
subarctic Siberia has proceeded along the three axes of ecological productivity 
described in Chapter Four, with migrants leaving northern, continental, and upland 
ecosystems for sites enjoying more southerly, maritime, and riverine – i.e. neo-
European – biogeographical conditions.542  The ecological structure driving this 
development is essentially the same as that which drove early the bifurcation of the 
Arctic’s imperial international systems: the presence or absence of neo-European 
biomes.  Though the units of the twenty-first century global international system 
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certainly possess more EC than their nineteenth and early twentieth century forbearers, 
they cannot escape their ecological contexts.  Units, and the systems constituted by 
their interactions, can only mediate constraints arising from the ecosystems in which 
they are embedded, and even then only at considerable cost in financial and human 
resources. 
 
   
 
Figure 6.1 – The Distribution of Russian and Indigenous Populations Across Siberia543 
 
The stability of indigenous populations in post-1991 Siberia is remarkable given the 
contemporaneous decline in European settlement.   In Chukotka, which lost 76% of its 
total population between 1989 and 2003 (dropping from 148,301 to 35,300), the 
indigenous population actually increased by 15% from 15,903 to 18,300.544  Although 
Siberia’s Small Peoples of the North remain swamped by its urban European 
settlements, making up just over 4% of the total population, their numbers have 
experienced steady growth since the 1970s, standing at around 90,000 as of the 2002 
census.545  Moreover, their distribution continues to give them local majorities away 
from the centres of Russian settlement – an area that covers the vast majority of 
Siberia’s landmass.  (see fig. 6.1)   
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The survival of indigenous actors through the assimilationist period of Arctic 
international history that ran from 1945 and 1970 led to their eventual re-emergence as 
semi-autonomous actors in a hybrid international system balanced between anarchic 
and hierarchic structural forms.  The state-building period of the Cold War certainly 
had a major impact on the ‘system of empires’ that preceded it.546  Metropolitan states’ 
efforts to integrate their imperial hinterlands into the neo-European mainstream 
concentrated indigenous groups in settled communities and radically altered their 
socio-economic systems, linking them more directly to those of the European and neo-
European core.  The effects of these changes were unexpected and contradictory.  Far 
from deleting the differences between core and peripheral units, they recreated a new 
form of imperial hierarchy for the modern age: a hybrid structure in which expanded 
archipelagos of colonial settlement replaced isolated islands, with indigenous peoples 
taking a central role in defining their extent.  This produced a new distribution of units 
to replace the early modern period’s rather neat tripartite division of neo-European 
metropolitan states, non-contiguous and trade-dependent colonial islands, and semi-
autonomous imperial proxies inhabiting non-European hinterlands.  In its place arose a 
much messier situation in which Arctic states share the domestic and international 
stage with a variety of functionally differentiated sub-state and imperial units 
organized in structures reminiscent of earlier hub-and-spoke arrangements, with 
peripheral actors possessing varying degrees of domestic and international autonomy 
in highly asymmetric federal systems. 
 
The first inkling of this hybrid structure arose in Alaska in 1971, with the passage of 
the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).  ANCSA has its roots in the 
discovery of significant oil and gas reserves in arctic North America in the late 1950s, 
which began to unravel the metropolitan state’s uncontested power in the region by 
introducing powerful new actors into the imperial international system that it had 
heretofore dominated.  Multinational corporations proved unlikely allies for Alaska’s 
embattled native peoples, who had been using the ‘Indian Title’ provisions in the 
Alaskan Statehood Act of 1958 as a lever against industrial development on traditional 
lands.547  Repeated attempts to settle indigenous land claims in the decade after 
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statehood floundered: caught between Alaska’s indigenous hinterlands – whose 
inhabitants held ill-defined de jure rights to the land – and Alaska’s islands of colonial 
development – whose inhabitants controlled the state government.  While the former 
sought to maintain their rights to the land and gain access to the resource wealth 
flowing from Alaska’s commodity sector, the latter opposed any step that might limit 
access to what they saw as an untouched resource hinterland – an economic terra 
nullius.548 Unable to construct pipelines or wells following oil discoveries at Prudhoe 
Bay on Alaska’s North Slope in 1968/69, oil and gas companies lobbied the federal 
government to cut this Gordian Knot, leading to the passage of ANCSA in 1971.549  
The same state-MNC-indigenous dynamic had much to do with the gradual devolution 
of sub-state power to various indigenous groups in Canada’s Northwest Territories, a 
process that also evolved out transnational companies’ need to settle land claims 
disputes during the Mackenzie Pipeline debate of the late 1970s.550 
 
Drawn up without any direct consultation with indigenous landholders, ANCSA was 
intended to extinguish native claims to 90% of Alaska’s 400 million acres of land.551  
It created a dual system of native governance that empowered more than 200 native 
villages to claim up to 40 million acres of land, and provided US$925million dollars in 
compensation from the federal and state governments, amounting to about two dollars 
and fifty cents and acre.552  This money was distributed to indigenous villages by 
twelve regional corporations, a new form of indigenous-controlled sub-state actor 
whose internal constitutions were modelled on private-sector firms rather than public 
or tribal governments.  (see fig. 6.2) They were to be run by local communities, and 
were made responsible for investing the 2% royalty indigenous groups were to receive 
from resource production and rents on the 103 million acres of lands conveyed to the 
state government by the Statehood Act of 1958.553  ANCSA is interesting to this 
project insofar as it signalled a return to the asymmetrical treatment of indigenous and 
European units by state actors who, for the previous twenty-five years, had pursued 
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assimilationist goals.   By providing Alaska natives with independent financial 
capacities, ANCSA allowed Alaska’s indigenous-controlled regional corporations to 
become key financial contributors to several transnational non-governmental 
organisations – particularly the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), a transnational 
non-governmental organisation that represents the interests of Inuit and Eskimo people 
from Siberia to the Denmark Strait.554  Although one of ANCSA’s purposes was to 
commodify Alaska’s native people – a move intended to integrate its imperial 
hinterlands into the colonial archipelagos that dotted the region at the time of its 
signing – it set the stage for a general pattern of sovereign devolution that would gain 
pace with the end of the Cold War and eventually lead to the asymmetrical federalism 
that typifies the structure of new hybrid imperial systems in the Russian Federation, 
the United States, Canada, and Kalaallit Nunaat-Denmark.555 
 
 
Figure 6.2 – ANCSA regional corporation boundaries and Alaskan indigenous languages556 
 
A key feature of this asymmetric federalism is that its hierarchically and functionally 
differentiated units are neither ethnically nor territorially defined.  Modern Alaska 
retains a dual structure for indigenous governance based on the financial capacities of 
its regional corporations and the domestic autonomy of its native villages.  These 
indigenous units, in turn, operate alongside the public government of Alaska, to whose 
legislature they elect representatives, but from whose decisions they possess 
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significant independence.557  This multi-layered system of governance puts villages 
and corporations alike into direct, unmediated relationship with the metropole in 
Washington and is reminiscent of the proxy relationship between Canadian First 
Nations and the Crown.  Like the treaties that extinguished native title across swathes 
of Canada, ANCSA was intended to help assimilate Alaska’s imperial hinterlands into 
the metropolitan state.  Instead, it became a tool with which the indigenous people of 
the imperial hinterland have gained control of their domestic sovereignty, becoming an 
instrument of indigenous autonomy as much as a means of imperial integration.558  
Such tension is only possible in a system that is at once based on the interaction of 
sovereign states in an anarchic states-system and the presence of underlying imperial 
hierarchies in which functionally differentiated units divide sovereignty among their 
overlapping domestic jurisdictions.  It signalled a return to the imperial international 
systems by which arctic states had previously ruled their Arctic peripheries, granting 
significant autonomy to local ‘effective occupiers’ of the land in return for the latter’s 
recognition of the metropole’s right to Vattelian-Westphalian sovereignty and banal 
lordship. 
 
The Arctic’s indirectly ruled imperial hierarchies and its experiences of state power are 
products of the coevolutionary processes that link human populations to the ecological 
systems in which we are embedded.  Without the region’s specific environmental 
history, which stretches back much farther than the scope of this project, its hybrid 
international system – a secondary international system in the Wightian sense of the 
term – could not have developed as it did.  Over the past four hundred years, the 
interaction of European actors with and within the Arctic Basin’s ecological context 
has produced a hybrid international system in which Arctic states sit at the centre of 
asymmetric confederations in which peripheral units are granted different rights 
depending on their position in the social and ecological structures of the region.559  
Home Rule on Greenland became law on May 1st, 1979, giving the residents of the 
island – regardless of ethnicity – considerable rights to domestic sovereignty while 
retaining Copenhagen’s exclusive control over foreign affairs, defence, citizenship, 
and banking.  This de jure ban on international action did not stop Greenland from 
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pressing Copenhagen to negotiate the island’s exit from the European Community in 
1985 over disputed EC fishing quotas.560  Using the threat of secession as a lever 
against the metropolitan state – a threat supported by the island’s history of colonial 
rule and precedents in international law relating to the independence of post-colonial 
polities – the Home Rule government effectively realigned its regional focus from 
Europe to North America.561  This process was facilitated by the ICC whose socio-
cultural importance to the 88% of Greenlanders who identify themselves as Inuit had 
an direct impact on the island’s international realignment away from its European 
metropole and towards its socio-cultural cousins in North America.562   
 
In Canada, several layers of public and indigenous government have been established 
that represent the Arctic’s imperial hinterlands, its indigenous Arctic populations, and 
its islands of colonial settlement.  Geographically, the largest public government in 
Canada is Nunavut, a territory established in 1999 following over three decades of 
negotiations with Ottawa.  It covers 2.1 million square kilometers and has a population 
of 27,000 spread over 25 incorporated communities.  85% of its population is Inuit, 
though its government is designed to represent all of its ethnic communities.  Like 
ANCSA, the Nunavut Agreement saw the Inuit extinguish their claims to the majority 
of the territory’s land (82%) in return for a cash settlement of CAN$1.15billion, co-
management rights over resource decisions, and enduring resource royalties.563  These 
royalties do not flow to the territorial government, which remains dependent on 
Ottawa for its operating budget and has no direct claim on land or resources.564  
Instead, they accrue to a private Inuit corporation on the Alaskan model: Nunavut 
Tunngavik Ltd.565 This dual system of public and indigenous governance highlights 
the complex and overlapping nature of the region’s modified imperial relationships, 
with multiple layers of overlapping authority operating in direct relationship to the 
metropolitan core rather than via the clear (if contested) hierarchies of local, 
provincial, and federal administrations that dominate southern Canada.566  Earlier 
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agreements in Northern Quebec, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon established 
similar dual structures of indigenous governance.  In these small-scale predecessors to 
the Nunavut Agreement, the co-management of resources between indigenous and 
public governments have given the Inuvialuit, Dene, and Innu peoples newfound 
financial levers to go with the de jure domestic autonomy guaranteed by their 
unmediated treaty relationship to the Crown.567  Territorial governments, meanwhile, 
possess few rights vis-à-vis the federal government.  Only the Yukon had any rights to 
publicly owned resources, with decreasing powers as one moves to the Northwest 
Territories (now focused around the Mackenzie River watershed), Nunavut and, 
finally, Nunavik on the Ungava peninsula.  Thus, sub-state units’ positions in Canada’s 
asymmetric federal hierarchy (an imperial structure in all but name) evolve differently 
along the three axes of ecological productivity described in chapters Four and Five, 
with the unitary power of public government increasing as one moves from the barren 
lands of Nunavik and Nunavut into the increasingly productive biomes of the 
Mackenzie and Yukon rivers.568 Moreover, though indigenous groups possess 
guaranteed rights to self-government, the region’s territorial governments enjoy no 
such powers – their decisions being subject to overrule by the Department of 
Aboriginal and Northern Affairs and the federal parliament in Ottawa.569  Each of 
these relationships is indicative of the core-periphery distribution of power that links 
the various actors that inhabit Canada’s asymmetric federal system - itself a product of 
the biogeographical structures that have led Canada to adopt policies that repackage 
nineteenth and early twentieth century systems of indirect, imperial rule for the 
modern age. 
 
In the Russian Arctic, indigenous peoples lack the absolute demographic majorities 
that they enjoy in much of Alaska, Canada, and Kalaallit Nunaat, making up 90,000 of 
the region’s almost 2 million inhabitants.  This has left them with far fewer levers with 
which to regain the autonomy they lost to the state in the Soviet period.  As a result, 
the return to indirect rule following 1991 empowered territorial public governments 
rather than the ‘Small Peoples of the North’, shifting proxy authority to representatives 
of the various sub-state units whose primary concern was for the development of 
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Siberia’s colonial islands rather than for the return of control over land, culture, and 
resources to the indigenous inhabitants of Siberia’s non-European hinterlands.570  
Nevertheless, thanks to international developments in other parts of the Arctic Basin, 
Russia’s Small Peoples of the North have been able to mobilize transnational support 
for their positions via their membership in the Russian Association of Indigenous 
Peoples of the North (RAIPON), a permanent participant in the Arctic Council and a 
working partner of the other indigenous NGOs in the region – the ICC, the Aleut 
International Organisation, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council 
International, and the Saami Council.  This transnational support has allowed 
indigenous groups in Russia to access the political and financial resources of more 
empowered indigenous units in Alaska, Canada, and Kalaallit Nunaat, boosting their 
ability to effectively lobby their public governments to grant – or uphold – their 
limited rights to self-government.  In 2000, these efforts resulted in passage of laws 
“On General Principles of Organizing Communities of Indigenous Minority Peoples of 
the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation”.  These recast Tsarist-
era obshchinas – communes dating from the emancipation of Russia’s serfs in the 
nineteenth century – as tools of indigenous autonomy, allowing them to petition the 
federal state directly for access to ‘territories of traditional use’.  Though often ignored 
by regional sub-state actors answering to Russia’s islands of colonial rule, this gave 
indigenous people a ‘direct line’ to the metropolitan core of Russia’s asymmetric 
federal system – a potentially powerful tool in the pursuit of land rights and self-
government.571  The recentralization of state power by Vladimir Putin since 2000 has 
made this unmediated, imperial relationship all the more important as increasing 
decision-making power flows back to the metropolitan core at the expense of the 
territorial governments who most often ignore indigenous units’ rights. 
 
The re-emergence of indigenous groups as semi-autonomous actors within asymmetric 
federal structures is mirrored in their growing role on the international stage.  The 
status of the ICC, Saami Council, RAIPON, Aleut International Association, Arctic 
Athabaskan Council, and Gwich’in Council International as permanent participants in 
the Arctic Council – the premiere intergovernmental organisation responsible for 
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coordinating political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural activities across 
the polar basin – is unique in the international community.572  Their demographic 
majorities outside the Arctic’s main cities gives them considerable influence over 
government policies on topics dealing with their traditional concerns – particularly 
where their rights to traditional land use are supported by domestic and international 
law, including questions of pollution, resource management, and cultural rights.573  
This influence does not extend to the military sphere, which cannot be discussed at 
Arctic Council meetings – a tension in the Council’s mandate that reflects its dual role 
in Arctic IR.574  For the region’s imperial states, it is a means of ensuring their control 
over regional cooperation.  For indigenous participants, it is a forum to air grievances 
and suggest solutions directly to federal governments – bypassing the intermediary, 
sub-state actors who normally mediate federal relationships.575  Once again, this 
tension illustrates the two faces of the Arctic international system – one looking to the 
sovereign state model that dominates global IR, the other to a regional model of 
hierarchical imperial relationships – that are products of the region’s bifurcated 
biogeographical structure. 
 
*** 
 
The hybrid structure of the Arctic’s international political system reflects two 
competing sets of principles: one similar to the anarchic European states-system 
described by classical English School writers, the other resembling a secondary state 
system (or system of empires) in which international relationships are clustered 
around, but not reducible to, those of their metropolitan hubs.  This hybrid organisation 
has been generated by the interaction of the region’s constituent units and its 
bifurcated biogeographical structure, which have produced sedimented principles of 
membership and behaviour that define the boundaries of its regional international 
system.   In the early modern era, these principles recognized three varieties of unit: 
the metropolitan states that formed the core of each imperial system, the non-
contiguous colonial islands that acted as resource providers to the core, and the semi-
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autonomous indigenous and corporate units who inhabited and effectively occupied the 
imperial hinterland.  Since 1945, states’ use of modern social and physical 
technologies has injected principles reminiscent of the global international system into 
this imperial hierarchy, creating a hybrid structure that falls somewhere between state-
centric and imperial forms of organisation.  No longer content to rely on semi-
autonomous imperial units to maintain their sovereign claims on the international 
stage, states have gone to considerable effort to assimilate the Arctic’s imperial 
hinterlands into metropolitan society.  They have done so by moving populations from 
their hitherto isolated hinterlands into new colonial archipelagos, each in direct contact 
with the metropolitan core.  States’ abilities to achieve their assimilationist goals have 
been constrained by the deep biogeographical structures that split the Arctic Basin into 
its constituent neo-European and non-European biomes.  Whereas the assimilation of 
the former is now all but complete, states’ limited EC in the latter, and the high energy 
demands of activities in the political sector, have left the region’s move towards global 
principles of membership and behaviour in limbo – stuck between the imperial 
organisation of its past and the Westphalian organisation of the wider international 
system.   
The Arctic International Economic System 
 
Whereas the second half of the twentieth century has seen states take an increasingly 
direct hand in the political sector of the Arctic international system, its economic 
structure continues to reflect earlier patterns of colonial-indigenous bifurcation.  The 
large-scale resource industries at the heart of the modern Arctic economy have allowed 
the region’s early modern colonial archipelagos to integrate closely into the global 
marketplace.  This has often left indigenous peripheries cut off from the financial 
flows that fuel large-scale resource extraction.  Whereas globalization has bolstered 
indigenous groups’ political claims to self-determination and autonomy in the 
circumpolar international system, its effects on the region’s economic system have 
been mixed.  Instead of undercutting the biogeographical bifurcation that separates the 
region’s neo-European and non-European biomes, the economic sector has seen this 
ecologically-generated gap reinforced.576  In place of the tripartite division of state, 
colony, and hinterland, the Arctic now supports a simpler distinction between colonial 
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and neotraditional economic units – the former describing the region’s resource 
settlements, and the latter the nucleated indigenous archipelagos that now dot its 
imperial hinterlands. 
 
The Arctic is an increasingly important source of natural resources for the world 
market.  In 2003, its industrial enclaves had a combined GDP of $224 billion, 
equivalent to Malaysia.  This includes production of 10.5% of the world’s oil, 25.5% 
of its natural gas, 25% of its gem-quality diamonds, 20% of its industrial diamonds, 
and over ten percent of its nickel, cobalt, palladium, apatite, and platinum.  In the 
previous year, arctic flora and fauna contributed 10% of the world’s fish production, 
5.3% of its crustaceans, and almost 5% of its timber products.577  These levels, though 
impressive, are unevenly distributed across the region.  They are concentrated around 
relatively few bonanza resource deposits, whose size allows economies of scale to 
lower the cost of their exploitation.  In 2003, 75% of the Arctic’s total GDP came from 
Russia and Alaska, the most heavily colonized territories in the region.578  Of this total, 
oil and gas revenues accounted for half and a quarter of each jurisdiction’s 
contribution to regional GDP, with only public administration and military spending in 
Alaska reaching comparable levels.579   
 
This regional focus on the large-scale extraction of natural resources means that the 
Arctic economy is reliant on external economic actors for financing and marketing.580  
Its most productive industries tend to focus on single-resource operations organised 
along monopolistic lines, often in close partnership with the metropolitan state in a 
Fordist model of economic development.581  Because these operations rely almost 
entirely on goods and services imported from ghost acreage to the South, the region’s 
main economic drivers are extremely vulnerable to price and demand shocks in 
southern economies.  On its industrial archipelagos, economic structures describe a 
colonial economy in which people do not produce what they consume, consume only 
small amounts of what they produce, and rely on absentee capital to overcome the high 
costs of energy extraction in harsh and remote ecosystems.582 Around these islands of 
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colonial production and consumption stretch the neotraditional economies of the 
indigenous archipelagos that now dot the hinterland.  In these, subsistence activities 
remain a primary feature of people’s lives, providing much of the food and many of 
the materials they use.  Indeed, food from the land is one of the few import 
substitutions possible in the circumpolar North, with annual harvests amounting to 
around 120kg of meat per person in Canada, 185kg per person in Alaska, and 125kg in 
Kalaallit Nunaat.583 These economies share many aspects of their pre-modern 
forbearers, with a heavy emphasis on reciprocity and kinship to spread the risks and 
costs of Arctic life.584  This is not a simple reversion to earlier socio-economic forms.  
Rather, indigenous units have reactivated aspects of past technologies, reimagining 
them in such a way as to make them useful in new conditions.585   
 
This neotraditional economic system has been made possible by modern technology.  
The snowmobile has greatly expanded the range of subsistence lifestyles by allowing 
rapid journeys of more than 400km over ice and snow.  This mobility permits hunters 
to live a more settled existence, using their machines for daily ‘commutes’ to hunting 
sites and trap lines.  As high value goods, snowmobiles require several thousand 
dollars’ worth of capital.  Those with paying jobs are most likely to have access to 
sufficient funds, though they are least likely to have enough time to take full advantage 
of the technology.  The underemployed, meanwhile, have more time for subsistence 
pursuits but may lack the capital needed to buy or maintain their machines.586  Among 
the Dolgan of Siberia’s Taimyr Peninsula, the near total collapse of the cash economy 
and a widespread return to subsistence pursuits after 1991 has simultaneously made 
snowmobiles more desirable as hunting tools and more difficult to purchase.587  The 
state enterprise that organized hunters in the region, Taimyrskii, provided its members 
with hunting tools before the fall of the USSR.  Since 1991, the state’s capacity to 
equip Dolgan hunters has been severely restricted by the end of subsidies and the 
region’s poor integration with metropolitan and international markets for their 
products.  As a result, the fuel allowance per hunter has been reduced from one ton a 
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year, enough to cover all regular needs, to barely 170 litres in 1997, enough to travel 
only 500km.  Meanwhile, the average cost of a Russian snowmobile has increased 
from five months’ salary in 1991 to 50 months’ salary in 1997.588  The snowmobile 
economy therefore incentivized a return to traditional patterns of sharing in order to 
spread the burden of purchase and ownership even as the technology itself allowed 
greater numbers of indigenous people to live in relatively dense settlements near local 
transportation hubs.  Such a return to a neotraditional mode of production has become 
the rule throughout the Russian Arctic in the wake of 1991.589 
 
The reason for these two very different developmental pathways – one colonial, one 
neotraditional – has been the economic decoupling of the Arctic’s scattered industrial 
enclaves from the hinterlands that surround them.  As a result, the latter tend to be 
poorer than generalized regional statistics indicate, with higher levels of dependency 
and lower quality public services.  Though the Arctic’s indigenous people have 
experienced considerable improvements in their political status since 1970, these have 
not led to a sufficient reallocation of material resources to bring their standard of living 
into line with their metropolitan cores.590  The majority of the profits of resource 
extraction flow to European and neo-European financiers and consumers, leaping 
directly from industrial archipelagos to metropoles with little impact on intervening 
lands and peoples.591  Only a small percentage flows back to indigenous people 
through royalties and employment.  Thus, outside of the Khanty-Mansiiskiy and 
Nenets Autonomous Okugs – the primary oil producing regions of Western Siberia – 
life expectancy is twelve years lower than the Russian average, while rates of 
alcoholism, tuberculosis, hepatitis, and respiratory infections are between 1.5 and 2 
times higher.  In Greenland, the average Inuit in 1998 lived for 64 years, as compared 
to 76 years for a Dane living on the same island.  In rural Alaska, labour force 
participation rates in 1998 were 55% for men and 48% for women, as compared to 
national averages of 74% and 57%.  Among the indigenous people of Arctic Canada, 
social indicators show the gross inequalities in standards of living between core and 
periphery, with substance abuse levels up to twenty-four times higher than in southern 
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populations, compounded by an ongoing housing crisis in northern communities.592  
As one travels down the axes of ecological productivity, from the Yukon to the 
Northwest Territories to Nunavut, life expectancy drops, while self-harming behaviour 
and food insecurity rise.593  These disturbing statistics are indicative of the deep 
structural rifts that continue to separate the economic conditions of the Arctic’s 
industrial and neotraditional archipelagos. 
 
While the profits of resource extraction tend to flow out of the region, the costs 
associated with it remain behind, as the environmental damage done in the name of 
resource extraction is borne by local producers.  The nickel-producing enclave at 
Noril’sk once again provides an interesting case in point.  Since its construction by 
GULAG labour in the 1930s, it has become one of the most polluted cities in the 
world, destroying vast stretches of grazing land around its open pit mines and smelters, 
displacing Dolgan pastoralists and hunters even as its population of over 100,000 puts 
added pressure on local food supplies.594  Officials responsible for the grazing land of 
the neighbouring Taimyr Autonomous Okrug estimate that the city’s industrial 
combines released 24 million tons of pollutants into the tundra and Pyasina River in 
1995 after production had already declined from its Soviet-era peaks.595  This 
combination of socio-ecological pressures has compounded Dolgan subsistence 
problems: constricting the territory available for their herding and hunting while 
simultaneously reducing the number of alternative energy sources (fish, forest 
products) available to offset those losses.596  
 
The asymmetrical relationship between the Arctic’s internationalized colonial enclaves 
and local producers indicates the transnational impact of the region’s bifurcated 
biogeographical structure on its international systems.597  Whereas the Arctic’s 
colonial economies are necessarily international, linked to world markets and capital, 
its neotraditional economies remain local, with limited exposure to global markets and 
high levels of dependence on state support. In the latter, sustainability is a matter of 
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predictable state funding and reliable access to subsistence resources.  The transfer of 
the state’s redistributive power to the local level has therefore been a primary goal of 
its indigenous groups.598  In colonial economies, the state cooperates with absentee 
capital: international financiers who cover the high start-up, maintenance, and 
transportation costs associated with doing business in the Arctic.  These powerful but 
distant economic actors have become indispensable partners of metropolitan states, 
reminiscent of the great commercial imperial proxies of an earlier age.  Driven by their 
financial priorities to extract profit from the Arctic’s commodified resources, firms 
increasingly oppose efforts to empower local governments – indigenous or public – 
who may increase taxes and regulatory controls.599  The result has been an economic 
model based on planned and monopolistic development in which companies are given 
sole rights to specific economic resources and regions – producing goods for southern 
consumption and making profits for southern owners, with relatively few benefits 
accruing to local inhabitants.600   
 
These political and economic structures have produced an international political 
economy featuring two largely decoupled economic systems, each incentivizing a 
different political outcome.  For those in the local economy, strong local governments 
with powers of taxation and regulation are the best means to protect neotraditional 
lifestyles by stabilizing the state transfers on which they rely for trade and imports.  In 
the region’s colonial enclaves, absentee capital tends to oppose these very measures, 
which negatively impact profitability while accruing few benefits to southern 
investors.  This leaves the region with an international economic system strongly 
reminiscent of its early-modern, imperial predecessor: split between neo-European, 
trade-dependent colonial islands, and semi-autonomous but subordinate indigenous 
peripheries. 
 
*** 
 
The economic structure of the modern arctic international system differs from its 
political counterpart insofar as it continues to reflect patterns of colonial-indigenous 
and socio-ecological bifurcation.  Politically, the region is now inhabited by a 
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collection of territorially and ethnically defined imperial units holding a variety of 
domestic and international positions vis-à-vis their metropolitan capitals.  In fact, 
thanks to their ability to mobilise international and domestic recognition of their 
special standing, indigenous units often hold superior positions in the region’s 
asymmetric federal hierarchies.  The same is not true of its economic system.  In this 
lower-energy sector, large-scale resource industries have allowed the colonial 
archipelagos of the region’s early modern period to integrate closely into the global 
marketplace.  This has left indigenous archipelagos separated from the financial flows 
that fuel large-scale resource extraction at the region’s many bonanza deposits of oil, 
gas, minerals, and other natural commodities, leaving them to capture what they can 
from neotraditional economies that combine subsistence hunting and herding with a 
mixture of capital transfers from the state and wage labour in government offices or 
nearby industrial enterprises.  Thus, whereas globalization has bolstered indigenous 
groups’ claims to self-determination and autonomy in the circumpolar political system, 
its effects on the region’s economic system has been altogether different: reinforcing 
the dependence of former imperial hinterlands on the states and firms from whom their 
newfound political autonomy was meant to free them.  Instead of complicating and 
undercutting the biogeographical bifurcation that separates the region’s neo-European 
and non-European biomes, the second half of the twentieth century has seen this gap 
reinforced in the economic sector.601  Thus, in place of the division of neo-European 
and non-European units that described the imperial hierarchies of the early modern 
Arctic, the region’s international economic system now supports distinction between 
colonial and neotraditional economic actors. 
GEC and Socio-Ecological Coevolution: see ice? 
 
The structures that constrain actor behaviour in the contemporary Arctic international 
system mark the culmination of a 400-year process of Socio-Ecological Coevolution, 
illustrating the dynamic bond between human societies and the ecological systems in 
which they are embedded.  Despite advances in physical and social technology that 
have mediated the impact of Arctic ecology, its international units, processes, and 
structures remain constrained by their ecological contexts.  The slow transformation of 
these contexts over human lifespans has made them durable sources of stability for 
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their embedded international systems.   Throughout the depletion events associated 
with successive waves of resource extraction, the pandemics associated with imported 
pathogens, and the pollution associated with industrial activity, the biogeographical 
structure of the region has remained relatively stable – divided between non-European 
biomes and the neo-European southern, maritime, and riverine ecosystems.  This 
biogeographical structure has been a constant feature of the region since long before 
the late sixteenth century, shaping the units that inhabit it, the ways in which they 
relate to one another, and the structures that cause them to behave in ways that may be 
at odds with their internal processes.  While the region’s dominant states have lately 
attempted to bring these units, processes, and structures into line with global norms, 
the Arctic’s bifurcated ecology has caused the international system they constitute to 
remain regionally distinct – defined by principles of international membership and 
behaviour that describe an atypical hybrid system, including aspects of anarchic and 
hierarchic structure.  Global Environmental Change (GEC) promises to overturn 
aspects of this historically generated socio-ecological structure.  By altering the 
ecological context the circumpolar world, GEC may succeed where social and physical 
technologies have failed – redrawing the fundamental bases of region’s international 
system. 
 
Climate change is instigating a new chapter in the story of the Arctic by radically 
redrawing the contours of its ecology.  GEC is a product of the third principle of 
coevolution, in which the consequences of human action resonate down from 
individual to systemic levels of analysis.  The earliest consequences of Europeans’ 
arrival in the Arctic basin were felt at the level of individual organisms and ecological 
populations – the depletion of Siberia’s sable and the spread of European pathogens 
being two examples.  Humanity’s increasing technological sophistication has since 
seen ecological effects resonate down to the communities that inhabit different 
ecological sites and the chemical and physical systems that support them.  GEC results 
from these deeper effects, altering the composition and nature of the abiotic systems on 
which all Arctic ecology has heretofore rested.602 The potential impacts of these 
transformations are too many and varied to summarize here.  Instead, this Chapter will 
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conclude by looking at how a central aspect of this transformation – reduced sea ice 
cover in the Arctic Ocean – may affect the socio-ecological bases of circumpolar IR. 
 
Over the past fifty years, the Arctic has witnessed the most widespread warming on the 
planet, with surface temperature rising by as much as 5°C.603 This has had a major 
impact on the sea ice that caps the polar ocean and helps to regulate global 
temperatures.  The ice cap itself experiences an annual cycle of expansion and 
contraction from a winter maximum that covers the entire polar basin and Siberian 
shelf between Alaska and Kamchatka to a summer minimum that typically opens the 
coastlines of the Bering Strait, Baffin Bay, Kara Sea and Beaufort Sea. (see fig. 6.3) 
 
 
Figure 6.3 – Sea Ice conditions in March and September 2011, with the mean distribution for  
1979-2000 indicated by the magenta line.604 
 
Overall, summer sea ice cover has decreased by an average of 3% per decade over the 
last 20 years, with more than a 7% drop in multiyear ice over the same time span.  This 
means that even as the total area covered by ice shrinks, the average thickness of the 
ice that remains drops even more rapidly, making the ice pack increasingly vulnerable 
to summer melting. Apart from the dramatic feedback effects this may have on the 
global climatic system, this is having immediate impacts on the secondary state system 
of the circumpolar basin.605 
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These impacts will be particularly acute in respect to states’ territoriality as defined by 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  Signed in 1982, 
UNCLOS came into force in 1994, and includes all arctic littoral states except the 
United States of America.606  Its arctic provisions were born during the Cold War, 
when military confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union led to 
significant upgrades in states’ capacity to monitor and enforce their international 
boundaries in the region.  Submarine transits of the Northwest Passage (NWP) through 
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great 
Britain – together with a small but growing number of commercial transits by private 
foreign vessels – convinced Ottawa of the need for multilateral assurances of its 
sovereignty.607 This search for international legal recognition is now reaching its 
apogee with the extension of sovereign borders to the Pole under the terms of 
UNCLOS, replacing the imperial frontiers that have heretofore demarcated 
territoriality among the imperial international systems of the High Arctic.608   Taking 
advantage of technical advances in bathymetry, UNCLOS designates states’ rights to a 
200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with rights over the use and 
exploitation of subsurface mineral deposits – a boundary that can be extended to the 
limits of a state’s continental shelf.609  Metropolitan states have therefore used a 
combination of social technologies, like UNCLOS, and material technologies, 
including bathymetry and satellite imaging, to replace the graded frontiers of their 
imperial marches with the firmly demarcated borders that define Westphalian 
territoriality in the global international system. 
 
UNCLOS remains the only major piece international legislation to explicitly 
acknowledge ecology’s central role in international affairs.  Article 234 alters the 
treaty’s provisions based on the presence of land fast sea ice, allowing arctic states 
greater control over pollution and navigation in their region’s challenging ecological 
conditions.  It asserts that ‘Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the Exclusive 
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Economic Zone.’610  It is worth pausing to consider just how unusual this proviso is.  
Most international law, be it concerned with individual or collective actors, 
decontextualises the subjects and objects of its provisions, claiming that rights and 
responsibilities exist independently of where, when, or by whom they are called forth.  
This penchant for the anthropocentrism, which alienates individual and collective 
actors from their ecological contexts in order to grant them international rights or 
responsibilities, lies at the very heart of International Relations as both diplomatic 
practice and academic discipline.  Thanks to its recognition of ecological context, 
UNCLOS has already provided for some of the consequences of climate change in the 
Arctic.  If sea ice continues to diminish, waterways once protected by Article 234 will 
revert to the rules assigned to coastal states in the rest of the world.611  This will have 
particular impact for Canada and Russia, whose Northwest Passage (NWP) and 
Northern Sea Route (NSR) currently fall under 234’s special exemptions.  If, as 
predicted by the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, earlier melting and later freeze-up 
leads to steady reductions in sea ice, the multilateral means by which Canada in 
particular has sought to bolster its sovereignty claims over the NWP will be severely 
diminished as it loses the right to legislate the conditions under which shipping may 
use the straits linking the Beaufort Sea and the Atlantic.612 (see fig. 6.4)  Stripped of the 
protection afforded by the sovereignty bargain implicit in UNCLOS, arctic states will 
need to reinforce their material capability to monitor and dominate their seascapes, a 
process already underway in Denmark, Russia, and the United States in the late 1990s 
through the design and construction of new ice-capable ships to patrol their 
jurisdictions.  Possessing the least ice capable fleet of the littoral states Canada is in a 
particularly vulnerable position with regard to the effects of climate change on its 
position in international law.613  Having long relied on its own version of “General 
Winter” to protect its Arctic hinterlands, Ottawa will need to invest heavily in the tools 
of sovereignty if it is to maintain de facto control over its Arctic waterways.  Though it 
has made noises in that direction through a variety of government announcements, 
funding and results remain elusive. 
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Figure 6.4 – Map showing the 200-mile EEZ claims of the Arctic Basin and potential overlaps between states’ 
claims to their continental shelves, including the paths of the NWP and Northern Sea Route.614 
 
The impact of climate change on the Law of the Sea is indicative of a wider 
transformation to the circumpolar international system that may follow hard on the 
heels of melting sea ice: the emergence of the Arctic as a region of significant politico-
military interaction.  Until recently, the Arctic Ocean has acted as an ecological 
insulator, marking a zone of weak interaction “where larger regional security 
dynamics stand back to back.”615  The Arctic itself has rarely been an object of 
contention in military relations.  Rather, its strategic position as a crossroads between 
the Eastern and Western blocs made it a conduit for military force.616  Its role in the 
Cold War was largely limited to its air- and sea-space: the former being the preferred 
route for adversaries’ bombers and missiles, the latter being the natural hiding and 
hunting grounds for their ballistic missile and hunter-killer submarines.  Kenneth Eyre 
has said of the immediate post-1945 period that ‘neither the United States nor Canada 
looked to the North as a place to be protected because of some intrinsic value. Rather 
                                                
614 Ibid: 453 
615 Barry Buzan & Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: the structure of international security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003): 40-44.  Although politico-military interactions will undoubtedly increase in the 
Arctic, this is not enough to label it a ‘Regional Security Complex’ (RSC).  Because, in Buzan and Waever’s 
reading, regions are mutually exclusive in their memberships, states can only belong to one RSC at a time, (Ibid: 
48-49, 80-81.)  This leaves the Arctic’s main security concerns divided between those of the Post-Soviet, North 
American, and European RSCs – the main regional blocs to which the region’s metropolitan states belong. (Ibid: xvi 
[map]). 
616 Heininen (2004): 218-219. 
  P a g e  | 222 
 
it was seen as a direction, as an exposed flank.’617   Though the threats that emanated 
from across the Arctic Ocean were very real, the land and sea ice of the region 
remained lightly patrolled and defended.  In Canada, this patrolling has been done 
mainly through indigenous auxiliaries such as the Canadian Rangers – a paramilitary 
militia composed primarily of Inuit volunteers equipped and supported by the 
Department of National Defence – rather than by permanently stationed regular troops 
whose maintenance would be costly and whose value in defending the region’s vast, 
unpopulated landscapes would be negligible.618  The harkens back to the difficulties of 
maintaining politico-military units and systems in arctic and subarctic biomes, 
discussed with reference to the HBC’s Bayside posts and the problems of defending 
Russian America in Chapter Five. 
 
As the Arctic’s rapidly shrinking ice cover opens transportation and communications 
routes to more conventional naval and land operations, climate change is bound to 
have a very significant impact on the future shape of Arctic security.  By removing the 
ecological insulator that has divided the littoral states of the circumpolar basin, it will 
effectively shorten the distances between them and therefore increase their security 
interactions.  If ‘distance matters’, then the shrinking polar cap promises to 
revolutionize states’ ability to project military power into (rather than simply over and 
under) the Arctic.619  Moreover, it will present arctic states with a shared set of 
ecological threats, from melting permafrost to increased commercial shipping and 
potential environmental disasters.  The Arctic’s position as an emerging hydrocarbon 
producer will present Arctic states with significant challenges in terms of 
environmental security.620  It should come as no surprise that the region’s littoral states 
are scrambling to clarify their borders and tighten their control over territories and sea-
space.  Even Canada and Denmark, whose relationship in other security regions is 
completely amicable, have gone to great lengths to generate scientific support their 
rival claims to Hans Island, a 1.3km2 knob of rock in the middle of the Kennedy 
Channel at 80°N.621  When considered in conjunction with the socio-ecological 
                                                
617 Kenneth Eyre, ‘Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947-87’, Arctic 40(4) 1987, p. 294. 
618 Coates (2008): 103-107; P. Whitney Lackenbauer, ‘The Canadian Rangers: a “postmodern” militia that works’, 
Canadian Military Journal 6(4) 2007, pp. 49-59. 
619 Buzan & Waever (2003): xvi, 466. 
620 Huskey in Heininen & Southcott (2010): 60; Donald L. Gautier, et al., ‘Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas 
in the Arctic’, Science 324(1175) 2007, p. 1178. 
621 Grant (2010): 455-456; The Globe and Mail,"In the Arctic, Canada Willing to Fight to the True North Free" 
[online].  Accessed 25 Jan. 2011. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/in-the-arctic-canada-willing-to-
fight-to-keep-the-true-north-free/article1881683/>. 
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processes at play in circumpolar basin, it seems likely that metropolitan states are on 
course to play an ever-more significant role in the region over the coming decades, as 
providers of security, as partners with international firms in the exploitation of 
resources, and as twenty-first century metropoles to the Arctic’s resource hinterlands.  
 
Shrinking sea ice is not the only anticipated consequence of GEC in the Arctic.  The 
northward march of terrestrial climate zones, rising sea levels, and melting permafrost 
are among many other potential sources of socio-ecological change for the region’s 
international systems.622  Coevolution as presented and applied in this project is a tool 
with which to assess the impact of these interconnected ecological transformations on 
the Arctic’s international units and systems – a baseline understanding of which has 
been the main goal of the past three chapters.  With this baseline understanding 
established, future projects can spend less time in intellectual ground clearing and 
more in the application of an existing model to the empirical realities of GEC in the 
Arctic Basin.   
 
*** 
 
The future evolution of the Arctic international system is going to be heavily impacted 
by ecological changes brought on by anthropogenic climate change.  The purpose of 
this project is to establish tools and baselines from which such future research can 
begin.  However, it is impossible to resist a looking at some of the impacts likely to 
result from one of the many ecological changes on the way in the region.  Shrinking 
sea ice is probably the most widely-known of these impacts, being regularly reported 
in the news and photographed by satellites and documentary makers alike.  Its impacts 
on the structures of circumpolar IR will be varied.  In general, a reduction in sea ice 
will accelerate trends that have heretofore been driven by units’ application of 
technology – removing climatic insulators that have heretofore constrained systemic 
interaction between imperial systems in the polar basin. It will certainly force them to 
increase their efforts to exercise domestic and interdependence sovereignty in the 
region as the Arctic Ocean becomes increasingly accessible as a resource provider and, 
                                                
622 John Walsh et al., ‘Cryosphere and Hydrology’, in Hassol et al. (2005): 209-220, 230-236; Terry Callaghan et 
al., ‘Arctic Tundra and Polar Desert Ecosystems’, in Hassol et al. (2005): 287-314; Christensen et al. in Solomon et 
al. (2007): 903-906; Paul Lemke, Jiawen Ren et al. ‘Observations, Changes in Snow, Ice and Frozen Ground’, in 
Solomon et al. (2007): 369-373. 
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in time, a transportation corridor.  At the same time, although GEC promises to redraw 
many of the Arctic’s fundamental ecological truths, it is unlikely that the region will 
become a site for sustained and large-scale settlement in the near future.  This means 
that states will likely continue to rely on indigenous sub-state actors to occupy 
significant portions of the Arctic landscape as semi-autonomous units in highly 
asymmetric federal systems.  Thus, the region will continue to be defined by its hybrid 
international structures, whose evolution continues to be shaped by the interactions of 
its units with and within the ecological context of the circumpolar world. 
Conclusion 
 
The structures that constrain actor behaviour in the international system of the 
circumpolar world are both socially and ecologically constituted.  They are neither 
stable nor homogenous across space.  Like the biological populations described by 
Ecology, human units are constantly affecting and being affected by the ecological 
contexts in which they are embedded – generating an ongoing process of Socio-
Ecological Coevolution in which neither actor nor context ever reaches a stable 
equilibrium.  This has led to the evolution a hybrid international system in the Arctic 
Basin, defined by principles of membership and behaviour typical of both an anarchic 
states system and an imperial hierarchy.  This Frankenstein’s monster is made up of a 
functionally and hierarchically differentiated set of imperial international systems 
whose international relationships are centred on, but are certainly not reducible to, the 
metropolitan cores of their asymmetric federations.  The result is a collection of 
territorially and ethnically defined archipelagos of settlement, each in direct 
relationship to their post-imperial capital and possessing different levels of autonomy 
domestically and on the international stage.  The political economy of the system is 
simpler, closer to the old imperial hierarchy out of which contemporary international 
systems have evolved.  This is divided between colonial and imperial economies – the 
former largely metropolitan, the latter largely indigenous in it constitution.  The 
colonial economies do not consume what they produce or produce what they consume, 
relying instead on ghost acreage in more productive biomes for their sustainability. 
The imperial economies of the hinterland, on the other hand, have evolved 
neotraditional modes of production that combine subsistence with limited amounts of 
wage labour and government transfers – leaving them dependent on state support for 
their economic stability.  Thus, whereas the former tend to eschew state regulation, the 
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latter have actively pursued governing power in order to control their economic 
destiny.   
 
This structure has evolved in a relatively stable, transnational ecological context and 
reflects the deep biogeographical bifurcation that splits the region into neo- and non-
European biomes.  It is at the ecotones between these worlds – connected by the states 
that straddle them – and in the ecosystems most affected by climate change that these 
international units, processes, and structures will undergo their greatest crises and 
transformations.   This includes the borders of the Arctic ice pack, where frozen sea 
gives way to open water.  The northward march of this oceanic ecotone promises to 
rewrite many of the interactive processes that define the arctic region, boosting 
imperial systems’ interaction and ecological capacities.  This has already accelerated 
the attempts of metropolitan states to complete the transformation of their imperial 
frontiers into Westphalian borders, a process signified by their claims to seabed and 
maritime rights under UNCLOS.  It will likely also accelerate their politico-military 
interactions in the region, with effects that may see the polar basin become a seat of 
increasing military confrontation.  This seems unlikely in the near future given the 
continuing difficulty of operating in the High Arctic ecosystems that border the basin’s 
most contested areas.  In the longer term, however, and given the uncertainties implicit 
in climate modelling, it is entirely possible that anthropogenic climate change and the 
positive ecological feedback mechanisms it may trigger could accelerate much faster 
than currently predicted.  Further investigations of the effects of GEC on the units, 
processes, and structures of international systems in the Arctic will undoubtedly 
generate firmer conclusions, investigations for which Socio-Ecological Coevolution 
and the international system baselines developed over the past three chapters have 
been designed and carried out. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions: Coevolution in the Arctic, Imperial Systems, Regionalism, and Saharan-
Sahelian Africa  
 
 
This project is a response to a recognised need in the social and natural sciences to 
develop ‘standardised baseline human system data…; integrated multidisciplinary 
studies; [and]… regionally specific human vulnerability studies’ relating to the effects 
of anthropocentric climate change in the circumpolar Arctic.623  It is a need that 
International Relations – with its multidisciplinary interest in human systems, sectoral 
interactions, and regional studies – should be well placed to address.  Unfortunately it 
is a need to which IR’s current analytical approaches are unsuited, requiring the 
development of a new theoretical toolkit with which to assess the influence of 
planetary ecology on the evolution of the Arctic’s international systems. The preceding 
chapters have pursued this goal by integrating the central tenets of Environmental 
History into Buzan and Little’s world historical approach to the study of international 
systems, producing an analytical matrix capable of tracing the impact of Socio-
Ecological Coevolution on the international and ecological systems of the polar basin.  
After reviewing the reasons and framework behind the project, this concluding chapter 
will look at the implications of our socio-ecological analysis for the circumpolar 
world, revisit the difficult question of arctic states as evolving imperial systems, 
consider Ecology’s utility as a framework for regional studies in IR, and reflect on the 
applicability – and limitations – of Coevolution to international systems analysis in 
other parts of the world.   
 
Over the past forty years, Ecology’s understanding of the planetary ecosphere has 
increased in leaps and bounds, allowing it to describe the ongoing transformation of 
ecological systems with growing precision.  The four increasingly detailed and 
authoritative IPCC Assessment Reports produced since 1990, culminating in the most 
recent report in 2007, are good indicators of its progress.624  Over the same period, IR 
has developed an increasingly nuanced understanding of the human systems that 
                                                
623 Anisimov et al. in Parry et al. (2007): 677. 
624 Solomon et al. (2007); Parry et al. (2007); B. Metz et al. (Eds.) Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
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describe our relationships at the international scale.  From Liberal Institutionalism and 
Realism to Constructivism and the English School to Critical Theory and International 
Political Economy, IR now possesses a plurality of approaches to its subject matter.625  
Divided by the levels of analysis and sectors of interaction they describe, these 
approaches describe different aspects of the ‘set of sets’ that constitutes the global 
international system.  They also share a deep-seated anthropocentric worldview.  This 
ontological assumption divides humanity from the natural world, advocating the 
primacy of human agency and social structure in shaping and constraining the 
evolution of international units and systems.626  As discussed at the beginning of this 
project, IR’s anthropocentric turn in the second half of the twentieth century was an 
understandable reaction to the deterministic and pseudoscientific monocausal 
geopolitical theories of the early twentieth century, particularly those popular in Nazi 
Germany before and during the Second World War.627  This ontological decision, 
however, has come at a cost.  At a time when our discipline is beginning to grapple 
with the impact of GEC on international units, processes, and structures, 
anthropocentrism has stripped it of the capacity to account for the mutually 
constitutive historical relationships that bind human systems to the ecological contexts 
in which they are embedded.  This is a major failing in an age of anthropogenic 
climate change, when understanding this relationship in terms of its impact on 
international units and systems is becoming increasingly important.   
 
The preceding chapters have been an attempt to address IR’s anthropocentric blind 
spot.  Like other ontological choices, anthropocentrism presents a viewer with a 
specific impression of reality, emphasizing and masking different aspects of the world.  
For Buzan and Little, Bull and Watson, Tally and Wendt, the evolution of international 
systems is best understood by reference to their social (i.e. human) context.628  As a 
result, their analyses focus on socially-endogenous sources of stability and change.  
Theirs are among IR’s most successful descriptions of systemic evolution, and are far 
too valuable to jettison in favour of a revolutionary, ecocentric alternative.  Instead, I 
have proposed an approach aimed at improving IR’s ability to fold basic ecological 
concepts into existing narratives; concepts such as the coevolutionary relationships that 
                                                
625 Halliday (1994): 23-46; Buzan & Little (2000): 36-47. 
626 Martin Coward, ‘Against anthropocentrism: the destruction of the built environment as a distinct form of 
political violence’, Review of International Studies (32:3) 2007, pp. 420-421 
627 Buzan & Little (2000): 59; Chapman (2010): 2; Flint (2006): 20-23. 
628 See Bull & Watson (1984); Tilly (1992); Wendt (1999); Watson (2009). 
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bind human populations to the biological, chemical, and physical systems in which 
they are embedded.  Chapters Two and Three trace this middle path between social 
and environmental determinism.  Building down from the two-dimensional analytical 
matrix developed by Buzan and Little for their study of socially constituted 
international systems in world history, I propose the construction of a third axis along 
which to disaggregate and study systemic evolution in socio-ecological terms.  This 
highlights the context in which our objects of study are embedded, bringing Ecology in 
from the cold by opening a conceptual space in which to integrate socio-ecological 
relationships into existing IR analysis.  The framework constructed in Chapter Three 
therefore encases IR’s social narratives within a wider and older set of socio-ecological 
relationships, giving students and practitioners the option and ability to integrate 
ecological factors into their work.  
 
 Economic Political Societal 
Individual IC/P/S IC/P/S IC/P/S 
Unit IC/P/S IC/P/S IC/P/S 
System IC/P/S IC/P/S IC/P/S 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 – Embedding Buzan and Little’s socially constituted analytical matrix [A] in its ecologically context, 
generates a three-dimensional matrix [B], transforming interaction capacity (IC), social process (P), and social 
structure (S) into their socio-ecological counterparts [ecological capacity (EC), coevolutionary process (C), and 
biogeographical structure (BG)].  629 
 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the effects of this move, which transforms the three sources of 
explanation by which Buzan and Little trace the social constitution of international 
systems in world history.  Thanks to their new ecological context, interaction capacity, 
                                                
629 Adapted from Buzan & Little: 77. Note that the subunit and subsystem levels continue to exist between the 
levels of analysis listed in both matrices. 
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(interactive) process, and (social) structure are recast as ecological capacity, 
coevolutionary process, and biogeographical structure: alternative sources of 
international behaviour whose influence has fundamentally affected the evolution of 
international systems around the world. 
 
Chapters Four to Six apply this analytical toolkit to analyse the evolution of 
international units, processes, and structures in Siberia and arctic North America – a 
region of the planet currently experiencing rapid and large-scale anthropogenic 
changes to its ecology.  As argued by the IPCC, it is imperative that we understand the 
likely impact of these changes on human systems if we are to successfully adapt to 
them.630  The taiga, tundra, and oceanic biomes that constitute the Arctic are 
experiencing the most powerful warming trends on the planet, with localized 
temperature increases of up to 5°C above the 1979-2000 average.631  These promise to 
radically alter the ecological contexts in which international units, processes, and 
structures are embedded.  Understanding the likely impact of GEC on circumpolar IR 
therefore requires that we understand the coevolutionary relationship between the 
region’s international and ecological systems.  This study finds that the evolution of 
the contemporary international system in the 270° arc extending westward from the 
Denmark Strait to the Ural Mountains has been driven by tensions arising from the 
overlay of largely European units, processes, and structures – with their origins in the 
temperate and productive ecosystems of Northwestern Eurasia – on pre-international, 
indigenous antecedents – which evolved locally in the thoroughly non-European 
biomes of the taiga and tundra.  The interaction of these ill-fitted units, systems, and 
contexts has produced convergent and divergent evolutionary dynamics that have 
helped to constitute the Arctic’s hybrid international system, which resembles both a 
set of imperial hierarchies and an anarchic states-system. 
Ecological Analysis: GEC and International 
Systems 
 
This project’s 450-year historical investigation of Socio-Ecological Coevolution in the 
circumpolar Arctic identifies several compelling evolutionary dynamics.  These 
                                                
630 Anisimov et al. in Parry et al. (2007): 655. 
631 Martin Sommerkorn & Susan Hassol, eds. Arctic Climate Feedbacks: global implications, (Oslo: WWF 
International Arctic Programme) 2009: 10; Anisimov et al. in Parry et al. (2007): 656. 
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include a direct correlation between a site’s ecological productivity and the principles 
that define its international units and systems; a refined understanding of the 
relationship between physical and social context in shaping the adaptations pursued by 
international units, processes, and structures; and a potentially generalizable 
explanation of the role of biogeographical structure in shaping the political and 
economic networks that help constitute the global international system.  It has also 
thrown up a potential stumbling block, however.  As implied by the fourth principle of 
Coevolution, socio-ecological effects are most visible where ecological factors are at 
their most influential: in extreme ecosystems and in regions inhabited by relatively 
undifferentiated and technologically unsophisticated social groups.  This may limit 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution’s effectiveness when used to analyse technologically 
sophisticated units and systems in relatively temperate biomes, limiting its reach to a 
few relatively extreme ecological settings.  This section will look at each of these 
points in turn. 
Ecological Capacity & International Systems 
First, there appears to be a direct correlation between international units’ and systems’ 
Ecological Capacity (EC) and their ability to maintain dense populations and/or 
hierarchically and functionally differentiated organisations.  When considered from the 
perspective of Ecology, this link is neither surprising nor controversial.  Humanity and 
its various geographical and social subgroupings constitute a number of biological 
populations – groups of individuals of a single species inhabiting a specific area.  We 
are one species among the ~8 million that are thought to inhabit the planet, each of 
which can be subdivided into subordinate populations on the basis of location and/or 
behaviour.632  The collective actors whose inside-outside distinctions define the 
international as a spatial scale align well with this ecological definition of man in the 
world, with the overarching international system being constituted by a collection of 
overlapping and interacting human populations that together form a global ‘set of 
sets’.633  In Ecology, a population’s defining characteristics, including the number of 
individuals who compose it (its abundance), are affected by two categories of factor: 
(i) variations in the population’s physical environment, and (ii) behavioural 
adaptations undertaken to address those environmental challenges and opportunities.634  
                                                
632 C. Mora et al., ‘How Many Species Are There on Earth and in the Ocean?’ PLoS Biology 9(8) 2011, p. 2. 
633 Braudel (1982): 458-499; Chaudhuri (1990): 430-431. 
634 Molles (1999): 164, 221-224. 
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These twin influences have been picked up by various members of the academy 
beyond Ecology and Environmental History.  These include environmental 
archaeologists, whose goal is ‘the study of the past environments of man’ in order to 
determine the relationship between cultures and ecologies.635  Anthropology was 
another early adopter of coupled environmental and behavioural change as an 
explanatory device to explain the human past, generating the subfields of 
environmental anthropology, cultural ecology, and human ecology.636  Ecological 
analyses in the social sciences are now being transformed by ‘New Ecology’, 
discussed in Chapter Three, which denies the existence of stable equilibria in the 
natural world.  Though quickly accepted in the natural sciences, New Ecology has 
been slower in taking root in on the social side of the scientific divide, where many 
disciplines continue to view the natural world as a static or slowly depleting backdrop 
against which human drama plays out.637  The need to move beyond homeostatic 
renderings of ecological reality in IR has therefore been a driving motivation behind 
the dynamic coevolutionary framework adopted in chapters Two and Three.   
 
Returning to our original point, EC is defined by the combined impact of local 
ecological productivity, measured in terms of NPP, and the physical and social 
technologies available for its use and subsidization.  This combination of social and 
ecological factors affects the levels of social complexity that any ecologically 
embedded unit or system can maintain in a given physical environment, impacting its 
population size, social hierarchies, and functional divisions of labour.638  The key point 
here is that units’ and systems’ defining characteristics – the principles of membership 
and behaviour that describe their constitutions – cannot be fully understood without 
reference to the ecological and the social contexts in which they evolve.  When 
combined with mankind’s perceptible impact on the planet’s ecological systems, this 
double movement captures our constitutive relationship with the natural world in 
which we live and of which we are a part, avoiding the monocausal determinism that 
plagued previous attempts to integrate environmental factors with descriptions of 
                                                
635 J.G. Evans, An Introduction to Environmental Archaeology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); Butzer 
(1982): 5; Karl Butzer & Georgina Endfield, ‘Critical Perspectives on Historical Collapse’, PNAS 109(10) 2012, p. 
3628. 
636 J.W. Bennett, The Ecological Transition: Cultural Anthropology and Human Adaptation (New York: Pergamon, 
1976): Ch. 3; Amos H. Hawley, Human Ecology: a theoretical essay (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986): 
1-4. 
637 Scoones (1999): 481-486.  See also Norgaard (1994); Zimmerer (1994). 
638 Tainter (1988): 37-38; Simmons (1997): 17; Tainter (2006), p. 92; Tainter (2011), pp. 89-90. 
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human behaviour.  Likewise, it undoes the damage inflicted on the historical record by 
anthropocentrism.  There is, in reality, no ecological veil of ignorance behind which 
international units and systems develop before stepping, fully grown, into the world.  
As historically constituted entities, units’ and systems’ defining principles of 
membership and behaviour evolve in response to pressures emanating from both sides 
of the socio-ecological equation.  As a result, their development cannot be properly 
understood without reference to both contexts.  Though potentially useful as 
simplifying tools, neither social nor ecological determinism can produce an accurate 
mapping of international evolution at the unit- or systems-level insofar as each reflects 
only one half of the total environment that drives our adaptations.   
 
Ecological Capacity is therefore a useful tool precisely because it incorporates a 
combination of ecological and social factors to describe a unit’s or system’s ability to 
sustain complexity in a given ecological milieu.  As the preceding chapters have 
shown, the imperial states that today inhabit and help to define the hybrid international 
system of the Arctic Basin have evolved higher levels of hierarchical and functional 
differentiation alongside their growing EC.  Each began as an imperial international 
system in its own right, incorporating thinly dispersed and largely autonomous 
indigenous populations into the Russian, British, Danish, and later American and 
Canadian empires through hub-and-spoke systems of indirect rule.  Such indirectly 
ruled territories were common features of Europe’s hierarchic imperial systems, which 
frequently used indigenous and corporate proxies to administer domestic sovereignty 
over far-flung imperial territories in which the state’s limited EC made direct rule 
through bureaucratic or military occupation unsustainable.639  Only when rapid 
increases to EC were made possible by revolutionary leaps in material technology in 
the early- and mid-twentieth century were the Arctic’s metropoles able to tighten and 
formalize their holds on their non-European hinterlands, redrawing their imperial 
frontiers as clearly demarcated borders and transforming their imperial systems of 
indirect rule into asymmetric federations with qualities reminiscent of the ideal 
Westphalian state. 
                                                
639 Herfried Münkler, Empires: the logic of world domination from Ancient Rome to the United States (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2007): 22-28; Motyl (1999):118-120, 124-130; Lieven (2002): 29-30. 
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Convergent & Divergent Patterns of Coevolution 
A second finding of the preceding chapters is that Coevolution can provide a refined 
understanding of the relationship between social and ecological factors in the evolution 
of international social systems.  As has already been argued, the complexity of 
international units and systems will generally covary alongside (i) the productivity of 
the biomes in which they are embedded and (ii) the technological complexity they are 
able to bring to bear to mobilize or supplement local energy resources.  In the 
circumpolar Arctic, this has meant that population sizes, hierarchies, and divisions of 
labour have tended to increase along the three axes of increasing ecological 
productivity first described in Chapter Four.  These run from North to South, from 
continental to maritime climates, and from tributary uplands to mature river valleys 
and coastlines.   For the imperial systems of the circumpolar basin, the presence of 
these axes within their boundaries has created a source of divergent evolution, driving 
the development of different principles of membership and behaviour across the neo-
European and non-European biomes they straddle.  As a result, the inside-outside 
distinctions that define the Arctic’s imperial states are cut across by a transnational 
socio-ecological bifurcation that traces the northern limits of both neo-European 
ecological conditions and neo-European settlement.  This pattern is interrupted by 
trade-dependent neo-European islands and archipelagos – boom towns that use 
commodities from bonanza deposits of natural resources to sustain themselves in spite 
of their natural surroundings. 
 
The different principles of membership and behaviour that exist on either side of the 
Arctic Basin’s socio-ecological bifurcation mark a transition from Westphalian (neo-
European) to imperial (non-European) international structures, with the latter 
describing relations between metropolitan states – in the sociological sense intended 
by Theda Skocpol640 – and the peoples and territories of their subordinate non-
European biomes.  In all of these imperial systems, these structures are the product of 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution.  By constituting a region-wide and relatively stable set 
of biomes in and across which the Arctic’s imperial states have had to expand, the 
biogeographical structure of the circumpolar basin has contributed to their convergent 
evolution around the principles of membership and behaviour associated with a hybrid 
imperial-anarchic secondary states system.  At the same time, socialization – a 
                                                
640 Skocpol (1979): 29. 
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socially-contextualized IR concept that explains the dynamics by which international 
units emulate one another’s successful adaptations – has played a homogenizing role: 
encouraging imperial systems to adapt and adopt one another’s successful strategies of 
imperial integration.641  These range from Tsarist Russia’s emulation of the HBC in 
Russian Alaska to the Canadian Inuit learning from and expanding on the land claims 
agreements won by Alaskan natives in ANCSA and the Greenlandic Inuit in the Home 
Rule Bill.   Together, these ecological and social factors have produced a set of parallel 
adaptations among the units and systems of the circumpolar North, combining to split 
the Arctic’s imperial systems along socio-ecological ecotones that describe the limits 
of their metropoles’ neo-European political and economic systems.642 
Biogeographical Structure & the Global International 
System 
Third, there is reason to suspect that biogeographical structures in other regions of the 
world can have similar effects to those of the Arctic: creating socio-ecological 
bifurcations that cut across units’ and systems’ boundaries to affect their defining 
principles of membership and behaviour.  When viewed in this light, the bands and 
pockets that describe the planet’s biomes take on new meaning, threatening the 
homogeneity of the units they divide and putting otherwise disparate units on 
convergent evolutionary pathways. (See figure 7.2)  
 
 
Figure 7.2 – An ecologically contextualized map of the international political system643 
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Most of the global system’s dominant political units – states – straddle more than one 
biome.  Indeed, the only states to enjoy relatively homogenous biogeographical 
structures at this broad spatial scale are those of western and northern Europe.  It is 
interesting to note that it was in this relatively homogenous and temperate ecoregion 
that the global international system’s dominant principles have their origins. States 
located elsewhere, including those of the Arctic Basin, have had to adapt to the 
biogeographical conditions in which they are embedded.  The Arctic’s experiences of 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution may therefore hold clues to the effects of 
biogeographical structure in other regions of the globe.  
 
As we have seen over the past three chapters, the Arctic’s bifurcated biogeographical 
structure has encouraged the construction of imperial international systems centred 
Moscow, Washington, Ottawa and Copenhagen.  These systems have subordinated 
semi-autonomous units located in peripheral arctic and subarctic biomes to their 
European and neo-European metropoles via ‘hub and spoke’ imperial systems in 
which subordinate actors’ international relations have become dependent on, but still 
not wholly reducible to, those of the core.644  Thanks to the mediating influence of 
modern physical technologies and their metropoles’ access to significant neo-European 
ghost acreage, the Arctic’s hybrid state-systems have been able to take on increasingly 
Westphalian characteristics over the past century, with imperial frontiers slowly 
transforming into clearly demarcated state borders.  However, even the powerful 
metropolitan states that inhabit the region – Russia, the United States, Canada, and 
Denmark – have been unable to fully escape the constraints imposed by their physical 
environments.  Thus, rather than the classic state structures associated with the 
exercise of Westphalian sovereignty and typical of their European and neo-European 
territories, capitals’ arctic and subarctic peripheries remain integrated by means of 
highly asymmetric federations.  These higher-energy variants of the hub and spoke 
model represent a reimagining of imperial systems for the twenty-first century, with 
arctic hinterlands continuing to occupy the most subordinate positions in their 
respective federations.  This has left the polar region balanced between imperial and 
Westphalian international units, processes, and structures, encompassing both 
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hierarchic and anarchic organising principles.  Could the same hold true for other, 
similarly structured regions of the globe? 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7.2, most of the units and regions of the post-colonial world 
vary from Europe’s ecologically homogenous ideal.  Instead of occupying relatively 
homogenous and temperate physical environments, they straddle ecological 
bifurcations that split them between two or more major biomes.  Faced with these 
transnational biogeographical structures, states must adapt their social technologies to 
address the challenges and opportunities of their different ecological contexts.  
Alongside socialisation, shared ecological contexts may lead to the evolution of similar 
units, processes, and structures among initially dissimilar actors.645  In socio-ecological 
terms, there appears to be a marked correlation between the neo-European biomes of 
the planet and significant concentrations of political and economic power.  Limiting 
ourselves to true ‘neo-Europes’ – temperate broadleaf forests, temperate steppes, 
regions of Mediterranean vegetation and montagne forests – produces an interesting 
image of the core of the global international system that incorporates Old Europe, a 
large section of North America, northeast China and Korea, central and northern 
Japan, the Rio del Plata, coastal sections of the Mediterranean basin, and segments of 
South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.  The addition of subtropical rainforests – 
which support important non-European food crops such as rice – expands the range of 
‘core’ biomes to include the remainder of eastern China and southern Japan, along 
with parts of southeast Asia and southeast Brazil.  Thanks to the application of 
sophisticated physical technology – such as in India’s ‘Green Revolution’ – arguments 
can be made for the addition of still more biomes to the list, particularly monsoon 
forests.  This leaves us with a map of neo-Europes that covers a significant portion of 
the globe, accounting for approximately a third of the planet’s landmass.646   At the 
global scale, there is a definite correlation between the presence of such biomes and a 
region’s position in or near the core of the international system.  This is not because 
productive ecosystems make for productive people – the sort of monocausal 
determinism against which IR turned in 1945.  Rather, it is a function of the 
Coevolution of human societies and their physical environments.  In this historical 
process, human societies have adapted their physical and social technologies to the 
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ecological conditions of their immediate surroundings, permitting the development of 
complex units and systems in biomes capable of supporting large populations, 
hierarchies, and divisions of labour.  The transnational distribution of these biomes has 
since contributed to successful processes of socialisation by enabling the spread of 
productive units, processes, and structures.  The resulting large-scale distribution of 
socio-ecological cores and peripheries is a consequence of the coevolutionary process 
first identified by Alfred Crosby in relation to Europe’s imperial age.647 
 
It is worth considering how GEC may alter this situation.  Remembering Joseph 
Tainter, the rise and fall of social complexity in the historical record has been affected 
by the introduction of new technologies, by resource exhaustion, and by large-scale 
environmental changes.  These can bring new biomes into play, exhaust the 
productivity of those already producing, and radically alter the utility of existing 
technological adaptations, affecting the sustainability of embedded units and 
systems.648  Sophisticated physical and social technologies have permitted post-
colonial states to bridge some of the socio-ecological gaps that divide them by 
wringing more energy from once-marginal ecosystems or allowing processes like trade 
to subsidize their energy deficits. Until the advent of anthropogenic climate change, 
however, few technological fixes have altered the transnational biogeographical 
structures on which these gaps are based.649  As result, divergent evolutionary 
pressures have continued to emanate from units’ bifurcated ecological contexts, 
constraining the ability of the non-European world to emulate Europe’s international 
units, processes, and structures.  As climate change shifts the ecological fault lines of 
the Arctic Basin northward, it will likely ease integration between the non-European 
periphery and the neo-European core by transforming the biogeographical structure of 
the former to more closely resemble that of the latter.650 Elsewhere, as we shall see in 
our discussion of Saharan-Sahelian Africa, the future is much less certain and climate 
change may actually deepen the biogeographical bifurcations that split some of the 
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world’s post-colonial states and the systems they inhabit.  Until more detailed work is 
done to integrate regional ecological models into the coevolutionary framework 
presented in this project, such hypotheses remain tentative in the extreme.  However, 
they present an interesting opportunity for future research into the global and regional 
distribution of core-periphery dynamics in the international system that may 
complement and enrich IR’s existing anthropocentric narratives. 
Limitations and Caveats 
Though it promises to enrich IR’s existing understanding of international units, 
processes, and systems, Coevolution is not a panacea.  The approach as it is currently 
constructed has been designed to deal with the international units and systems of the 
circumpolar Arctic: one of the most extreme ecological regions on the globe.  As the 
four principles of Coevolution imply, the impact of ecology on social systems will be 
most visible when ecological constraints on social evolution are considerable and/or 
when embedded human societies lack sophisticated social and physical technology 
with which to access and supplement local energy resources.  Coevolution is therefore 
best suited to analyse regions that share the Arctic’s dramatic ecological divisions.  
This does not mean that only units and systems in the polar basin can be considered.  
Rather, the regions best suited to the current approach straddle two or more distinctive 
ecological regimes.  As indicated in the previous section, Coevolution predicts that 
international systems – be they hierarchic or anarchic, regional or global – will likely 
see units in relatively neo-European biomes dominate others through some 
combination of indirect rule and direct hegemonic control.  Thanks to its current focus 
on discontinuities in regional ecological structures, Coevolution has less to say about 
homogenously structured biogeographical spaces beyond predicting the presence of a 
much more homogenously distributed sets of organizing principles among their 
embedded international units and systems.  This in itself is an interesting conclusion 
insofar as the global international system, and the principles of membership and 
behaviour that define and bound it, originated in just such a region of the world.  
However, given the heterogeneous makeup of the ecosphere and this author’s still-
rudimentary grasp of its functions within a coevolutionary narrative of international 
systems history, such hypotheses remain purely speculative and require further study. 
 
Similar difficulties arise when Coevolution is applied to highly complex units and 
systems, whose relationship with their ecological context is mediated by sophisticated 
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social and/or physical technology.  This technological sophistication may allow them 
to mediate many of the limitations imposed by their ecological surroundings, leaving 
the ecological side of the socio-ecological equation effectively buried until such time 
as either the units/systems involved collapse back to a less sophisticated technological 
condition or their ecological context transforms so as to drastically reduce the utility of 
existing technological adaptations.  Although history is littered with examples of (and 
with books about) civilizations that have undergone some form of technological 
‘collapse’, reducing their absolute level of social and material complexity, it seems an 
unlikely prospect in the short- to medium-term.651  A more likely danger is that some 
large-scale ecological transformation driven by anthropogenic climate change may 
alter the utility of existing adaptations.  As experts around the world admit, the impact 
of the present warming trends on the planet’s many ecosystems and climate regimes is 
impossible to predict with absolute certainty.  The more disturbing near-term 
possibilities range from a dramatic intensification of flood and drought regimes that 
undermine existing agricultural processes, to a sea level rise of over two meters that 
puts low-lying coastal units at risk, to abrupt and large-scale changes to climate 
patterns that could disturb the ecological structures on which oceanic fisheries and 
terrestrial agricultural production rely.652  However, even such radical transformations 
of the physical environment may not undermine the technological foundations of the 
units and systems at the core of contemporary IR, whose complexity – though costly – 
may allow them to escape significant harm.   
Hierarchic and Anarchic International Systems 
 
One of the difficulties faced by this project has been the fact that the states of the 
circumpolar Arctic, whose borders are meant to define the ‘international’ as a scale 
and IR as a discipline, do not conform to the principles of membership and behaviour 
that define sovereign statehood in the core of the global international system.  As such, 
I have had to make a relatively complicated argument that each of the states of the 
circumpolar world possesses the qualities of both a sovereign state and a hierarchic 
international system.  Russia, the United States, Canada, and Kalaallit-
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Nunaat/Denmark have evolved out of imperial international systems in which 
metropolitan capitals – in Moscow and St. Petersburg, Washington, London and 
Ottawa, and Copenhagen – have acted as ‘hubs’ around which various non-European 
polities have been organised in a hierarchic system.  Each of these has since evolved 
toward, but not achieved, a form of sovereign statehood that resembles the global 
international system’s Westphalian ideals.  They have done so by reconstituting 
themselves as asymmetric federations in which the central government possesses an 
increasing degree of control over relatively well-demarcated borders and a varying 
degree of control over the local political and economic affairs of its non-European 
peripheries.  This situation has been made more complex by the fact that every Arctic 
state expresses the classical characteristics of sovereign statehood over portions of 
their territory that are ecologically neo-European.  In these regions, ‘hard’ territoriality 
and sovereign control conform closely to global principles of membership and 
behaviour.  In their non-European ecosystems, however, these characteristics have 
been liable to break down and be replaced by much more permeable forms of 
territoriality and constrained forms of sovereignty, resulting in the hybrid units and 
systems described in Chapter Six.653 
 
If the principles of sovereignty and territoriality used by ecologically bifurcated states 
to organize their power are not homogenously spread over the biomes and ecotones 
they straddle, how should they and the systems constituted by their interactions be 
characterized? Throughout this project, regular references have been made to 
asymmetric core-periphery relationships in the hybrid international political and 
economic systems of the circumpolar world.  These have been described in imperial 
terms, harkening back to Michael Doyle’s definition of empire as ‘a system of political 
interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts 
political control over the internal and external policy – the effective sovereignty – of 
the other, the subordinate periphery.’654  A useful expansion of this definition is 
provided by David Lake, who refers to informal empires as combining ‘both security 
and economic hierarchy, with the subordinate polity ceding some, but not all authority 
to the dominant state in both arenas.’655  Lake’s definition is particularly useful insofar 
as it expands the range of sectors to which imperial relationships can be applied and 
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opens space in which substate actors, such as the Regional Native Corporations of 
Alaska or the Home Rule Government of Kalaallit-Nunaat, might be considered semi-
autonomous imperial actors on the international stage.  It is also reminiscent of the 
imperial hierarchies described in Chapter Six, in which international relationships are 
‘centred on, but certainly not reducible to, states possessing sovereignty in the 
Westphalian model.’656  Though often masked under the title of ‘states’, informal 
imperial systems continue to exist in parts of the world where ‘sub-state’ imperial 
peripheries possess (i) an international legal personality, and (ii) nominally 
independent governments.  Even harder to locate than these informal imperial systems 
are formal empires, whose peripheral sub-state units possess neither ‘international 
legal personality nor a nominally independent government’ and ‘ultimate authority is 
vested in the imperial centre’, giving them a very state-like appearance.657 The 
existence, however imperfect, of the obshchina in the Russian federation, of 
constitutional guarantees of tribal sovereignty in the United States, of direct treaty 
relations between first nations and the Crown in Canada, and of devolved territorial 
governance in Kalaallit Nunaat are evidence of these informal and formal imperial 
arrangements in the circumpolar North.  Herfried Münkler sums up the difficulty of 
identifying imperial orders in a formally statist international system when he explains 
that,  
 
Since the whole habitable surface of the Earth has been organized in the form of 
states… imperial structures are superimposed on the state order, but they no longer 
replace it.  This sometimes makes it difficult to identify an empire. Whoever thinks of 
imperiality as simply an alternative to statehood will come to the conclusion that no 
empires exist today.   Whoever, on the contrary, proceeds from the superimposition of 
imperial structures on the state order will encounter structures of power and influence 
not identical to those of the state.658 
 
It is these non-state and imperial structures, conditioned by coevolutionary processes 
and the biogeographical structures of the planetary ecosphere, which define the Arctic 
international system as a hybrid of hierarchic and anarchic orders. 
 
As ever, Martin Wight can shed considerable light on this confusing hybrid of units 
and systems.  In his discussion of different forms of state systems, he recognizes that 
some systems can be suzerain in the sense that a metropolitan core acts as ‘the sole 
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source of legitimate authority, conferring status on the rest and exacting tribute or 
other marks of deference.’659  As examples, he points to Imperial China and, more 
importantly for our purposes, the British Raj in India, which ‘asserted an authority 
over the 600-odd native princes which was so effective that the Raj appears an extreme 
example of what we are discussing.’660  British and, later, Canadian rule over the first 
nations of the taiga and tundra followed a similar course insofar as the treaty relations 
between them recognized indigenous groups’ nominal autonomy and bounded them as 
collective actors while at the same time subjugating them to the executive branch of 
government in return for specific privileges and payments.  In Tsarist and modern 
Russia, much the same is true with reference to the Small Peoples of the North, as it is 
with the Native Americans of Alaska.  Each group is involved in different state-centred 
suzerain state systems that, taken together, constitute the secondary states-system of 
the circumpolar world.661 
 
An ecological analysis of international units and systems therefore helps to explain 
why international systems in the Arctic can be so difficult to identify as either 
sovereign or imperial, either anarchic or hierarchic.  One answer lies in the fact that 
the units and systems being described are never ecologically homogenous.  As 
indicated by our discussion of New Ecology in Chapter Three, homogeneity does not 
exist at any spatial scale in the Earth’s natural systems.  Because the international units 
and systems under investigation in this project straddle ecological gradients between 
biomes, the social principles by which they are bounded and organized will vary across 
space and time.  Thanks to the influence of Socio-Ecological Coevolution on their 
historical development, international systems’ organizing principles will tend to mirror 
the ecological systems in which they are embedded.  States, non-state actors, process, 
and structures in the Arctic Basin are socio-ecological constructs, products of the 
interaction of human populations with and within the region’s bifurcated 
biogeographical structure.  
 
Returning to Figure 7.2, international units and systems straddle transnational ecotones 
that cut across their neat, socially constituted boundaries.  Thanks to the coevolution of 
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human populations and the biological, chemical, and physical systems in which they 
are embedded, these transnational divisions mark transitional zones that divide human 
populations’ ecological and social contexts.  They are socio-ecological ecotones and 
indicators of a global pattern of ecological imperialism: a process in which 
ecologically productive sites and biomes attract the most complex units and systems 
and thereby affect the shape and character of international units and systems.662  
Thanks to their denser populations and their more developed hierarchies and divisions 
of labour, these complex actors are able to mobilize significant financial and human 
capital to reproduce themselves and subordinate the populations of less productive 
biomes.663  This combination of Charles Tilly’s theory of state development, Joseph 
Tainter’s theory of social complexity, and Alfred Crosby’s theory of Europe’s 
ecologically-driven imperial expansion adds to our understanding of how and why the 
modern international system of the circumpolar North remains stubbornly caught 
between states and empires, units and systems, anarchy and hierarchy. 
Ecology & Regionalism 
 
The preceding socio-ecological analysis has been closely related to the idea of regions: 
territorial sub-sets within the global international system which differ from dominant 
norms in terms of the principles of membership and behaviour that define their 
boundaries and interactions.664  In his classic rendering of regions, David Grigg 
associates regional identification with classification – the process of ‘grouping objects 
into classes on the basis of properties or relationships they have in common.’665  This 
can be accomplished on the basis of differentiating characteristics: properties that 
separate a ‘class’ from a larger universe of individuals.  If properly selected, a class’s 
differentiating characteristics should covary with other properties that identify it as a 
population distinct from the larger whole.  If these ‘accessory characteristics’ mirror 
the divisions produced by the differentiating characteristic, they help to solidify the 
class’s claim to a distinct regional identify.   IR has utilized many differentiating 
characteristics as bases for its regional divisions.  Martin Wight’s oft-quoted statement 
that we ‘must assume that a states-system will not come into being without a degree of 
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cultural unity among its members’ provides a socio-cultural basis for regional 
identification without reference to ecology or non-human factors.666  Buzan bases his 
division of the world on a different – if still anthropocentric – set of characteristics 
centred on the heterogeneous principles of behaviour and membership that are present, 
absent, or expressed differently at the regional level.667  These include the particular 
varieties of unit expressed at a spatial scale below that of the international system, 
foreshadowing this project’s conclusion that the Arctic is a region defined – at least in 
part – by its resident imperial states: units whose evolution has been fundamentally 
affected by the physical contexts in which they have developed. 
 
As it has developed, this project has used ecological structures as primary 
differentiating characteristics to identify the Arctic region.  The fact that these covary 
with the principles of membership and behaviour that define international units and 
systems strengthens the project’s claim that Ecology can serve as a useful organizing 
device in the study of IR. In methodological terms, this project has employed the 
biogeographical structure of the ecosphere as the primary differentiating principle on 
which to base its regional mapping.  Instead of building its ‘class’ from a universe of 
autonomous individuals, however, it has begun with a single category that shares a set 
of common characteristics – the global international system. It has then separated out a 
subset of that totality (the regional Arctic international system) on the basis of its 
chosen differentiating characteristic (its biogeographical structure).  The result is what 
Grigg calls a ‘logical division’.668    
 
Relying on non-human characteristics to divide the world into regions carries with it 
the ever-present risk of falling back into monocausal environmental determinism.  
Were I to adopt the homeostatic vision of Ecology present in most attempts to integrate 
the subject into IR, this charge would probably stick.  However, informed by the 
dynamism of New Ecology, Coevolution maintains that the biogeographical structure 
of the Earth is itself the product, at least in part, of human influence.  Thus, the use of 
biogeographical features to describe groups of human actors should not fall victim to 
this particular bugbear so long as the region’s accessory characteristics are social and 
are observed to correspond to the ecological divisions adopted by the analyst. 
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Ecology provides a number of interesting perspectives on the construction and 
identification of regional subsystems.  One of the fundamental conclusions of this 
project has been that where IR happens affects how it happens.  That is to say, actors’ 
ecological contexts affect the ways in which they organize themselves and their 
interactions.  There is a clear link here to the process of regionalization, which 
necessarily includes an element of geographical continuity.  As Buzan argues, 
‘Regions are not just any subsystem of states in an international system, but a specific 
type of subsystem defined by geographical clustering.’669 The importance given to 
clustering is mirrored in ecological population dynamics, where both individuals and 
populations will adopt ‘clumped’ distributions at medium to large spatial scales, 
attracted either by other actors or by a common resource. In coevolutionary terms, this 
means that units embedded in similar ecological contexts will converge around a 
shared set of behaviours and/or mutually attractive environmental factors.  To 
ecologists, this clumping is driven mainly by behaviour, in which individuals and 
populations attract, repel, or ignore one another.  The more attraction exists, the tighter 
the resultant clumping.  Behaviours are reinforced or dampened by environmental 
factors, such as the presence or shortage of a locally available resource.670  Translated 
back into the language of IR, regions (understood as clustered collective actors) can be 
formed through different forms of social interaction, with Alexander Wendt’s troika of 
enemies, rivals and friends being a particularly promising typology.671  This leaves us 
with a picture of regional social systems ranging from power political to cooperative to 
convergence, each corresponding to one of Wendt’s broad categories of interaction.672   
In each case, endogenous social factors can be amplified or dampened by the 
ecological contexts in which they take place.  For example, mutually hostile human 
populations sharing a resource-poor site are likely to clash over access to the resources 
in question, while friendly populations may cooperate in order to make more efficient 
use of shortfalls or trade local ecological surpluses to subsidize each other’s energy 
shortfalls in less productive ecosystems. These interactions – based as they are on a 
combination of social and ecological factors – combine over time to produce 
increasingly distinct international regions.   
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Given this project’s discussion of the convergent evolution of Arctic units, processes, 
and systems, the use of ecosystems and biomes as a differentiating characteristic on 
which to base a logical division of regional international systems appears promising.  
Contrary to the tenets of anthropocentrism, humanity and ecology do not exist in 
isolation from one another.    Rather, they covary over time and space thanks to the 
influence (i) of ecological context on the principles by which international systems are 
organised, and (ii) of human technology on the ecosystems in which we are embedded. 
The Arctic provides just one examples of how socio-ecological covariance leads to the 
identification of contiguous biomes and sites as discrete regional systems.  Its 
ecological composition has generated successive waves of pre-international, early-
modern, and modern international units and systems that are remarkably similar in 
terms of the principles of membership and behaviour by which they organise 
themselves and their interactions.  In each era, the distribution of Ecological Capacity 
among units and systems has produced clumped spatial organizations typical of 
biological populations at large spatial scales.673  Given the relationship between 
population dynamics and ecological context discussed earlier in this Chapter, this 
socio-ecological covariance should not be surprising.  Indeed, from an ecological 
perspective, it would be surprising only if it were absent. 
 
Does this mean that Ecology provides a metastructure capable of explaining regional 
processes around the world?  Yes and no.  It isn’t ecology itself, but rather the ways in 
which humanity interacts with ecology that describes discrete international regions.  
Though a pedantic distinction, it is an important one.  Claiming that ecology alone can 
determine human population dynamics – of which our international relations are one 
variety – would be to ignore the fundamental importance of endogenous (social) 
factors in determining human behaviour.  Claiming the existence of socially 
constructed regions without paying attention to the ecological similarities that bind 
their human populations together falls into a similarly deterministic trap by ignoring 
the importance of exogenous (ecological) factors in constraining and encouraging 
human behaviour.  Ecology is most useful when it is harnessed to the power of social 
analysis, and vice versa.  Though ecosystems and biomes can provide an interesting 
starting point from which to investigate social covariance, they should never be 
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assumed to be constitutive of international regions in their own right.  For this reason, 
it may be that Socio-Ecological Coevolution – by combining influences from our 
social and ecological contexts – is better able to describe the various, overlapping 
subsystems of the global ‘set of sets’  than most of the monocausal differentiating 
characteristics currently in use. 
Saharan Africa: a comparative case for IR & 
GEC 
 
Coevolution helps to explain the persistence of many of the asymmetric relationships 
that continue to describe interactions within and between the units and regions of the 
global international system.  The Saharan-Sahelian belt of Africa provides a 
compelling case in point that is both fundamentally different and broadly comparable 
to that of the circumpolar Arctic.  If we identify the Saharan-Sahelian belt as a distinct 
region, we must do so on the basis of its social and ecological contexts.  As in the 
Arctic, these contexts covary in such a way as to produce principles of membership 
and behaviour that differ from those of the global system of which the Saharan-
Sahelian region is a part.   The short discussion that follows is not enough to determine 
whether any global principles are entirely present or absent in this geographically 
contiguous and socio-ecologically bounded subsystem.  However, it is possible to 
observe how some of the central organizing principles of the global system are 
expressed differently at this particular regional level. 
 
As illustrated in figure 7.3, the domination of less productive biomes by their more 
productive neighbours is a common feature across much of the Saharan belt that 
stretches from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea.  As in the Arctic, the states of the 
region are not exclusively Saharan in their biogeographical constitution.  In each, 
desert hinterlands are ruled from the relatively productive Sahel, forest, and 
Mediterranean biomes that border them.  Though the axes of ecological productivity 
that describe the region’s biogeographical structure will necessarily differ from those 
of the Arctic Basin, the relationship between centralized state power and systems of 
indirect rule in relatively marginal ecosystems remains constant.  Much of this has to 
do with the region’s international history, which constructed its states in the image of 
the imperial systems that first demarcated their territorial frontiers on world maps 
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following the Berlin Conference of 1884/5.674  Across the heart of the continent, state 
power is concentrated along the relatively productive shoreline – as in Mauritania and 
in the states of North Africa – or in sub-Saharan states’ more ecologically productive 
southern biomes – as in Mali, Niger, and Chad.  Khartoum’s location at the confluence 
of the White and Blue Nile may also be indicative of Coevolution’s ability to explain 
international units and systems in terms of the biogeographical structures they reflect – 
mirroring the third axes of Arctic NPP in that locates the most productive ecological 
sites at riverine and coastal locations.  
 
 
Figure 7.3 – Major biomes and political boundaries in North Africa675 
 
As in the Arctic, the principles by which Saharan Africa’s international units and 
structures are organised are not determined by the ecological systems in which they are 
embedded.  Rather, their development has been affected by their conjoined social and 
ecological contexts, each contributing to the evolution of the region’s international 
units and systems.  For example, it would be foolishly simplistic to assert that the 
separation of South Sudan from the remainder of the Sudanese Republic was caused 
by the areas’ different ecological structures.  Influences from ethnicity to religion to oil 
revenues have each played their part, amplified and dampened by the bifurcated 
ecologies in which different actors are embedded.676  However, when one extends the 
                                                
674 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of 
Colonialism’, Comparative Studies in Society and History (43) 2001, pp. 654-655; Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power 
in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 71-76.  See 
also Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
675 ‘North African Vegetation Region Map’, IUCN/SSG Cat Specialist Group – Cheetah Conservation 
Compendium, Maps: North African Region [online]. Accessed October 15 2011 <http://www.catsg.org/cheetah/07_ 
map-centre/7_4_North-African-region/basic-maps/north_african_region_vegetation.jpg>. 
676 See Alex Cobham, ‘Causes of conflict in Sudan: Testing the Black Book’, The European Journal of 
Development Research 17(3) 2005, pp. 462-480.  For a cautionary article about the dangers of neo-Malthusian 
environmental determinism in locating the causes of the Sudanese civil war, see Harry Verhoeven, ‘Climate 
Change, Conflict and Development in Sudan: global neo-Malthusian narratives and local power struggles’, 
Development & Change 42(3) 2011, pp. 679-707. 
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depth of their historical analysis to account for the ethnic and religious divisions of the 
region, ecology’s role becomes less deterministic and much more compelling.  As in 
the Arctic, the evolution of pre-international and international units and systems has 
been influenced by the distribution of EC amongst its actors and the biogeographical 
structures that constrain their actions.  It is a coevolutionary rather than a deterministic 
relationship: one in which units, processes, and systems interact with and within their 
ecological contexts, with effects on both sides of the socio-ecological equation 
radiating down the levels of analysis from individuals to the wider systems constituted 
by their interactions.  It is also a relationship increasingly mediated by the modern 
social and physical technologies that African state, sub-state, and non-state actors have 
at their disposal.   
 
Unlike the Arctic Basin, whose ecological productivity is constrained by its low 
temperatures and low levels of Photosynthetically Active Radiation, the Sahara has a 
surplus of both.  Its NPP is mainly limited by aridity.677  This ecological characteristic 
means that the impact of climate change on the region’s units and systems will be very 
different from those in the circumpolar North.  Increasing precipitation gradients will 
likely see more rainfall in the wet tropics and less in the dry subtropics – home to the 
majority of the planet’s major deserts and semi-desert grasslands.678  Even where 
climate models predict increasing precipitation, simultaneous increases in temperature 
are likely boost evapotranspiration rates, leading to drier soil horizons. Combined with 
trends in human land use that lead to soil degradation, GEC is therefore likely to 
contribute to desertification along the northern and southern margins of the Sahara, 
driving Sahelian and forest biomes before it.679  Instead of expanding the biomes in 
which neo-European units and systems are based, as it may do by warming and 
wetting large regions of the circumpolar world, GEC in Africa is likely contract the 
ecological range in which units and processes associated with the global (née 
European) international system can be sustainably maintained.  This will put pressure 
on the financial and human capital available to Saharan states as they attempt to 
maintain their population sizes, hierarchies, and divisions of labour, endangering the 
sustainability of complex units and systems in the region.  GEC may thus encourage 
                                                
677 Molles (1999): 26-29; Dickinson & Murphy (1998): 125-126. 
678 Christensen et al. in Solomon et al. (2007): 868. 
679 Robert Balling, ‘Interactions of desertification and climate in Africa’, in Pak Low, Climate Change and Africa  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 46-47. 
  P a g e  | 250 
 
states to reintroduce forms of imperial or indirect rule, whose the lower energy 
requirements have shown themselves to be well-suited to the constrained NPP of other 
extreme environmental systems around the world. 
 
Socio-Ecological Coevolution, as currently constructed, is an approach that relies on 
the presence of significant ecological gradients whose presence will be mirrored in the 
units, processes and structures that constitute an international system.  While this 
description leaves many regions of the world in play – including Amazonia, Arabia, 
the Tibetan Plateau and Taklimakan Desert, Southwestern Africa, and large swathes of 
Central and South Asia – it also excludes some of the core regions of the current 
international system.  This exclusion, however, may be instructive in and of itself. 
Looking back one last time at figure 7.2, it is telling that many of the dominant units 
and regions in the global international system are embedded in the planet’s most 
productive ecological contexts.  Where GEC serves to extend the range of these 
productive ecosystems, as it may in the circumpolar North, embedded units and 
systems may find themselves better positioned within the international social systems 
of which they are a part.  Such will certainly not be the case for those units and 
regional systems whose ecological contexts are degraded by GEC, resulting in much 
higher costs to maintain the population densities and levels of technological 
sophistication to which they have become accustomed.  
Conclusion 
 
The global climate is not a static backdrop against which human dramas play out.  It is 
dynamic context influencing – and influenced by – the human populations that inhabit 
it.  Understanding this coevolutionary relationship, integrating it into IR analyses of 
regional international systems, and using the resulting toolkit to develop socio-
ecological baselines for future research into the impact of GEC on the circumpolar 
world have been the main goals of this project.  Each step has required that we 
question the anthropocentric assumptions that unite IR’s otherwise disparate schools of 
thought.  The approach advocated in the preceding chapters is not intended to replace 
anthropocentrism with some other form of monocausal determinism.  It has cleaved to 
a middle path described by Socio-Ecological Coevolution – the mutually constitutive 
process that describes the interaction of international and ecological units and systems 
over time.   Informed by developments in IR, Ecology and History, Coevolution 
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asserts that humans have always affected, and been affected by the biological, 
chemical, and physical systems in which we are embedded.  Though the influence of 
our ecological context can be mitigated by social and physical technologies, the 
complexity of the planetary ecosphere and of our relationship to it has ensured that we 
cannot completely escape its grasp. 
 
The preceding chapters have generated several compelling conclusions with 
potentially important implications for our discipline.  First, there appears to be a direct 
correlation between the complexity of international units and systems – a term that 
describes their population size and level of hierarchical and functional differentiation – 
and their Ecological Capacity of a given ecological context.  This has effectively 
stalled the development of highly differentiated state units in the circumpolar North, 
whose imperial international systems were constrained by extremely low EC until the 
mid-twentieth century.  The arrival of modern communications and transport 
technology following the Second World War set off a period of punctuated evolution, 
in which technological changes led to a flurry of new institutional forms.680  In Russia, 
the United States, Canada, and Denmark alike, technological advancement has led to 
the creation of units and systems that combine low-energy imperial hierarchies with 
relatively high-energy state characteristics.  The presence of these two forms of 
international unit and system marks the Arctic off as a secondary states-system in the 
Wightian sense, or a ‘set of sets’ to use Braudel’s and Chaudhuri’s description.681  This 
hierarchic-anarchic hybrid has evolved out of the region’s specific ecological and 
social history, and cannot be ascribed to either anthropogenic or environmental 
causation.  It is the product of the system’s coevolutionary history. 
 
Second, Coevolution implies a link between the biogeographical structure of the planet 
and the distribution of dominant and subordinate actors in its embedded international 
systems.  This has interesting implications for IR.  It helps to explain why so many 
states around the world fail to conform to the principles of membership and behaviour 
– including centralised sovereign control and hard territoriality – that dominate the 
global system’s European and neo-European core.  States that straddle two or more 
major biomes may not be able to sustain the social technologies needed to establish 
                                                
680 Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 25. 
681 Wight (1977): 24; Braudel (1981): 459; Chaudhuri (1990): 431. 
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Westphalian characteristics across their territories, relying instead on sovereignty 
bargains with sub-state, non-state, or foreign state actors to buttress their claims on the 
international stage.682  The Arctic, with its distinctive banded set of transnational 
maritime, tundra, and taiga biomes, has seen its dominant states adopt a variety of 
institutional forms to deal with this socio-ecological reality, from the highly uneven 
resource-driven expansion of state influence in parts of Siberian Russia to the Native 
Corporations and village administrations of Alaska, to the partially devolved territorial 
governments of Canada, to the economically dependent but increasingly autonomous 
Home Rule Government of Kalaallit-Nunaat.  Though these institutional forms vary, 
the hybrid imperial states involved are linked by several transnational social and 
ecological factors.  These include their need to maintain international claims to 
effective sovereignty over their Arctic territories, their imperial relationships to the 
indigenous peoples who effectively occupy the majority of the arctic and subarctic 
territory in question, and the bifurcated ecological structures of the circumpolar basin.  
Given the ecological changes predicted in recent scientific reports from the IPCC and 
the Arctic Council, it is likely that some of these imperial projects will prove more 
successful than others, setting off the second phase of punctuated evolution: a period in 
which these imperial states are likely to undergo a period of selection in which they 
compete with their synchronic counterparts.683  The most successful forms are then 
likely to become socialized around the region, returning the polar basin to the 
relatively homogenous institutional condition in which it existed before innovations of 
the modern era set off a period of institutional variation. 
 
Finally, it is possible that regional studies of Arctic international systems may have 
wider applicability in similarly structured socio-ecological contexts.  The Saharan-
Sahelian example discussed earlier in this Chapter is a promising first step in this 
direction, though substantial research across the social and natural sciences is needed 
to flesh out its rather tentative hypotheses.  For now, the most compelling arguments 
have to do with the likely impact of GEC on regional international systems.  Where 
climate change shifts ecological systems into more productive gears, it is likely that 
both units and systems will converge increasingly with the global norms of hard 
territoriality and sovereign control – leading to a period of potential instability in 
                                                
682 Litfin (1998): 10-11; Krasner (1999):12-13, 20. 
683 Spruyt (1994): 25. 
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regions like the Arctic where borders have historically been loosely defined and 
enforced.  Regions in which GEC lowers ecological productivity will likely diverge 
from these same principles of membership and behaviour, adapting them to better 
address their immediate socio-ecological environments.  This may mean a return to 
indirect rule and informal, imperial systems throughout much of the post-colonial 
world – often masked under the label of asymmetric federalism and typified by 
increasingly porous borders and decentralized sovereign control over both territory and 
people. 
 
Understanding the planet’s ecological systems is certainly not the job of International 
Relations.  However, understanding how these systems relate to international units, 
processes, and structures should be.  For inspiration, our discipline need look no 
farther than Ecology and Environmental History, which have already done much of the 
groundwork needed to support a new analytical framework.  With its increasingly 
nuanced and pluralist approach to the study of human phenomena at the international 
scale, our discipline is uniquely well-placed to address the impacts of climate change 
on international systems.  As suggested by the theoretical toolkit developed for this 
project, ecological analyses of international systems will be best served by cleaving as 
closely as possible to the strengths of existing approaches.  That developed by Buzan 
and Little to study the social constitution of international systems in world history is a 
promising starting point for future endeavours, particularly for students and 
practitioners who tend towards qualitative analysis.  Other IR theories may generate 
alternative starting points from which our understanding of Ecology as a factor in the 
evolution of international systems can develop.  What is important is not that we 
choose one framework of analysis or another, but that we as a discipline recognize the 
need and value of integrating our growing understanding of the ecological and 
international systems in which we are embedded.  
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